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PREFACE 
 
The impulse to this work came in spring 2010 from a respected Swedish col-
league and teacher at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the 
Finnish National Defence University. The radical Swedish defence reorganiza-
tion and the unilateral declarations of solidarity made by Sweden created a 
rather opaque situation. The implications and consequences of the adopted 
policy were difficult to assess. 
 
The views and assessments of Finnish military and security experts are appre-
ciated in Sweden. We accepted the invitation to write this report, which is part 
of a long-time international cooperation. The authors alone carry the respon-
sibility of the final product. 
 
The authors are greatly indebted to Professor Richard Impola for his volun-
tary and thorough translation. 
 
 
 
Helsinki, March 2013 
 
Stefan Forss 
Docent, Finnish National Defence University 
Member of the Royal Swedish War Academy of Sciences 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The powerful revival of geopolitics in world politics is an established fact. Its 
effects also extend to areas close to Finland. The Soviet Union’s withdrawal 
from its positions in the Warsaw Pact and Baltic countries at the end of the 
Cold War was the first phase of the change, which simultaneously had a part 
in shaping Europe’s new, so-called cooperative security regime within the 
framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), later known as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). 
 
The second phase, Russia’s regaining a position of influence among former 
Soviet republics, gained impetus halfway through the last decade and reached 
its peak with the war in Georgia, the collapse of the so-called “Orange revo-
lution” in the Ukraine, and further integration of Belarus into the Russian 
system. “Russia is seeking to restore its great-power status and considers it 
very important to alter the decisions of the 1990s, which it deems as unfa-
vourable to Russia”.1 
 
A somewhat adversarial stance has thus re-emerged into the picture, and 
faith in the Euro-Atlantic security regime has weakened, although the west-
ern countries are reluctant to admit that. One indication of that is Russia’s 
attempt to overthrow the most important accomplishments of the OSCE, 
such as the basic security obligations stated in the Charter of European Security, 
adopted in Istanbul in 1999. In its military doctrine, Russia considers NATO 
a danger, and NATO in turn considers Russia a partner. 
 
In the 1990’s, however, Western Europe began to consider the threat of war 
such an outmoded idea that it made possible an exceptionally large reduction 
in the armed forces of NATO and other Western countries, and a change of 
missions from territorial defence to crisis management. At the same time, the 
military readiness of countries was substantially reduced. 
 
The internal problems of NATO increased in a situation where the interests 
of its most important member state, the United States, were more and more 
strongly focused on Asia and the Pacific. The U.S. economic resources are 
diminishing, and its fulfilment of various commitments to allies and friends is 
becoming more uncertain. The actions and attitudes of traditional U.S. allies 
in Europe are also influencing the matter. The role of the NATO member 
state Germany is crucial. Germany’s Russia policy in particular, but also the 
policy of France, have raised questions. 
                                                           
1 Prime Minister’s Office, 2009, p. 40. The next Finnish government White paper, released 
on 21 December 2012, says that Russia strives for a multipolar world and wants recogni-
tion as one of the major actors in world politics. Prime Minister’s Office, 2012, p. 30. 
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Underlying Russia’s reform of its armed forces, one can plainly see an effort 
to respond to different kinds of challenges appearing in different parts of its 
huge country. Organizational changes required by the times have been made. 
Heavy and cumbersome divisions have given way to more manageable bri-
gades in the Western fashion. Old military districts (MD’s) have been aban-
doned, and have given way to four operational-strategic combined com-
mands, still called military districts in peacetime. The Western MD was cre-
ated by combining the Leningrad and Moscow MD’s. Its HQ is located in St. 
Petersburg, which is also a sign of the fact that the center of gravity in the 
western direction has been displaced from Central Europe toward the 
northwest. 
 
Steps are being taken to modernize Russia’s dilapidated weaponry in com-
prehensive ways via large and increasingly large appropriations, and in part 
with the direct support of Germany and France. The armaments program in 
effect until 2020 has received an equipment appropriation totalling about 20 
trillion roubles or approximately 500 billion euro. Extensive start-up of serial 
production of Russian military equipment is commencing for the first time 
since the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
 
General conscription will not be abandoned for at least the next ten to fif-
teen years, which guarantees the country a trained military reserve of several 
million men, 700,000 of which can be mobilised rapidly. Even if Russia de-
velops her armed forces primarily with local warfare capability in mind and 
for control of her neighbourhood, she as a last resort, prepares also for a fu-
ture large-scale war. A large reserve is needed particularly in the eastern direc-
tion. It is technically possible to use it as an occupying force. 
 
It is apparent that in the west, Russia needs small, mobile, highly trained and 
effective strike forces in high readiness, which are able to achieve operational 
results directly from their peacetime deployments. This vision is the result of 
new Russian military scientific thinking, which emphasizes the decisive im-
portance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first strategic 
strike, including pre-emptive actions.  
 
The forces can be reinforced quickly if necessary. The abandonment of terri-
torial defence in most NATO countries and the increase in preparedness of 
Russian forces created confusion and uncertainty in countries near Finland 
and in the eastern parts of Central Europe. 
 
The number of Russian troop units and troop strength in the former Lenin-
grad MD has changed markedly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The large decrease that took place in the late 1990s and at the start of this 
century has changed to an increased capability again.  
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The current ground forces east and southeast of Finland seem to be under 
the command of the Russian 6th Army Headquarters. In 2010 a motorized 
infantry brigade was reported to have been established south of 
St. Petersburg. It probably is part of the planned high readiness units. At 
Kamenka on the Karelian Isthmus there is in readiness a motorized infantry 
brigade which ranks among the elite army units. At Sertolovo, north of 
St. Petersburg, a brigade is likely to be formed at the supply depot there. A 
helicopter unit supporting the brigades is also located on the Karelian Isth-
mus. Among the abundant artillery groups supporting the troops let us men-
tion the heavy rocket launcher brigade, the range of whose weapons is over 
eighty kilometres. 
 
An especially significant increase in military capability is the stationing of the 
Iskander-M ballistic missiles, with a range of 450 to 700 kilometres, with the 
artillery-missile brigade at Luga, south of St. Petersburg. These missiles rep-
resent the kind of high precision weapons mentioned in military doctrine, 
and its range covers, in addition to the Baltic countries, most of Finland. The 
Iskander-M can be equipped with either a variety of conventional warheads 
or a nuclear warhead.2 
 
In Russian defence planning, the Iskander missile system is given important 
roles in various parts of the country as both a nuclear deterrent weapon and 
an effective offensive conventional weapon. Tactical ballistic missiles and 
cruise missiles are assuming an increasing operational-tactical role and aug-
ment aviation strike forces well. The country’s military authorities have great 
expectations with regard to the Iskander missile system. 
 
In carrying out strategic strikes, the Luga Iskander missile brigade is of fun-
damental importance. Along with air power, its accurate strikes could be 
used to suppress any organized defence by opponents, taking advantage of 
their lack of readiness. 
 
In the Pskov area, an airborne assault division is deployed, along with a Spe-
cial Forces (Spetsnaz) brigade. In Pechenga there is a motorized infantry bri-
gade and a naval infantry brigade. The stated ambition is that these units be 
ready for action in only a few hours. An Arctic Brigade, recruited from Spets-
naz special forces accustomed to Arctic conditions, was also to be established 
in Pechenga, according to an announcement by the commander of Russia’s 
ground forces in March 2011. Plans have since been postponed to 2015. It is 
too early to tell if the brigade will be an entirely new unit.  
 
                                                           
2 For a thorough military-political and technical analysis of this missile system see Forss, 
2012. 
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The Alakurtti Air Base east of Salla is being repaired and a renovated heli-
copter regiment is likely to be stationed there. Its equipment includes attack 
helicopters and armed transport helicopters. From equipment stored in the 
area a new motorized infantry brigade can be established which the helicop-
ter regiment may support. At least one more brigade may be established with 
the equipment stored in Petrozavodsk, the capability of which was demon-
strated in a mobilisation and combat exercise in September 2012. 
 
At Lekhtusi, to the north of St. Petersburg, an effective radar base has been 
completed in order to provide early warning of a possible strategic missile 
attack. In addition, a new air-surveillance radar base at Hogland (Suursaari) 
has been built. In addition to the Gulf of Finland, it covers the air space of 
Estonia and all of southern Finland. 
 
In the 1st Air Force and Air Defence Command (1 Командование ВВС и 
ПВО) the air forces of the Baltic and Northern Fleets have a strength of 
more than two hundred combat aircraft of different types, plus more than a 
hundred combat helicopters, and an equal number of armed transport heli-
copters, plus many other specialized and transport planes. Certain other air 
force units also use this as a forward deployment area. 
 
Russia’s air forces everywhere can be quickly mobilized; its units are con-
stantly in a state of readiness and at full wartime strength. They can be 
moved quickly to even distant locations. 
 
New heavy S-400 air defence missiles, which earlier were operational only for 
the defence of Moscow, have been deployed in Kaliningrad. This, along with 
the Iskander missiles, is a powerful political signal. In a crisis situation, the S-
400 would complicate aerial operations in the Baltic Sea airspace significantly, 
and perhaps even prevent such operations entirely. 
 
A significant conclusion of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences’ A 
National Strategy for Neighbouring Areas research project is that NATO appar-
ently would not be able to react quickly enough in case of a possible military 
conflict in the Baltic countries, but would be faced with a fait accompli. 
 
The primary duty of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) is the defence of the 
homeland. The chosen Finnish defence concept of general conscription and 
regional defence implies that the peacetime readiness of the Finnish army is 
at a low level. This should be a reassuring element in the area, but it places 
great demands on any effort to increase the readiness. 
 
The peacetime strength of the Finnish Defence Forces is among Europe’s 
smallest, some 30,000 men and women. Especially in peacetime, the ground 
forces are in effect a training organization. Combat forces will be formed 
only from reserves. 
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Comparisons in which Finland’s mobilized strength of 230,000 is matched 
against the professional peacetime armies of those countries with population 
figures many times higher, and a much smaller geographical area, and a to-
tally different geopolitical stance are misleading, deficient, and slanted. 
 
Finland’s territory is large, and reserves are needed to protect a high number 
of vital industrial and societal infrastructure objects in all of Finland, and to 
replace gaps among those mobilized and battle losses suffered in the first 
combat operations. Annual training of age groups is necessary if the plan is 
to get a sufficient number of units. A large reserve is an indication of the will 
to defend the country, even after enemy invasion. Its preventive value is 
great. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
he division of Europe into two blocs actually began during the Second 
World War with the Allied race for Berlin, when a significant part of 
“liberated” Europe was left in the Soviet sphere of influence behind 
the Iron Curtain.3 In this huge political upheaval, the United States and the 
Soviet Union rose to be the undisputed leaders of the two political blocs, the 
East and the West. In the West, Soviet efforts to expand were dealt with using 
the so-called “Containment Policy”4 devised by President Truman5 and by 
founding the defensive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. 
Gradually the Soviet Union realized that it was surrounded. The same attitude 
is still very much alive in Russia. 
 
The next massive geopolitical change, the surprising break-up of the Soviet 
Union, came more than forty years later. According to Russia’s President 
Putin, this was one of the great geopolitical catastrophes of the last century.6 
Having recovered from the humiliating position experienced during Yeltsin’s 
presidency, Russia is seeking to restore its great power status and considers it 
very important to alter the decisions of the 1990s, which it deems unfavour-
able to Russia.7 It is impossible to predict how well Russia will finally succeed, 
but it is certain that the effects of her aspirations, be they positive or negative, 
will extend to Finland and her neighbourhood.  
 
During the decades of the Cold War, the military alliances in Europe were 
armed for a large-scale war with one another. Finland was especially affected 
by the powerful Soviet military power beyond her border, a significant part of 
which was always at a high state of readiness.8 
                                                           
3 Churchill, 1946. The key passage of Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech reads as follows: 
”From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. 
Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, 
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations 
around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to 
Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.” 
4 X (a.k.a. Kennan, George F.), 1947.  
5 Truman, 1947. 
6 President of Russia, 2005. 
7 Juntunen, 2013. Professor Alpo Juntunen paints a thorough picture of Russian political 
culture and mode of thought, which is based upon geopolitics and historical tradition. 
8 Gustafsson, 2007. Former Supreme Commander of Sweden’s defence forces, General 
Bengt Gustafsson, has written extensively about the Soviet Union’s operational plans 
aimed at Sweden (and Finland). 
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A departure from earlier times was the arrival of new weapons with hitherto 
unheard-of destructive power, including nuclear weapons. They totally upset 
the conception of a large-scale war, and they were perhaps the single most 
important factor in restraining the great powers from taking too great risks. In 
spite of several serious crises, peace was preserved between the great powers 
and their allies.9  
 
The build-up of nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, reached exceptional proportions. The striving for nu-
clear parity and the eventual goal to surpass the United States, with complete 
disregard both for efforts and costs, undoubtedly weighed more in Soviet de-
cision-making than other factors.  
 
However, the country’s political and military leaders had already concluded 
during the 1970s that there would be no victor in a nuclear war.10 This matter 
was finally confirmed by both President Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985. “A 
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”  In addition, according 
to the Soviet leadership, a nuclear war must be avoided at all cost.11 
 
It is difficult to interpret correctly the military-operational plans discovered in 
the archives of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany or 
GDR) in which the abundant use of tactical nuclear weapons would have had 
an obvious and decisive role. As early as the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 
October of 1962, the Soviet military leadership issued a stern order that is was 
categorically forbidden to use the short- and medium-range nuclear weapons 
stationed in Cuba to repel a possible landing by the United States.12 
                                                           
9 No country with nuclear weapons has waged all-out war against another country 
equipped with nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have fought over the possession of  the 
Kashmir area, but only with conventional means. See also Shultz, Perry, Kissinger & Nunn, 
2011.  
10 Hines, 1995.  
11 Ibid. See the interviews with the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergey F. 
Akhromeev and Colonel General (ret.) Andrian A. Danilevich. This was not well under-
stood in the West until the early 1990s, when key Soviet figures told about it openly. The 
Soviet top military leadership also assured that the Soviet Union never had the intention to 
use nuclear weapons first. See [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb285/ 
vol%20II%20Akhromeev.pdf] and  
[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb2 85/vol%20iI%20Danilevich.pdf].  
12 Fursenko & Naftali, 1997, pp. 242–243. In order to manage the risks, Soviet Defence 
Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky gave the order, after long deliberations, that a possi-
ble U.S. landing was to be repelled entirely with conventional means. The ballistic missiles 
of  General Statsenko, Commander of  the missile division, and the ”cargo” [i.e. nuclear 
warheads] of  Colonel Beloborodov were thoroughly ruled out from the allowed military 
means. In addition, tactical nuclear weapons such as Luna (Frog 7) rockets or FKR-cruise 
missiles were ruled out [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621022%20 
Malinovsky's%20Order%20to%20Pliyev.pdf]. See also McNamara, 2002.  
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In the West, the Soviet Union’s aggressive offensive posture has perhaps been 
overemphasized while at the same time its fear of a Western surprise attack 
has been underestimated.13 For his part, General Matvei Burlakov, the last 
commander of the Soviet Western Army Group, spoke in March 2005, of the 
exceptionally high level of readiness of his troops in the former East Ger-
many. His troops numbered over half a million men, and there were abundant 
nuclear weapons at their disposal, which could have been used in a first strike 
if necessary.14 
 
Nuclear deterrence did not, however, prevent the Soviet Union from interfer-
ing in the people’s uprisings among its Eastern European allies in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but it had a major significance in the preservation of peace in 
Europe. Finland was in a difficult position, but also benefited from that. 
                                                           
13 Burr & Savranskaya, 2009.  
14 Kalashnikova, 2005. The interview given by General Burlakov reveals that nuclear first 
use was indeed planned, regardless of what the political leadership officially stat-
ed.”[Foreign Minister Gromyko] said one thing and the military thought another. We are 
the ones who are responsible for [fighting] wars.” 
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GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES IN EUROPE AFTER THE 
END OF THE COLD WAR 
 
 
he Cold War is generally considered to have ended with the collapse of 
the Berlin wall, or at the latest with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 
December of 1991.15 Geopolitical changes in the CSCE Member States 
were noteworthy. Germany was reunited, and the Soviet republics became 
independent. In the case of the Baltic States it was indeed a return to inde-
pendence. The Government of Finland unilaterally declared in September of 
1990 that the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 limiting Finland’s 
sovereignty had lost their meaning. At the same time President Koivisto rein-
terpreted the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance 
[FCMA], which finally disappeared into history on the fall of the Soviet Union 
in December the following year.16 Finland joined the European Union in 
1995, and her security political position became perhaps more favourable than 
ever before after 1917, when independence was declared. 
 
The President of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel chaired the Warsaw Pact 
summit meeting on 1 July 1991, when that military alliance was formally ter-
minated.17 NATO, however, prevailed, and was assigned new tasks.  
 
                                                           
15 Lavrov, 2011. The exact timing of  the end of  the Cold War is diffuse. It is rather a proc-
ess that is still affected by the relations between the leading powers, because these have 
returned to it repeatedly. Speaking at the 47th Munich Security Conference on 5 February 
2011, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov referred to President Dmitry Medvedev's 
initiative to conclude the Euro-Atlantic Security Treaty (EST) as follows: ”[…] Essentially we 
are talking here about permanent elimination of  the Cold War legacy”. The United States and Russia 
made a joint statement at the 2010 NPT Review Conference which said that signing of  the New START 
Treaty “in effect, marks the final end of  the “Cold War” period”. See also United Nations, 2010. 
Colonel Sergey Tretyakov, a former officer in charge of  Russia’s foreign security service 
SVR operations in the United States in 1995–2000, strongly denied that the Cold War was 
over as late as in June 2009. See also Fox News, 2009, “KGB Defector Weighs in on 
US/Russian Relations”, 7 June 2009 [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zh7VG3jCHQA] 
and Earley, 2007, pp. 330–331. 
16 Nyberg, 2007, pp. 285–299. 
17 Havel, 2008, p. 294. President Havel was of the opinion that the termination of the War-
saw Pact was the single most significant event during his term as President. Because of his 
personal experiences he found the official termination ceremony to be both strange and 
absurd. Completing the Soviet withdrawal was a very complicated process and the last So-
viet troops left the country only two years later.  
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The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later 
known as the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
was instrumental in shaping Europe’s new, so-called cooperative security re-
gime (The Charter of Paris for a New Europe) in 1990.18  A crucially impor-
tant update (The Istanbul Document 1999) was agreed upon in Istanbul, and 
it is still in force.19  
 
2.1 Western Threat Views and the Development of Western Forces 
 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Soviet forces withdrew some 1 000 
kilometres to the east from Central Europe. The Soviet threat was gone and 
various “new threats” were added to the western threat scenarios with ever-
increasing weight. The 9/11 terrorist strike in New York in 2001 became a 
certain turning point. 
 
 
Figure 1. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, Soviet 
troops withdrew some 1 000 kilometres to the east. 
                                                           
18 CSCE, 1990.  
19 OSCE, 1999. 
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Western armed forces have been reduced radically and most countries have 
abandoned compulsory conscription.20 For that reason, significant reserves are 
not being built up. Military activities are concentrated on crisis management 
(CM) and repelling threats far away. In Western Europe, countries have al-
most entirely lost their capability of territorial defence. A respected Russian 
observer estimated in January of 2011: “In reality, Europe is becoming a de-
fenceless continent. […] Without America the Europeans will be left naked 
and defenceless, because except for Britain, they have no armed forces to 
speak of.”21 Increasingly expensive modern weapons put a strain on arms ex-
penditures of Western countries, and therefore the purchases have been mod-
est even at the expense of capability.  
 
The fairly modest operation in Libya in the spring and summer of 2011 clearly 
revealed the military shortcomings of the European members of NATO.22 
The out-going U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates said at the NATO 
Headquarters on June 10, 2011 that 
 
The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. 
Congress … to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are ap-
parently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes in 
order to be serious and capable partners in their own defence.23  
 
At the same time Mr. Gates also acknowledged the contributions of Norway 
and Denmark, whose performance in Libya was exceptionally good in relation 
to their resources. 
 
NATO’s total peacetime strength, the United States included, exceeded 5.3 
million men in 1989. The corresponding figure of the Soviet Union was over 
4.2 million and the strength of other Warsaw Pact forces was more than 1.1 
million. Both military alliances were approximately equal in manpower.24 Rus-
sia’s recent peacetime strength is about one million. Here the manpower of 
the other Russian “power” ministries, about 500 000, has been omitted. 
NATO’s corresponding strength is still surprisingly high, over 3.9 million 
men, of which the share of the USA and Turkey is more than a half.25 There 
were grounds for such comparisons during the Cold War. Today they are no 
longer relevant. NATO no longer has any unified territorial defence and nei-
                                                           
20 The latest examples of countries that have abandoned general conscription are 
Sweden, who left it resting in peacetime, and Germany whose last contingent entered ser-
vice in early 2011.  
21 Karaganov & Shestakov, 2011. 
22 Gates, 2011; Shankar, 2011; DeYoung & Jaffe, 2011. 
23 Ibid. 
24 IISS, 1989. 
25 IISS, 2011. 
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ther the troops trained for this task. Four distinguished researchers at RAND 
Corporation gave the following assessment of NATO’s capabilities: 
 
Power projection and the maintenance of significant forces outside of Europe’s imme-
diate neighbourhood will be particularly difficult due to reduced force size; limited lift 
and logistics capability; and a lack of certain key enablers (such as missile defence 
and unmanned aerial vehicles). Additionally, several key NATO European na-
tions are either eliminating or significantly reducing key capabilities such as littoral 
maritime forces and the related intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plat-
forms. 
[…] 
Put simply, the unit of account for European ground forces is set to become battalion 
battlegroups and brigade combat teams rather than full-strength divisions and corps. 
The navies of the major European naval powers will see radical reductions as well. 
For example, if Brazil’s naval expansion plans are executed by the mid-2020s, the 
Brazilian navy will have carrier, destroyer and amphibious fleets comparable to the 
British and French navies combined.26 
 
The manpower of new NATO member states is modest. The rebuilding of 
the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact countries is still in process. Their 
armed forces were to be used operationally only in specific auxiliary tasks or-
dered by the Soviet Union. 
 
2.2 The Change of Attitudes in Russian Foreign Policy 
 
The warm relations between Russia and the western countries at the start of 
the period following the Cold War unfortunately did not last long. Russia’s 
liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who was well disposed 
toward the West, surprised his audience at the CSCE foreign ministers’ meet-
ing in Stockholm on December 14, 1992. He noted that: 
 
The space of the former Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a zone of full applica-
tion of CSCE norms. In essence, this is a post-imperial space, in which Russia has 
to defend its interests using all available means, including military and economic 
ones. We shall strongly insist that the former USSR Republics join the new Federa-
tion or Confederation without delay, and there will be tough talks on this matter.27  
 
Kozyrev admitted later that the speech was intended to be a joke. Its objective 
had been to serve as an alarm clock. Twenty years later Russia is in the proc-
ess of consolidating her grip over major portions of the post-Soviet space in 
the name of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and hard-
line circles in Moscow are optimistic as, in their opinion, “The White House 
                                                           
26 Gordon, Johnson, Larrabee & Wilson, 2012, p. 140. 
27 Rotfeld, 2009, p. 30; Whitney, 1992. 
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has sent a clear signal to Moscow [at the beginning of the second term of the 
Obama Administration] that the post-Soviet space is not included in the main 
priorities of U.S. foreign policy”. 28 This would give Russia freedom of action. 
The intergovernmental military alliance CSTO was agreed upon on 15 May 
1992 and the Charter of CSTO entered into force on 18 September 2003.29  
 
At the CSCE summit meeting held in Budapest in December 1994, a clear 
change in direction could be noted. “Europe may be forced into a Cold 
Peace”, President Boris Yeltsin, warned.30 After this, Russia’s liberal political 
leadership was gradually forced to step aside. In January of 1996, Yevgeni 
Primakov, a high-ranking officer in the former KGB and the head of the for-
eign intelligence service SVR, replaced Mr. Kozyrev. Political power in Russia 
and the responsibility for threat assessments and situational awareness shifted 
increasingly into the hands of conservatives who were close to the country’s 
security agencies and military authorities.  
 
The development sketched out in Andrei Kozyrev’s “joking speech” of 1992 
was conclusively realized after the war in Georgia, when President Medvedev 
                                                           
28 Руська Правда, 19 January 2013, США и Россия разграничат «сферы влияния»  
(Александров, Михаил (Aleksandrov, Mikhail)) [http://ruska-pravda.org/monitoring-
smi/38-st-monitoring-smi/19724--l-r.html]. Dr. Mikhail Alexandrov, Department head at 
the CIS Baltic Institute, writes in Ruska Pravda: “Washington actually offers Moscow exchange: to 
agree to the consolidation of the post-Soviet Russia's sphere of influence in return for non-interference in 
other regions of the world, which are vitally important to U.S. interests.” See also RIA Novosti, 30 
January 2013, “Russia, Kazakhstan Sign Air Defence Agreement” 
[http://en.rian.ru/world/20130130/179120146/Russia-Kazakhstan-Sign-Air-Defen-se-
Agreement.html]; RIA Novosti, 31.01.2013, “Russia, Armenia Agree to Set up Joint Defence 
Enterprises” [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130131/17913 8896/Russia-Armenia-
Agree-to-Set-up-Joint-Defense-Enterprises.html]. In late January 2013 Russia and Kazakh-
stan signed an agreement to create a joint regional air defence system and Russia and Ar-
menia agreed on defence co-operation, including building joint defence enterprises and 
maintenance centres for military equipment. 
29 Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности (OДКБ) − Collective Secu-
rity Treaty Organization (CSTO), Basic facts [http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_ 
aengl.htm, accessed 29 January 2013]. The Secretary-General of CSTO, Col.Gen. Nikolay 
Bordyuzha was appointed in 2003. His background includes service in the Strategic Rocket 
Forces, the KGB, the Federal Border Service, and the Presidential Administration. See 
more VIPERSON.RU, 2013, “Бордюжа, Николай Николаевич”  
[http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=1487, accessed 29 January 2013]. 
30 The disappointing Budapest CSCE summit was a disaster, according to Newsweek Maga-
zine. Russia opposed NATO enlargement and especially the proposals for statements con-
cerning Serbia and the war in Bosnia. Newsweek: “a red-faced Yeltsin admonishing a 
stunned Bill Clinton that ‘the destinies . . . of the world community [cannot] be managed 
from a single capital [i.e., Washington].’ ” See Newsweek, 19 December 1994, “Plunging into 
a Cold Peace” [http://www.newsweek.com/1994/12/18/plunging-into-a-cold-
peace.html]. After this “Cold Peace” as a concept has remained doggedly in the vocabulary 
of international politics. See Beste, Klussmann & Steingart, 2008. 
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presented the main principles of Russian foreign and defence policy in August 
of 2008. Special attention was given to the following passage:  
 
Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unques-
tionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this 
need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should 
be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.31  
 
These principles were finally written into law at the end of 2009, giving Rus-
sia’s armed forces the right to operate abroad.32 
 
With regard to Russia’s relations to foreign countries, Medvedev affirmed that 
“there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are 
situated in countries with which we share special historical relations and are 
bound together as friends and good neighbors.”33 In September of 2008, 
Medvedev told political analysts from the Western countries that: “Our 
neighbors are close to us in many respects, and are a traditional area of inter-
est for the Russian nation. We are so close to each other, it would be impossi-
ble to tear us apart, to say that Russia has to embark on one path and our 
neighbors on another.”34  
 
Thus Russia also strives to strengthen the loyalty of Russians living outside 
her borders to their Motherland, and may also use harsh methods to achieve 
her goals. In this sense, problems have come up, especially in certain Baltic 
States in that preserving Russian citizenship is more important to a large 
number of Baltic Russians than the citizenship to their actual homeland. One 
may consider secondary citizenship to also include certain obligations to the 
country one is a citizen of. Problems of conflicting loyalties may arise from 
this in times of crisis and not only in the Baltic States. 
 
Finland is also a target of Russia’s persistent efforts to increase her influence 
using “soft power”. Under the pretext of protecting the rights of Russians 
living in Finland, Russian authorities have meddled in the affairs of private 
citizens and tried to elevate these issues to a national level. In a particular case 
concerning child-care, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov went as far as to con-
demn Finland of “uncivilized” treatment of a Russian national.35
                                                           
31 President of Russia, 2008.  
32 Matthews & Nemtsova, 2009; People’s Daily Online, 9 November 2009, “Medvedev  
Signs Use of Russian Army Abroad into Law”  
[http://english.people.com.cn/90001/ 90777/90851/6808120.html]. 
33 President of Russia, 2008. 
34 Debski, 2008.  
35 Voice of Russia, 8 October 2012, “Russian Foreign Chief Slams Finland for Separating 
Mother and New-Born Baby” [http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_08/Russian-foreign-chief-
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2.3 The Return of Russia’s Geopolitical Way of Thinking  
 
In the confusing times following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there arose 
in anti-Western circles an immediate desire to find a new direction and a new 
basis for values. From a group of conservative Russian geopolitical thinkers, 
there soon emerged a forward-looking young philosopher named Alexander 
Dugin (b. 1962), who’s influence on ruling circles has been noteworthy. Ac-
cording to Dugin, who grew up in a military family, true patriotism is to be 
found only in the army and in the security services.36 
 
In 1992 Dugin had already been appointed teacher in the General Staff Acad-
emy of the Russian armed forces. There, under Lieutenant General Nikolai 
Klokotov, the director of the Academy’s Strategic Institute, and with the sup-
port of the Principal of the Academy and future Minister of Defence Army 
General Igor Rodionov, he started to work on an important book about the 
foundations of geopolitics and Russia’s geopolitical future. 
 
In 2003, Dr. Alpo Juntunen, former Professor of Russia’s security policy at 
the Finnish National Defence University, encapsulated Dugin’s ideas as fol-
lows:  
 
[Dugin examines] everything as a battle between land and sea, in which the sides 
are the maritime powers led by the U.S.A., and Eurasia, led by Russia. The forces 
led by the United States are the enemy, which strives for a liberal-commercial, cul-
tureless, and secularized world mastery. This grouping is now overwhelming, but in 
order to save the world, the Eurasian continent will have to counterattack under the 
leadership of Russia. A new great power alliance must be shaped, to be led by the 
Moscow-Berlin axis.”37 
[…]  
Military co-operation with Germany must be made closer. The worst military prob-
lems facing the future superpower are the border areas, the rimland, which the At-
lantic powers are striving to get under their control in order to weaken the Moscow-
led mainland. Moscow has to take a firmer grip of the rimland area. […] Russia’s 
only proper form of government is imperial.38 
                                                                                                                                                                          
slams-Finland-for-separating-mother-and-new-born-baby/]. A prominent role on the Rus-
sian side is played by Dr. Pavel A. Astakhov, Children’s Rights Commissar for the Presi-
dent of the Russian Federation. He graduated from the Faculty of Law, Dzerzhinski KGB 
Higher School in 1991 [http://english.rfdeti.ru/content.php?id=12].  
36 Laruelle, 2006. See also Dugin, 2010. 
37 Other important axes to thwart the power of the United States and China are according 
to Dugin the Moscow-Tokyo and Moscow-Tehran axes. See Dunlop, 2004. 
38 Juntunen, 2003, pp. 39–40. 
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Giving up the process of empire-building is, in Dugin’s world of values, the 
same as “national suicide.” Without an empire, Russia “will disappear as a na-
tion”.39  
 
Indications of the impact of Dugin’s thinking came as early as October 1995 
when INOBIS (Институт оборонных исследований, ИНОБИС), a semi-
official defence research institute close to Russia’s power ministries, published 
an outspoken report which outlined the external threats to Russia’s national 
security and possible countermeasures.40 
 
“The chief aim of the US and Western policy toward Russia is not to allow 
her to become an economically, politically, and militarily influential force and 
to turn the post-Soviet space into an economic and political appendage to the 
West, as well as its mineral-rich colony. That is why the United States and its 
allies are the sources of the major external threats to this country’s national 
security and should be regarded as the main potential adversaries of the Rus-
sian Federation, political, and military affairs,” states the INOBIS report dated 
October 26, 1995.  
 
In Dugin’s vision, Germany and Russia would again divide Europe into 
spheres of influence. Germany would get Europe’s Protestant and Catholic 
areas, but not Finland. Nevertheless, Europe’s division into spheres of influ-
ence with Germany would not be Russia’s final goal, but rather the “finlandi-
sation of all of Europe”. According to Dugin, Finland belongs to the  
 
Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, which is culturally and in part economically uni-
fied, but forms a strategic support for a Eurasian center [i.e. Moscow] […] As a 
state, Finland is very unstable, since it belongs naturally and historically to Russia’s 
geopolitical sphere.41  
 
Russia’s Minister of  Culture, Vladimir Medinsky echoed these same senti-
ments at the 6th Finno-Ugric Peoples World Congress in Siófok, Hungary on 5 
September 2012.42  
                                                           
39 Dugin, 1997, p. 197 and 251. See also Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 
2011. The well-known U.S. Russia expert, Professor Stephen J. Blank expressed essentially 
the same interpretation as Dugin in Helsinki in November 2011: “The logic of European 
integration represents in itself a threat to Russia’s empire mindset. Also the values the EU 
represents are seen as threatening in Russia.” 
40 The Institute of Defence Studies (INOBIS), 1995. The supporters of the INOBIS insti-
tute included among others the General Staff, military industrial enterprises and the Minis-
try of Atomic Energy. See also Staar, 1996. Colonel (ret.), Dr. Richard Staar was the Head 
of the U.S. Delegation to the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 
(MBFR) in Vienna 1981–1983.  
41 Dugin, 1997, p. 316. See also Koivisto, 2001, p. 292. 
42 Mallinen, 2012. In the presence of Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Estonian Presi-
dent Tomas Hendrik Ilves, Russia’s Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky said that the 
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Dugin’s suggested means for achieving Russia’s sovereignty over Eurasia were 
not primarily military, but he favoured a more subtle program which also in-
cluded subversive activities in the target countries and undermining their sta-
bility through the use of disinformation. In addition, Russia’s gas, oil, and 
other natural products were to be used as a harsh means of pressuring and 
bending other countries to the will of Russia. The same was already proposed 
in the INOBIS report. According to Dugin, one should not even fear resort-
ing to war, but it would be better if one could achieve the goals without the 
use of force: 
 
It is vitally important for Russia to prevent Western oil companies from illegally de-
veloping resources off the Caspian Sea shelf…Russia must...take practical steps and 
even use force if necessary to prevent any activity related to oil production by foreign 
companies in the former Soviet space. 43  
 
Later developments, such as the war in Georgia and the continued pressure 
on that country,44 clearly show that Dugin’s basic ideas are significant and en-
joy far-reaching support.45  
 
Russia has also succeeded in keeping central Asian states which are rich in hy-
drocarbons quite well in her grasp and has gained agreements advantageous to 
her from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.46 Prime Minister Putin’s 
initiative in October 2011 to establish a Eurasian Union fits Dugin’s vision 
well.47 Russia’s preferred solution to the European missile defence problem – 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Finno-Ugric world is an inseparable part of the Russian world and that Russia will not re-
peat the multicultural mistakes that have been done in Europe. He went on to remind the 
Finns that Finland as a nation had survived only as a result of Russia’s goodwill, and ended 
his speech by quoting Czar Alexander I, who speaking to a French visitor referred to a 
motley group of Finns, Tatars and Georgians as “all being my Russians”. After this event 
Minister Medinsky went to Pskov to participate in the founding of the Izborsky Club for 
conservative patriots. See e.g. Samarina, 2012; Newsru.com, 8 September 2012, “Мединский 
все-таки приехал в "Изборский клуб" патриотов и выступил с заявлением” 
[http://www. newsru.com/arch/russia/08sep2012/medinsky.html].  
43 Dunlop, 2004; Международное Евразийское Движение (Mezhdunarodnoe Evraziiskoe 
dvizhenie), 5 February 2009, “Dugin: Russia should consider war to head off the Nabucco 
project, ‘Today’s Zaman’” 
[http://evrazia.info/modules.php?name=News& file=article&sid=4190]. 
44 Antidze, 2011. The following source is a good example of how Dugin’s teachings are put 
to practice: Umland, 2008. 
45 Dugin became a mystic later. See Laruelle, 2006. 
46 See Juntunen, 2013, p. 81. Professor Alpo Juntunen points out that the main problem of 
the Central Asian states is their dependence on Russia’s energy industry and the transport 
routes that it controls. See also Juntunen, 2003.  
47 Izvestia, 4 October 2011, “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Mak-
ing (Putin, Vladimir) [http://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/246]. According to Prime Minister 
Putin: “A crucial integration project, the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
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dividing the area to be defended and responsibility for defence into separate 
sectors – reflects Dugin’s geopolitical thinking. 
 
 
Figure 2. Russia’s geopolitical ambitions are revealed in this slide describing Russia’s ‘Sectoral Ap-
proach’ to NATO-Russian Joint System of Missile Defence Combat Control in Europe. Deployment 
of NATO BMD assets in the shaded area covering Finland and parts of Sweden and Norway would 
according to this view challenge the capabilities of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces. Chief of General 
Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov presented this picture in a speech in Helsinki on 5 June 
2012.  
 
The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea partially 
serves the same goal. Poland and the Baltic States have strongly opposed the 
construction of the pipe for reasons of economics and political security.48 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(CES), will kick off on January 1, 2012. This project is, without exaggeration, a historic milestone for all 
three countries and for the broader post-Soviet space.” See also Marin, 2011 and FIIA, 2011. 
Stephen J Blank’s summary in Helsinki, 8 November 2011: “The Eurasian Union is a reflection 
of Russia’s empire mindset and there is nothing dramatically new in it. It is an integration project based on 
the primacy of Russia and Russia’s interests at the expense of the sovereignty of the smaller post-Soviet 
states in the region.” See also STRATFOR, 2011, “Russia, Belarus: Setting the Stage for the 
Eurasian Union”, 25 November 2011. According to STRATFOR: “Russia used Belarus’ finan-
cial hardship as an opportunity to assert itself, raising export duties on key goods in order to pressure 
Minsk at a time of weakness. Belarus eventually sold many of its strategic assets to Russia in order to get 
what Minsk wanted the whole time — economic and financial concessions, primarily in the form of lower 
natural gas prices. […] Lukashenko has voiced his support for Putin’s Eurasian Union, calling for the 
union’s formation to be moved up to 2013 (though Russia has preferred to stick to the original 2015 target 
date).” 
48 Peltomäki, 2011. “The Poles believed that the purpose of Nord Stream is to make it easier for Russia 
to use the threat of a cut-off of natural energy supplies as leverage against Poland and other East European 
countries. In principle, Nord Stream makes it possible for Russia to cut off supplies to East Europe, as it 
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One can also view the warm period of relationship between Russia and Ger-
many during the last decade in the light of history. U.S. history professor 
emeritus and former diplomat Albert Weeks emphasizes: “In the present 
post-communist era in Russia, Moscow’s ties with Germany can be described 
as stronger than those with any other state.”49 The co-operation between these 
countries is extending strongly also into the military sphere,50 which has 
caused uneasiness especially among the new NATO member states. Germany 
is known to have opposed NATO contingency planning for the defence of 
the Baltic States.51 Germany’s strivings for great power status, however, does 
not find popular political support and Germany is not ready to assume secu-
rity political leadership in Europe.52 That German position suits Russia per-
fectly. 
 
For a long time, the NATO enlargement has been a sore spot for Russia. The 
writers of the INOBIS report already considered the enlargement of NATO 
and especially the possibility of Baltic NATO membership so dangerous that 
Russia should have prepared to occupy those countries. Russia did not, how-
ever, resort to such extreme measures, but the so-called Bronze warrior dis-
pute and especially the war in Georgia in August of 2008 demonstrated that 
Russia was prepared to take stern measures when necessary. “If we had wa-
vered in 2008, the geopolitical layout would have been different; a range of 
countries which the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization] tries to artificially 
‘protect’ would have been within it”, President Medvedev said in November 
2011.53 
                                                                                                                                                                          
did during the “gas war” of 2009 with Ukraine. The undersea pipeline makes this possible without inter-
rupting sales to the lucrative West European market.” 
49 Weeks, 2011, p. 50. See also Lukyanov, 2012. Only in late 2012 there were signs of   
cooling relations between Germany and Russia. 
50 The military co-operation is versatile, ranging from bilateral military exercises to military 
high-tech. One of the latest examples is the agreement with Rheinmetall to build a military 
combat training simulator for the Russian ground forces. Tactical situations up to brigade 
level can be handled. Rheinmetall Defence, 2011, “Rheinmetall Wins Major Order in Russia”, 
24 November 2011; STRATFOR, 2011a, Russia: German Company To Build Military Training 
Center, 21 June 2011; Pyadushkin, 2011.  
51 European voice, 21 January 2010, “Thanks to Poland, NATO Will Defend the Baltic 
States”; See also Daalder, 2011. 
52 Baer, 2011. Germany’s pronounced passiveness regarding the U.N. operation in Libya in 
March 2011 is a good example. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said that the 
world has changed and that Germany may form new partnerships. U.S. President Barack 
Obama no longer listed Germany an ally. Germany’s former Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer regarded Germany’s foreign policy a farce. Germany has, however, assumed a lead-
ing role in Europe in the efforts to curb the prolonged and difficult financial debt crisis. It 
will be interesting to see what results Germany’s strong leadership ambition will produce in 
this respect. 
53 RIA Novosti, 21 November 2011, “Russia’s 2008 War Prevented NATO Growth – Med-
vedev” [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111121/168901195.html].  
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The Baltic States could be occupied without any risk, and “Russia has all legal 
and moral rights to invade the Baltics. …Analysis shows that no one in the 
West is going to fight with Russia over [these countries]”, the INOBIS ana-
lysts concluded. This assessment is probably still relevant, and it raises the 
question of the difficult problems of defending the Baltic countries.54 
 
The enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance since the early 1990s has been pri-
marily a political process. Its military dimension has been secondary. In the 
background of Russia’s stiff opposition is the knowledge that countries which 
have joined NATO may have slipped permanently from Russia’s grip. For 
these reasons alone, “NATO expansion should be kept at bay with an iron 
fist.”55 
 
Russia’s former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in the Newsweek 
magazine (February 10, 1997) that “the Russian people must be told the truth, 
and the truth is, NATO is not our enemy.”56 The contrast between the views 
of Kozyrev and those of the current Russian leadership is great.57 According 
to a Wikileaks report published in the Norwegian daily Aftenposten on Decem-
ber 17, 2009, Vladimir Putin allegedly told NATO Secretary-General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen that NATO no longer has a purpose and it was in Russia’s 
                                                           
54 Dr. Henry Kissinger gave a lecture at the German Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in 
Hamburg in the autumn of 1997. A Finnish naval officer, Commander Jyrki Berner asked 
Dr. Kissinger: “What would NATO and/or the west do if Russia using political, economi-
cal or military threats or force will retake the Baltic States?” Kissinger answered literally as 
follows: “The Commander comes from Finland and surely knows history. In 1956 world 
peace and the fate of ten million Hungarians hung in the scales. The Commander knows 
the answer. Next question!” Commander (ret.) Jyrki Berner, personal communication, 14 
March 2011.  
55 Karaganov, 2011; RIA Novosti, 26 February 2012, “Russia Should Pursue ‘Iron Fist in a 
Kid Glove’ Foreign Policy – Rogozin” [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120226/17153926 
2.html].  
56 Kozyrev, 1997; Ilves, 1997. See also Forss, 1997. 
57 President of  Russia, 2010. President Medvedev: “It is not about our military doctrine, but about 
the never-ending enlargement of  NATO through absorbing the countries that used to be part of  the Soviet 
Union or happen to be our closest neighbours, such as Romania and Bulgaria. This is the threat. NATO 
is a military alliance which has expanded itself  right to our borders. Our Armed Forces should therefore be 
ready to accomplish their missions in light of  the changes we have seen.” See also RIA Novosti, 31 May 
2008, “Russia Opposes NATO Expansion in Principle – PM Putin” [http://en.rian.ru/ 
Russia/20080531/ 1089652 13.html]; Felgenhauer, 2010. The Secretary of Russia’s Na-
tional Security Council and former Head of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev said that the “con-
sensus opinion of all who worked on the military doctrine [was] that NATO threatens us 
and seriously.” The former Russian officer in the SVR, Colonel Sergei Tretyakov, stated 
that Russia’s security threats since Soviet times have been the United States, NATO and 
China, in this order. See more Fox News, 7 June 2009, “KGB Defector Weighs in on 
US/Russian Relations” [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zh7VG3jCH QA]; See also 
Earley, 2007, pp. 330-331. 
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interest that NATO no longer exists.58 The director of the Carnegie Moscow 
Institute, Dr. Dmitri Trenin, wrote in late November 2011 that “The Russians 
… persist in seeing the United States through the old Soviet prism of a super-
power confrontation.”59 President Putin returned to this topic on 5 October 
2012, when visiting the Russian 201st Military Base in Tajikistan: 
 
I believe that NATO, which was formed during the Cold War, has long ago lost its 
primary function and it is unclear why it exists today. There is no more confronta-
tion between two political systems since there are no two systems any longer and no 
Warsaw Pact, which one way or another was NATO’s rival. So it is unclear why 
NATO exists to this day. I think it is largely a throwback to the Cold War. But 
the existence of this military bloc is a geopolitical reality which we must take into ac-
count.60  
 
At the Istanbul summit in 1999, the OSCE member states, including Russia, 
approved the Charter for European Security (in The Istanbul Document).61 The 
following quote is worth mentioning:  
 
We affirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose 
or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance as they evolve. […] 
Within the OSCE no State, group of States, or organization can have pre-eminent 
responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area, or can consider 
any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence. 62  
 
This principle was already written in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed 
in Paris on May 27, 1997.63 Russia compared this document to the Helsinki 
Final Act of 1975 and emphasized its binding nature.64 In the Founding Act, 
NATO and Russia  
 
[…] shared the commitment to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial 
integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own 
security, the inviolability of borders, and the people’s right of self-determination as 
enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and in other OSCE documents.65 
 
Since then Russia’s spheres of influence thinking has only become stronger. 
She has taken the initiative to replace the Paris Charter and the Istanbul 
                                                           
58 Aftenposten, 11 February 2011, “Wikileaks Dokument, 6 January 2010, Additional Details 
on Syg’s Moscow Trip Allege Putin Sparred on Missile Defence” 
[http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/Wikileaksdokumenter/article4025434.ece].  
59 Trenin, 2011.  
60 President of Russia, 2012.  
61 CSCE, 1990. See also OSCE, 1999, p. 3.  
62 Ibid.   
63 NATO, 1997. 
64 Puheloinen, 1999, p. 90. 
65 NATO, 1997. 
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Document with a new “Helsinki Plus” agreement, which would better serve 
her geopolitical aspirations.66 In March 2011, the prestigious Russian Valdai 
Club, led by Professor Sergey Karaganov, published a report about the devel-
opment of the relationship between Russia and the United States. The report 
proposes that, as a precondition for talks concerning non-strategic (tactical) 
nuclear weapons, the demands of the Istanbul Document and the so called 
flank rules of the CFE Treaty should be lifted.67 
 
The summary of Europe’s geopolitical development in the last few decades 
presented above demonstrates that the situation with regard to international 
security may not have changed as fundamentally as is generally believed. It 
also serves as a foundation for a more thorough assessment of Russia’s mili-
tary-political development. 
 
                                                           
66 President of Russia, 2009. See also Forss, 2010, p. 59.  
67 Karaganov, 2011a, pp. 29–30. 
 3 
 
 
 
AN ESTIMATE OF RUSSIA’S MILITARY-POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
NOBIS published a report on Russia’s military reform and security in 
1996.68 The “strategy of neutralizing external threats and assuring the na-
tional survival of the Russian Federation” recommended by the writers of 
the INOBIS report contained forceful stands and concrete measures. 
 
According to the report, the role of the armed forces is so central to Russia 
that she should not participate in one-sided arms reductions. This is especially 
relevant to nuclear weapons. “Russia’s nuclear potential is one of the few ar-
guments that can [still] convince the West.” It is necessary to develop the stra-
tegic nuclear forces (SNF) with determination. Tactical nuclear weapons 
should become the backbone of Russia’s defence capability in all three Euro-
pean theatres, i.e. in the Polish, Baltic Sea, and northern directions, and the 
southern Black Sea direction (Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia, and Armenia). This 
would be even more important after Poland, Hungary, and the former 
Czechoslovakia became NATO members.69 The deployment of tactical nu-
clear weapons in Kaliningrad and on some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet was 
considered crucial.70 
 
Dr. Alexander Pikayev, a well-known expert on nuclear weapons, wrote in the 
Moscow Carnegie Institute report as follows: 
 
The issue of  TNWs in Europe became more acute after the Baltic States joined 
NATO. The buffer dividing Russia from NATO vanished, the Kaliningrad Oblast 
was surrounded by NATO member states’ territory, and the Baltic States are only a 
short distance from Moscow, and even closer to St Petersburg. The small depth of  de-
fence, very short flight time for missiles and attack aviation if  deployed in Latvia and 
Estonia, and the sizable overall imbalance in NATO’s favour in conventional weap-
ons and armed forces have inevitably increased Russian interest in NSNW’s [non-
                                                           
68 Dementyev & Surikov, 1996.  
69 Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia became NATO member states on March 12, 1999, 
i.e. more than three years after the publication of the INOBIS article. 
70 The recommendation of the INOBIS report was adopted in practice. There have been 
tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad at least from the beginning of the 21st century. 
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt pointed out in August 2008: “There are nuclear weapons in 
Kaliningrad, which are integrated into Russia’s Baltic Fleet. That has been the case for a period now, and 
we have also noticed that they perform exercises which include nuclear weapons” (Bildt, 2008). See also 
Forss, 2001; Forss, 2001a and Burt, 2012.   
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strategic nuclear weapons] as a means of  neutralizing the West’s numerical, geo-
strategic and operational superiority.  
[...] 
So far, NATO’s eastward expansion has not been accompanied by the deployment of  
nuclear weapons and the most destabilizing nuclear weapons delivery systems on the 
soil of  the new member states. Brussels has observed the provisions of  the 1997 
NATO-Russia Founding Act, which clearly states that NATO does not plan to de-
ploy nuclear weapons on the territory of  new member states. This document is not le-
gally binding, but it continues to have important political significance as a factor con-
tributing to security.71 
 
Strategic parity in nuclear weapons with the United States still remains the 
cornerstone of Russian military doctrine. In tactical nuclear weapons, Russia 
has overwhelming superiority, even though their deployed numbers may be 
lower than earlier anticipated.72 The notion of nuclear first-use seems to have 
remained part of the doctrine, although it is not stated publicly.73 Large exer-
cises like West-1999 and West-2009 [Zapad-1999 and 2009] in the Baltic Sea 
area and Vostok-2010 [East-2010] in the Far East have ended with the simu-
lated use of tactical nuclear weapons in situations where conventional forces 
alone were deemed insufficient.74 
 
In Russia, both her position and her military capability are assessed primarily 
in relation to the United States, NATO and China.75 The USA, which has for 
long enjoyed military-technological superiority, is in a period of deep eco-
nomic and fiscal problems. Expenditures, including those for defence, have to 
                                                           
71 Pikayev, 2009,  p. 123. 
72 Sutyagin, 2012; NTI Global Security Newswire, 2 December.2010, “Leaked Cables Confirm 
NATO Tactical Nuke Locations” [http://gsn.nti.org/siteservices/print_friendly. 
php?ID=nw_20101202_2226] and Lewis, 2010. 
73 Westerlund, 2010, pp. 18–23. See also Podvig, 2010. According to Dr. Podvig, the mili-
tary doctrine annex dealing with nuclear weapons, “Basic Principles of State’s Policy in the 
Area of Nuclear Deterrence through 2020”, was declared secret. SIPRI researcher Ian An-
thony presented a similar view at NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence and Defence: A Nordic 
Perspective Seminar organized by the Finnish Peace Union in Helsinki on 28 April 2011. 
Daivis Petraitis, Bureau Chief at the Lithuanian Department of Defence strongly endorsed 
this view. See also Zagorski, 2011, pp. 22–27. 
74 Lindvall, Rydqvist, Westerlund & Winnerstig, 2011, pp. 21–28. 
75 The School of Russian and Asian Studies, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 
Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010  
[http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010]. See also Earley, 2007, 
p. 331. Former SVR Colonel Tretyakov pointed out especially that the threats to Russia – 
The United States, NATO and China – had remained unchanged. Tretyakov died suddenly 
in June 2010. A large Russian spy ring in the United States was uncovered at the end of  
June 2010. 
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be reduced markedly.76 She strives increasingly to stay out of those conflicts 
which do not directly affect her most important national interests. The Libyan 
conflict in the spring of 2011 is a good example of this.  
 
For its part, the Chinese economy has continued its strong growth, and the 
country is developing its military capability with clear objectives and increasing 
budgetary support.77 
 
After the Cold War, the focus of attention of the United States has gradually 
shifted almost entirely from Europe to Asia and the Middle East. This opens 
new possibilities for Russia in Europe.78 Russia strives to deal with the Euro-
pean states and also to pursue projects on a bilateral basis, which undermines 
the cohesion of both NATO and the European Union.79 After making certain 
concessions regarding Afghanistan, Russia may strive to get assurances from 
NATO to show restraint, for example in its Baltic policy.80 This kind of de-
velopment would be worrisome at least to those small countries which have 
sought security from NATO and the U.S. against possible pressure from Rus-
sia. The so-called Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia have in this respect arrived at their own conclusion. On May12, 
2011, they decided to establish a combat unit (brigade) with Poland as the lead 
country.81 This measure may be viewed as these countries’ distrust in the abil-
ity and willingness of NATO and the US to provide sufficient security. 
 
3.1 Military Threats and Military Doctrine82  
 
In a report published by Russia’s Academy of Military Sciences, its president, 
Army General Makhmut A. Gareev, writes that Russia in the coming years 
will have to prepare itself for powerful geopolitical challenges and even threats 
rising from two directions, especially from the U.S. but also from China.83 
                                                           
76 Substantial defence expenditure savings will materialize when the US withdrawal from 
Iraq and Afghanistan are concluded, but traditional Pentagon activities, such as procure-
ment programs will be subject to major cuts. See IISS The Military Balance 2012. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Clinton, 2011. See also Fluornoy, 2011. 
79 Daalder, 2011. 
80 Ibid. See also Felgenhauer, 2010a.   
81 STRATFOR, 12 May 2011, A Militarized Visegrad Group? and STRATFOR, 13 May 2011, 
A Tectonic Shift in Central Europe. 
82 Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, described current 
military matters and thinking before the Public Chamber in Moscow on 17 November 
2011. See Tikhonov et al. 2011.  
83 Bridge, 2011. Gareev compares a potentially threatening situation with the ”Troubled 
times” (B смутное время) of 1598–1613, when Russia had to face both famine and for-
eign invasion forces. See also Karaganov (ed.), 2011a, p. 31: “Last but not least, Russia needs 
tactical nuclear weapons to avert the rise of fears over the «Chinese threat» in the future.” 
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Russia may end up encircled in East-West pincers, and the task for planners is 
to find a solution for the problem in view.  
 
 
Figure 3. The traditional threat picture of the encircled Russia. 
 
Although NATO considers Russia a partner, Russia, according to her new 
military doctrine that came into force in February of 2010, still considers 
NATO one of the main dangers, if no longer officially a threat.84 The en-
largement of NATO and the possible arrival of U.S. troops in areas near Rus-
sia are also viewed as threats.85 Territorial claims to Russia, the use of military 
force in the vicinity of Russia, and international terrorism are presented as 
other threats. 
 
Russia is especially sensitive about the plans to deploy elements of the US 
missile defence system in areas of the former Warsaw Pact countries, in spite 
of US/NATO assurances that the missile defence is not aimed at Russia and 
assessments of leading Russian missile experts stating clearly that Russia’s nu-
                                                           
84 President of  Russia, 2010. President Medvedev: “It is not about our military doctrine, but about 
the never-ending enlargement of  NATO through absorbing the countries that used to be part of  the Soviet 
Union or happen to be our closest neighbours, such as Romania and Bulgaria. This is the threat. NATO 
is a military alliance which has expanded itself  right to our borders. Our Armed Forces should therefore be 
ready to accomplish their missions in light of  the changes we have seen.” See also Felgenhauer, 2010. 
Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the National Security Council and former Head of the FSB: 
“It is a consensus opinion of all who worked on the military doctrine that NATO threatens 
us and seriously.”  
85 Deryabin, 2009 and Russia Today, 5 February 2010, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine  
Approved” [http://rt.com/usa/news/ russia-military-doctrine-approved/]. 
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clear deterrent is not endangered.86 Russia’s primary response to U.S. initia-
tives regarding co-operation on missile defence has been a proposal to divide 
the areas to be defended into sectors, for the defence of which one of the 
partners would be responsible. NATO has opposed this idea steadfastly, as 
well as Russia’s demand for a single missile defence agency to be formed to-
gether.87  
 
Despite NATO’s official optimism, possibilities of the US and Russia coming 
to an understanding about the missile defence plan, does not look promising. 
The politically infected issue has wound up in a difficult political deadlock, 
with Russia threatening to resort to strong asymmetric countermeasures 
against bordering states in Europe.88  
 
Given the disparate level of missile defence technology and capabilities in the 
United States and Russia, and considering military operational factors, it 
would be most difficult to create an integrated and interoperable missile de-
fence system that would satisfy both parties.89 
 
In Russia’s military doctrine, precision weapons and space-based systems play 
an essential role. Their strategic significance is considered so important that 
they should be regarded as being strategic weapons. 
 
In doctrines, cyber warfare capability plays an increasingly important role in 
our present online interactive world. At the same time it has become a lasting 
                                                           
86 The famous Russian missile designer Yuri Solomonov, (Chief designer of Topol-M, RS-
24 Yars and Bulava) thinks that ”all that fuss” surrounding the U.S. missile shield in Europe “is 
totally senseless”. […] It is a political game and it is not very smart. […] The issue has nothing to do with 
real combat efficiency of the national strategic nuclear forces”; NTI Global Security Newswire, 18 March 
2011, “Russian Nukes Not Undercut by U.S. Missile Defence, State Expert Says” 
[http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110318_ 6126.php]. Former Chief of Staff of the Strategic 
Rocket Forces, General Viktor Esin, says that Russia’s strategic weapons are able to defeat 
any missile defence systems that may be around during the next 20-30 years. Rysslands röst 
(Voice of Russia), 24 November 2011, Utveckling av ryska ballistiska robotar “(Development 
of Russian ballistic missiles)” [http://swedish.ruvr.ru/_print/60959244.html]. 
87 RIA Novosti, 03 May 2011, “Moscow Pushes for Guarantee U.S. Missile Shield not  
Targeting Russia” [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110503/163840949.html]; RIA No-
vosti, 29 April 2011, “Russia Outlines Its Vision of European Missile Shield” 
[http://en.beta.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110429/163762332.html]. 
88 RIA Novosti, 23 November 2011, “Russia to Move Missiles to EU Borders if U.S. Shield 
Talks Fail – Medvedev” [http://en.rian.ru/world/20111123/168974746.html]; See also 
NTI Global Security Newswire, 30 November 2011, “Russia Could Cancel Summit With 
NATO Due to Antimissile Impasse” [http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20111130_8656. php]; 
See also Frolov, 2011 and Trenin, 2011. 
89 RIA Novosti, 12 May 2011, “Rasmussen Calls for NATO, Russia to ’Build Security  
Together’” [http://en.rian.ru/world/20110512/163985309.html]; Blank, 2010; NTI Global 
Security Newswire, 20 January 2011, “NATO Chief  Sees Two Separate Systems in European 
Missile Shield” [http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110120_9913.php]. 
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threat. Cyber operations are carried out daily all over the world. Paralyzing of 
societal infrastructure, electric power production, information, business, 
transportation and logistics networks, and, on the other hand, the repulsion of 
attacks on them are a part of modern warfare. Actual military strikes are to be 
carried out simultaneously with cyber-attacks or separately to ensure that the 
desired results in case the cyber-attacks and other paralyzing actions have 
failed. 
 
Before turning to Russian military organizational changes it may be prudent to 
remind of the four stages of armed conflict defined in Russia’s military doc-
trine adopted in 2010, i.e. armed conflict, local war, regional war and large-
scale war.90  
 
3.2 Shift of the Centre of Gravity in the Western Direction 
 
Russia’s new territorial defence structure, the so called Operational-Strategic 
Commands (Oбъединённое стратегическое командованиe) and their re-
spective command and control systems, came into force on December 1, 
2010. These four new commands replaced the former six military districts. All 
other forces belonging to the so called power ministries would be subordi-
nated to these commands, at least in times of crisis. The forces of the former 
Leningrad and Moscow military districts, the Northern and Baltic Fleets (with 
the exception of strategic missile-carrying submarines), and the 1st Air Force 
and Air Defence Command (1 Командование ВВС и ПВО) are subordi-
nated to the Joint Western Command (Western Military District). Its head-
quarters is located in St. Petersburg.91 
 
The new command structure was already tested in the large-scale military ex-
ercises in 2009. The different services are still in charge of developing training 
and improving war materiel. The Naval headquarters moved from Moscow to 
St. Petersburg in October 2012.92 
 
                                                           
90 The School of Russian and Asian Studies, SRAS, 20 February 2010, The Military Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February, 2010 
[http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010]. 
91 Pravo.ru, 21 September 2010, “В России останется только 4 военных округа - Указ 
Президента” [http://www.pravo.ru/news/view/38561]. Указ №1144 “О военно-
административном делении Российской Федерации” is found here; See also home-
page of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Министерстерство обороны 
Российской Федерации) [http://www.mil.ru/index.htm or http://eng.mil.ru/] and Giles, 
2012, p. 12. A brief summary of the thinking behind introduction of OSKs and how they 
are to be activated are given.  
92 ITAR-TASS News Agency, 31 October 2012, “Russian Naval Headquarters Moves to Pe-
tersburg” [http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/560174.html].  
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Figure 4. Russia’s military district organization until December 1, 2010. 
 
 
Figure 5. Russia’s military district organization after December 1, 2010. The number of MD’s decreased 
from six to four and at the same time they became strategic joint commands. 
 
Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov commented on the 
effects of the reorganization in a speech in Helsinki in June 2012. He pointed 
out that joint command of army, navy, air force and air defence units resulted 
in a qualitative improvement of combat capability in all military districts. Less 
reaction time is needed in crisis situations. At the same time the strike force of 
the military districts increased and ambiguities concerning command authority 
were removed.93 
 
                                                           
93 YLE News, 7 June 2012, ”Kenraali Makarovin puhe kokonaisuudessaan” (General 
Makarov’s Full Speech), [http://yle.fi/uutiset/kenraali_makarovin_puhe_kokonaisuudes-
saan/6169951]. The commander of the former Leningrad MD had only the military assets 
and forces of that military district at his disposal. Now the commander of the Western MD 
has at his disposal the combined assets and forces of the former Leningrad MD, the Mos-
cow MD, the Northern and Baltic Fleets and the 1st Air Force and Air Defence Command, 
and in times of crisis also the military units of the other power ministries. 
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The defence reorganization in Russia can be seen as a long-term security pol-
icy reaction to the major geopolitical changes that have already occurred, 
when NATO members are now her bordering neighbours. At the time of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland was perhaps regarded “neutral.”94 With 
Russia’s gradual recovery from 2000 on, Finland is probably now regarded as 
a virtual NATO member state. On a lower diplomatic level, Finland has been 
warned that NATO membership would trigger countermeasures.95 
 
At the same time, the economic significance of Russia’s north-western area is 
clearly rising. In northern waters there are large natural reserves. Along with 
climate warming, the northern sea routes seem to be taking on a larger role. It 
is quite probable that the competition for influence in the arctic areas will 
grow. Russia views the Arctic in very different terms from all other littoral and 
nearby states, and takes any "foreign" interest in the area as an indication of 
hostile intent which may require a securitized response.96 
 
In the Baltic Sea area, Russia has lost her former military superiority. At the 
same time the area is more important to her, because of the new Nord Stream 
gas pipeline and commercial traffic, especially oil transports. The significance 
of the St. Petersburg defensive zone and the entire north-western direction are 
emphasized in this new situation.97 
 
An indication of how Russia assesses the importance of the various regions of 
the country can be obtained by comparing the regional distribution of her 
armed forces units. There are about 100 brigades in permanent readiness, 36 
of which are deployed in Western MD, 26 in Eastern MD, 23 in Southern 
MD and 15 in Central MD. Airborne troops, naval infantry, coastal missile 
brigades and contingents abroad  are often omitted in western and some Rus-
sian assessments.98 
 
                                                           
94 The Soviet Union finally recognized Finnish neutrality during President Mikhail Gorba-
chev’s official state visit in Finland in 25–27 October, 1989.  
95 Kozin, 2007. According to several Finnish and other sources, Dr. Kozin acted on direct 
orders from Moscow, and expressed this view in no unclear terms, both in the seminar and 
later in interviews on the major Finnish TV Channels YLE and MTV3; 
МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ, 
ФИНЛЯНДСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fed-
eration), 7 November 2011. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
noted on its homepage in November 2011, that Finland is not excluding the possibility of 
joining NATO in the event of changes in the geopolitical situation and that the Defence 
Forces of Finland, as far as technical and organizational relationships are concerned, is fully 
compatible with NATO standards.  
96 Smith & Giles, 2007.  
97 Mukhin, 2009.  
98 See Annex 2. See also Barabanov (ed.), 2011 as well as Vendil Pallin, 2012a and War-
fare.be.  
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The regional distribution of armed forces units certified to employ non-
strategic nuclear weapons is another good indication. Half of the active depots 
are in the Western MD, supporting more than twenty dual-capable units.99 
Twelve of these are located in the Kola and in the neighbourhood of St. Pe-
tersburg and in Kaliningrad. 
 
 
Figure 6. The regional distribution of active non-strategic nuclear weapons depots. Six out of twelve 
depots are in the Western MD, supporting nuclear certified units (Adapted from Sutyagin, Atomic 
Accounting, RUSI, November 2012). 
 
The Central European direction is probably not as militarily significant to 
Russia as it was previously. Therefore the military centre of gravity in the new 
Western MD – not to be misinterpreted as the national military centre of 
gravity – seems to have been shifted to the northwest, perhaps as a preventive 
measure.100 An indication of this is the deployment of the first Iskander mis-
sile brigade in Luga. In the worst case scenario of the Cold War, the massive 
ballistic and cruise missile attack on Russia would have come from the north 
and northwest and some of the missile trajectories could have passed over 
Finnish territory. 
 
For NATO the Baltic Sea has become almost an inland sea. Only the Kalinin-
grad enclave has remained as an isle from which Russia can negate the other 
                                                           
99 Sutyagin, 2012. 
100 Professor Stephen J. Blank confirmed this assessment at the Q/A session after his pres-
entation at FIIA, Helsinki, 8 November 2011. He pointed out that there is a clear trend 
towards strengthening the defence at the country’s periphery. The same can also be seen in 
the east. See also STRATFOR, 7 December 2011, Estonia’s Defensive Options Against Russia 
[http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111206-estonias-defensive-options-against-russia]; 
See further Bidder, 2011 and Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 89. 
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countries’ almost total control of the sea. However, Russia can, if need be, 
prevent her opponents from using the Baltic Sea waters, with the exception of 
the Gulf of Bothnia, by the use of new air-launched and ground-launched 
missiles. 
 4 
 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA’S MILITARY POTENTIAL 
 
 
4.1 Potential, not Intentions, Determines the Development Needs 
 
t the Russia-NATO Council meeting in Bucharest in April 2008, 
President Vladimir Putin referred to Otto von Bismarck’s well-known 
view that capability, not intentions, matters most.101 This is the classi-
cal starting point of defence planning. Building defence capability is a long-
term process. Political intentions, however, may change overnight. Therefore 
it is prudent to analyze a country’s military potential rather than its current 
political situation. 
 
Prime Minister Putin laid out the future of the Armed Forces in December 
2009 as follows: 
 
The Russian Armed Forces must keep up with modern challenges in order to reliably 
ensure national security. The military reform is crucial to making the military leaner 
and meaner, enabling it to deal with any conflicts that could arise. New types of arms, 
new equipment and new methods of waging war are necessary for that.102 
It is evident that Russia needs in the western direction small, efficient and 
flexible strike units in a high state of readiness, and which can be quickly rein-
forced when necessary. “The nature of threats has become such that opera-
tions on a regional scale can start suddenly”, the Chief of the General Staff, 
Army General Nikolai Makarov said on November 17, 2011.103 Behind this 
assessment it is possible to discern the thoughts of  one of  Russia’s most pres-
tigious military thinkers, Army General (ret.) Makhmut Gareev, president of  
the Academy of  War Sciences. He strongly doubts the credibility of  tactical 
nuclear weapons as general-purpose weapons in local conflicts. Mindful of  
                                                           
101 President of Russia, 2008a. According to President Vladimir Putin, “You know, I have a 
great interest in and love for European history, including German history. Bismarck was an important 
German and European political leader. He said that in such matters, what is important is not the inten-
tion but the capability.” See also RIA Novosti, 31 May 2008, “Russia opposes NATO expan-
sion in principle – PM Putin.”, According to Putin, “As Bismarck said long ago, what really 
counts is potentials rather than goodwill intentions or statements”. During an interview for 
Le Monde in late May 2008 Putin said that, “And all we see is that military infrastructure is 
getting closer and closer to our borders. Why? Nobody threatens each other anymore". 
102 RIA Novosti, 3 December 2009, “Putin Reiterates Need for Military Reform to Ensure 
Security [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091203/157086584.html]. 
103 Tikhonov et al., 2011. 
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Russia’s experiences of  war, he thinks it is time to assess the merits of the de-
cisive importance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first 
strategic strike. “More aggressive actions may be needed and pre-emptive ac-
tions as well, if necessary.”104 
 
The Commander of Russia’s Ground Forces Col. Gen. Vladimir Chirkin 
stated in July 2012 that Russia will form 26 additional brigades by 2020, in-
cluding 10 reconnaissance brigades, 14 army aviation and two air defence bri-
gades.105 
 
On the other hand, large reserves are needed in the direction of China. Presi-
dent Medvedev announced in April of 2011, that Russia has to retain general 
conscription for 10–15 years.106 Russia is also preparing for the most extreme 
alternative, a large-scale war.107  
 
Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov repeated in October 2012, that Russia 
will not do away with the draft any time soon. “An entirely professional army 
is optimal in my view,” he said. “But we cannot afford it for the foreseeable 
future,” adding that for now the armed forces will include a mix of profes-
sionals serving under enlistment contracts and draftees.108 Mr. Serdyukov’s 
dismissal in November 2012 supports the view that powerful circles in Russia 
that have not been happy with the concept of a small “New Look” Army, 
succeeded to limit it. Mr. Serdyukov’s successor, Army General Sergei Shoigu 
has clearly changed direction.109 The end result of the Russian defence reform 
seems to be a mix of modern and more traditional armed forces, with a suffi-
ciently large trained reserve. 
 
The recruiting of contract soldiers is one of the central factors in the process 
of improving capability, but at present it has not produced the desired result. 
The lack of trained non-commissioned officers is a problem. Therefore readi-
ness and combat capability have not yet risen to the planned high level.110 
General Makarov, however, reported that all units and formations in the cate-
gory of  permanent readiness have been reinforced to full combat strength. 
                                                           
104 McDermott, 2011, pp. 67-68. See also Miranovitsh, 2009. 
105 RIA Novosti, 16 July 2012, “Russian Military to Form 26 New Brigades by 2020”  
[http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120716/174634711.html]. 
106 RIA Novosti, 4 April 2011, “Russia to Continue Military Conscription for 10–15 Years – 
Medvedev” [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110404/163367728.html]. 
107 Daily Mail, 18 November 2011, “Nuclear War Could Erupt along Russia’s Border with 
Europe, Warns Kremlin Commander” [http://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-
2062865/Nikolai-Makarov-Nuclear-war-erupt-Russias-borders-Europe.html]. 
108 RIA Novosti, 7 October 2012, “Russian Military Pay Rises, but Draft to Remain – Chief” 
[http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20121007/176467212.html]. For a more detailed analysis, 
see McDermott, 2012a. 
109 McDermott, 2013.  
110 McDermott, 2011. See also, Felgenhauer, 2011. 
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These units are to be ready to execute combat operations within one hour af-
ter receiving orders.111 In practice, however, it is evident that ‘permanent 
readiness’ brigades will not appear as originally planned, to be able to maintain 
daily readiness at full strength. Rather there will be combat units of battalion 
strength in permanent readiness.112 Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, suc-
cessor to Army General Nikolai Makarov as Chief of the General Staff, 
pointed out in January 2013 that “no one rules out the possibility of a major 
war, and it cannot be said that we are unprepared”.113 
 
In 2008, the period of conscript service was reduced from two years to one. 
According to announcements made in the spring of 2011, the earlier goal of 
over 550 000 draftees annually was reduced to 400 000.114 The call-up in fall 
2011, less than 136 000 men, was not encouraging and this raises doubts as to 
the possibilities to reach stated goals.115 If the modernized armed forces can 
pool up 300 000 conscripts annually, a challenging goal, the system will pro-
duce even in the future a reserve of several millions of trained reservists under 
the age of 35. A report published by the prestigious Valdai Club in July 2012, 
states:  
 
Thus, by the end of 2011 it is assumed that the million-strong army will consist of 
220 000 officers, 425 000 contract soldiers, and 350 000 conscripts. The latter fig-
ure is much more realistic compared to the previously planned 700 000. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the Defense Ministry will be able to assemble a 400 000-
strong corps of contract personnel.116  
 
Because of the military organizational changes, the current conscript service 
crisis in the Russian Armed Forces and the negative demographic develop-
                                                           
111 The ambitious aim is to improve combat readiness for the frontline units to just 1−2 
hours after given orders. Tikhonov, Aleksandr et. al., 2011; IHS Jane’s World Armies, 15 No-
vember 2012, “Russian Federation.” Jane’s World Armies estimated in November 2012 that 
the majority of the Airborne Forces can be deployed within 12 hours while the bulk of the 
Ground Forces should be operational within 24 to 48 hours, albeit in many cases with 
20−40 percent deficit in vehicles. See also Litovkin, 2010 and Estinko, 2010. 
112 McDermott, 2012. 
113 Litovkin, 2013; RIA Novosti, 26 January 2013, “Russia’s Forces Are Ready for War  
– Army Chief” [http://en.rian.ru/mili-tary_news/20130126/179040460/Russias-Forces-
Are-Ready-for-War-Army-Chief.html]. 
114 Felgenhauer, 2011. 
115 Carlsson & Norberg, 2012, pp. 102−03. See also Russian Defence Policy, 6 January 
2012, “No One to Call (Part I)” [http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/01/06/no-
one-to-call-part-i/]. The number of conscripted young men during 2011 was altogether 
354,570, according to Russian Ministry of Defence. It is too early to tell if the steep decline 
in conscription figures in the fall of 2011 will prove to be permanent. According to official 
Russian census figures there should be about two million young men of 18−19 year’s age, 
but some 800 000 seem to be able to evade conscription service without legally acceptable 
reasons.  
116 Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012, p. 28  
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ment, it is uncertain if the stated goals will be achieved.117 The trained reserve 
in 2011 may in theory be 8 million, but the real figure is probably significantly 
lower, perhaps two million, because of lack of refresher training and equip-
ment.118 Some clarification was given by Chief of General Staff, Army General 
Nikolai Makarov in November 2011: “We have a mobilization reserve of 
700 000 men, we have brigades that may be put on war footing. Practically the 
entire mobilization reserve of the Army consists of conscripts.”119  
 
One major problem not to be omitted seems to be the mobilization system 
itself, largely inherited from Soviet times and not very well adapted to the new 
defence structure.120 A sign of improvement is the mobilization of 4 000 re-
servists in the vicinity of Petrozavodsk, Karelia, where the 216th Storage and 
Repair Depot is located, facilitating the first exercise of a fully manned Motor-
ized Infantry Brigade since 1993. The exercise was held 13-30 September 
2012.121  
 
4.2 The Development of Russia’s Military Potential and Armaments 
 
Russia has reduced her peacetime armed forces. After the difficult economic 
years, the country has accordingly increased her defence spending. This trend 
also grows stronger.122 The starting level was indeed low, but even after taking 
inflation corrections into account, the annual growth of the defence budget 
has been 10 to 15 percent. In 2011 the share of defence expenditures in the 
national budget exceeded 20 percent.123 President Medvedev stated in March 
2011, that the money spent on defence (including military-related spending of 
the other power ministries) would rise to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2012.124 The 
actual outcome for 2012 will be slightly higher and since the planned defence 
expenditure growth for 2013−2015 is expected to be at approximately 12 per-
                                                           
117 RIA Novosti, 17 November 2011, “Russian Military Has No One Left to Draft” 
[http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20111117/168776056.html]. 
118 IHS Jane’s World Armies, “Russian Federation”; IISS, 2012, p. 192 and Tikhonov, 2011.   
119 РИА Новости, 17 November 2011, “Генштаб: мобилизационный резерв армии  
РФ составляет 700 тыс человек” [http://www.ria.ru/defense_safety/20111117/  
490941556.html]. 
120 Boltenkov, Gayday, Karnaukhov, Lavrov & Tseluiko, 2011, pp. 9−31.  
121 TV Zvezda, 26 September 2012, “Command and staff mobilization exercises in Kare- 
lia − K rl 299” (Валерий Жевлаков, НОВОСТИ ДНА) [http://www.youtube.com/ 
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2012 [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5r_xuR8-os&feature=plcp]. 
122 A look at IISS Military Balance yearbooks 2006 to 2012 shows that the defence spending 
grew steadily between 2005 and 2011, regardless of the economic problems created by the 
financial crisis in 2008. A marked jump in defence spending took place in 2009 and this 
trend seems to be reinforced. 
123 Cooper, 2012. See also Leijonhielm, 2012. 
124 Military Parade, 2 (104), March/April 2011, p. 4. 
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cent annually, spending has now reached a level that is generating strains on 
the budget and could prove unsustainable, especially if another round of crisis 
were to afflict the global economy. 125  
 
As the State rearmament program for 2007−2015 had encountered serious 
problems from the very beginning, President Medvedev stated in March 2010 
that a new and far more ambitious programme for 2011−2020 would be an-
nounced later that year.126 The first figure mentioned for funding of the ar-
mament program was 13 trillion roubles. Defence Minister Serdyukov dis-
closed in September 2010 that the figure would rise to 19 trillion roubles (ap-
proximately 500 billion euros).127 In an interview, Serdyukov said: 
 
This is the minimum we need to equip our armed forces with modern weaponry. We 
could ask for a bigger number, but we need to understand that the budget cannot af-
ford such spending, so 19 trillion is a serious amount of money that will provide con-
siderable orders for our defense industry. 
 
When funding for refurbishment of the worn out defence industry infrastruc-
ture is included, the sums rise even higher. Prime Minister Putin declared in 
March 2011: 
 
I’d like to remind you that we plan to allocate over 20 trillion roubles for this current 
programme through 2020, which is three times more than we allocated towards the 
previous one. These are very substantial funds, and as you can understand, they will 
have to come at the expense of other areas. But I believe that we are justified in invest-
ing in the defence industry inasmuch as it is by nature a high-tech industry. 128  
 
Russia’s Minister of Finance, Alexey Kudrin, who opposed high defence ex-
penditure, was dismissed in late September 2011.129 
                                                           
125 Mukhin, 2012; Cooper, 2012. 
126 President of Russia, 2010b.     
127 Arkhipov & Pronina, 2010. Minister Serdyukov’s remark hinted at a request for more 
than 30 trillion roubles that the generals had calculated would be needed to restore the 
armed forces. 
128 Government of  the Russian Federation, 21 March 2011. See also Military Parade,  
2(104), March/April 2011, “Modernization of  Army – A Priority Objective”, pp. 4-7, and 
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Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich defined the priorities of the State 
as follows in October 2012: 
 
We cannot allow ourselves to simultaneously have a very high level of social protection 
in a system built on paternalistic principles, at the same time a very large army, and 
at the same time a very large amount of state property conjointly with very low prices 
for energy resources within the country. … Choose one, two at most.130  
 
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, also chairman of the Military-
Industrial Commission said in September 2012 that from now on national de-
fence spending must be 3.5 percent of GDP.131 This does not include the ca 
1.5 percent military related other spending.  
 
The well-known expert on Russia’s defence economy and industry, Professor 
Julian Cooper, wrote: 
 
It has become clear that President Putin and the Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, 
are resolutely committed to the full implementation of [the State Armament Pro-
gramme, Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya, GPV-2020] even if it re-
quires a larger defence burden on the economy.132  
 
Summing up, the position of the Russian leadership is clear. The rearmament 
program is in fact seen as a means to boost the growth of the entire Russian 
industry, the same way as in the 1930s.133 This may prove to be an illusion. If 
the national economy cannot sustain such an ambitious defence program, so-
cial programs will have to yield. If the acquisitions are realized, actual defence 
spending would increase substantially in coming years, perhaps as much as 50 
                                                                                                                                                                          
[http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/ 20110927/167180695.html]. 
130 Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH), 3 October 2012, “Authorities: Not Possible to  
Support Social Protections, Large Army, Many State Properties Simultaneously” 
[http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/10/03/authorities_its_not_possible_to_support_social_prot
ections_large_arm_18779.html]. 
131 Взгляд, 17 September 2012 “Рогозин: Расходы на оборону должны быть на  
уровне 3,5% ВВП” [http://www.vz.ru/news/2012/9/17/598406.html]. 
132 Cooper, 2012. See also Russia Today, 27 September 2011, “No Pain, No Gain: Big  
Defense Spending to Continue, Says Medvedev” [http://rt.com/politics/defense-budget-
remain-priority-469/]; РИА Новости, 21 November 2011, “Медведев пригрозил 
НАТО из штаба самой воюющей армии России” [http://ria.ru/defense_safety/ 
20111121/494300754.html]; Российская газета, 20 February 2012, “Владимир Путин: 
“Быть сильными: гарантии национальной безопасности для России””  
[http://www.rg.ru/ 2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html]. 
133 President of Russia, 2012a; Reuters, 31 August 2012, “Putin Calls for Stalin-Style  
“Leap forward”” [http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/31/us-russia-putin-stalin-id 
USBRE87U16420120831]; RIA Novosti, 2 May 2012, “Rearmament of Russian Army to 
Boost Economy – Dvorkovich”  
[http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120502/173165 137.html]. 
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percent. The greatest impact would be at the end of this decade.134 Deputy 
Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a detailed breakdown of the 
planned annual expenditure at the end of 2012. “The state defence order will 
reach about 1.9 trillion roubles next year [i.e. 2013], about 2.2 trillion in 2014 
and 2.8 trillion in 2015”, and is expected to stay at that level until the end of 
the decade.135  
 
The official Russian plans regarding defence expenditure have been received 
with various degrees of scepticism in the west. The prognosis of the Russian 
defence economy until 2020, made by the Swedish Defence Research Agency 
(FOI) using a range of realistic growth figures for the whole economy as well 
as for the defence budget, shows that the defence budget is likely to increase 
50–100 per cent in real terms during this decade.136 
 
Carrying out the armaments program, will not, however, be easy for Russia 
because of the severe crisis in the defence industry. The problems are largely 
systemic in nature, which adds to the difficulty of finding lasting solutions. 
Among the major problems are corruption137 and flawed business manage-
ment practices, excessive brain drain, Soviet-style inefficient production 
methods, obsolete production machinery and aging personnel. According to 
Professor Cooper, the defence industry has lost four million workers during 
the last 20 years – the present manpower figure is now about 1.5 million – and 
that the average age of workers is 55 to 60 years. The percentage of those un-
der 30 is only 0.5 percent.138 Similar estimates are presented in the respected 
defence publication Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (NVO).139 
 
As an illustration of how the Russian leaders tackle the problems, President 
Medvedev demanded in May 2011 that the government present ideas for mak-
ing investments in national defence more effective and the military to submit 
tenders without delay. Otherwise a number of weapons systems, vital for Rus-
sia would not be delivered, as was the case in 2009.140 Then, 30 strategic mis-
siles, three nuclear submarines, five Iskander missile systems, 300 armored 
vehicles, 30 helicopters, and 28 combat aircraft were not delivered to the 
armed forces. 
 
                                                           
134 Cooper, 2012, See also Cooper, 2012a.  
135 RIA Novosti, 27 December 2012, “Russia to Triple State Defense Order by 2015” 
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136 Oxenstierna & Bergstrand, 2012, pp. 57–58. 
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Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the situation had not 
really changed for the better.141 Responsible managers have been sacked, but 
that doesn’t solve the systemic problems.  
 
Great efforts have, however, been made in order to improve the conditions of 
the defence industry. In October 2011 Prime Minister Putin reported on an 
additional financial input of 3 000 billion roubles (about 72 billion euros) to 
improve the industrial production base.142 According to Prime Minister Med-
vedev, Russia will pay special attention to the development of aircraft con-
struction and shipbuilding, as well as the radio-electronic, space and nuclear 
industries in the next few years. “The military-industrial complex will receive a 
serious impetus. It should become a source of technological innovation, both 
in the military and civilian sectors”, Medvedev said on 31 January 2013.143 
 
The defence industrial focus is, however, shifting from research and develop-
ment to production, even though resources for research show growth in abso-
lute terms. One may, perhaps, doubt the credibility of official announcements, 
which deal with the huge economic appropriations for materiel acquisition 
during the period until 2020. Nevertheless, one can expect that all armed 
forces in the Russian Federation will be substantially strengthened.144 
 
In 2010, Russia still had over 20 000 main battle tanks (MBTs), a large num-
ber of them are older types and are in poor condition. Future needs were an-
nounced to be 10 000 MBTs.145 Of these, 4 500 are modernized T-80’s and 
600 new T-90 types.146 Some of the T-72 MBTs are being modernized.147  
                                                           
141 RIA Novosti, 19 May 2011, “Russian State Defence Order Still in Bad Shape – Govt”  
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The MBT inventory and the trained reserves will make it possible in principle 
to establish of some 200 armoured and motorized infantry brigades. Mobiliza-
tion on such a scale would, however, take many months to accomplish. Dur-
ing the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia operated mainly with older equipment 
and did not mobilise. 
 
After introducing the brigade organization in the Russian Army in 2009, forty 
armoured brigades and infantry brigades, capable of fighting independently 
(“combined-arms operations”) were established. The task of these front-line 
units is to be in a high state of readiness (with a constant strength of 95 per-
cent and full combat readiness). The armoured brigade has three tank battal-
ions and a total of some one hundred heavy MBTs. The motorized infantry 
brigade has one reinforced tank battalion (41 heavy MBTs). Altogether these 
brigades have about 2 000 heavy MBT’s. It is believed that less than half of 
these units were combat ready in 2010.148  
 
Russia has maintained her strong artillery and the principle of massive artillery 
fire support. A major program to procure new guided rocket launchers and 
artillery systems was announced in November 2012.149 Russia’s ground forces 
have about 24 000 artillery pieces, of which over 6 000 are self-propelled artil-
lery vehicles and about 3 500 rocket launchers.150 In addition, naval infantry 
and coastal defence units have more than 700 artillery pieces of various types. 
151 Even border units, which do not belong to the armed forces, and Interior 
Ministry units have some artillery in their inventory.  
 
New types of combat aircraft of the Russian Air Force are, among others, the 
Su-34 fighter-bomber, the Su-35 multi-purpose strike fighter, and the T-50 
PAK FA fifth-generation multi-purpose strike-fighter, which is planned to 
enter service in the second half of the decade.152 Russia’s goal is to obtain by 
the year 2020 nearly 1 500 new or thoroughly refurbished aircraft of various 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 [http://www.army-technology.com/projects/t90/]. 
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types, including 600 combat aircraft, 1 000 helicopters, and some 200 new air-
defence missile systems.153  
 
Development of the Russian Navy is primarily focused on developing and 
producing nuclear ballistic missile- carrying strategic submarines and their 
missiles as well as nuclear attack submarines.154 It is important for Finland and 
her small neighbouring countries to observe Russia’s remarkable input to re-
turn to her invasion capability. Russia will procure four large Mistral amphibi-
ous assault landing ships (LHD) from France. Two of them will be built in 
Russia.155 The Mistral LHDs can carry 16 helicopters, four landing craft, and 
an entire tank battalion, i.e. some 30 MBTs. In addition, five Ivan Gren type 
landing craft are being built in Kaliningrad. Each of them can transport 13 
MBTs or 60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs).156 
 
While obtaining new naval ships and dismantling older types, the total inven-
tory may continue to decrease. Contrary to earlier practices, Russia also aims 
to purchase other types of modern military technology from the West. For 
example, Russia buys hundreds of recce/patrol vehicles from France and It-
aly, and an advanced ground forces combat simulator from Germany as well 
as UAVs from Israel.157 The change of leadership in the Russian military 
community as well as technical difficulties concerning hardware procurement 
from the West, have reversed the trend. Co-operation with the West is not 
longer regarded as attractive as a few years ago.158  
 
Vladimir Putin explained his position on the rearmament program in the Rus-
sian government daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta in February 2012 as follows: 
 
I am convinced that no "pinpoint" purchasing of military hardware and equipment 
can be a substitute for the production of our own types of armaments, it can only serve 
as the basis for obtaining technologies and knowledge. Incidentally this has happened 
before in history. Let me remind you that the whole "family" of our country's tanks in 
the 1930s was produced on the basis of American and British machines. And then, 
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using the experience accumulated, our specialists developed the T-34 - the best tank in 
World War II. 
[...] 
In the coming decade the troops will take delivery of more than 400 modern ground- 
and sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, eight strategic missile submarines, 
around 20 multi-role submarines, more than 50 surface warships, around 100 mili-
tary satellites, more than 600 modern aircraft, including fifth-generation fighters, more 
than 1 000 helicopters, 28 S-400 regiment-level surface-to-air missile systems, 38 
Vityaz division-level surface-to-air missile systems, ten brigade-level Iskander-M sys-
tems, more than 2 300 modern tanks, around 2 000 self-propelled artillery systems 
and cannon, and also more than 17 000 military vehicles. 
[...] 
The updating of the defense industry complex will be the locomotive that will pull the 
development of the most diverse sectors in its wake.159 
 
The outcome of the rearmament program remains to be seen.160 Some West-
ern experts point out that “the currently envisaged plans for military expendi-
ture do not seem to be sustainable, even if the economic situation does not 
deteriorate”.161 Interestingly enough, the high command of the Swedish De-
fence Forces, stated clearly in January 2013, that Russia’s “modernisation of 
her defence equipment is proceeding well”.162 Pushing the programme 
through with great determination may be possible, but it could be accom-
plished only by diverting funds from social programs, which could trigger un-
popular reactions and social unrest. On the other hand Russia’s increasing de-
fence export should be mentioned. Annual revenue during 2011−2012 alone 
is exceeding 10 billion euro.163 
 
The Director of the U.S. National Intelligence, Lt.Gen. James R. Clapper gave 
the following assessment of Russia’s military capabilities in January 2012: 
 
Moscow is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of rearmament and professionali-
zation. In 2010, Medvedev and Putin approved a 10-year procurement plan to replace 
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Soviet-era hardware and bolster deterrence with a balanced set of modern conventional, 
asymmetric, and nuclear capabilities. However, funding, bureaucratic, and cultural hur-
dles—coupled with the challenge of reinvigorating a military industrial base that deterio-
rated for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse—will complicate Russian efforts.  
[...] 
The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that will allow the Rus-
sian military to more rapidly defeat its smaller neighbors and remain the dominant mili-
tary force in the post-Soviet space, but will not—and are not intended to—enable Mos-
cow to conduct sustained offensive operations against NATO collectively. In addition, the 
steep decline in conventional capabilities since the collapse of the Soviet Union has com-
pelled Moscow to invest significant capital to modernize its conventional forces. At least 
until Russia’s high precision conventional arms achieve practical operational utility, Mos-
cow will embrace nuclear deterrence as the focal point of its defense planning, and it still 
views its nuclear forces as critical for ensuring Russian sovereignty and relevance on the 
world stage, and for offsetting its military weaknesses vis-à-vis potential opponents with 
stronger militaries.164 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF RUSSIA’S USE OF FORCE 
 
 
ussia’s operational plans are naturally secret, but by analysing the back-
ground and decisions regarding defence policy, deployments of armed 
forces units, military exercises and literature, one can present some 
estimates. As outlined earlier and based upon her strategic decisions, Russia is 
developing those of her armed forces that are in their own garrisons capable 
for immediate action in different directions. According to the country’s tradi-
tional military thinking, the aim is to keep warfare outside the homeland terri-
tory. In dimensioning the capacity of her own armed forces facing west, Rus-
sia assesses the capabilities of the United States and NATO. 
 
In Russian thinking, high combat readiness of forces is nothing new. For ex-
ample, Soviet forces in East Germany were ready to start “defence battle” by 
immediate attack. This was told by Colonel General Matvei Burlakov (the 
former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in East Germany) in 
2005.165 
 
A high state of readiness is an exceptionally great advantage in offensive op-
erations, especially if the troops can be ordered into action directly from basic 
readiness. The possibility for successful surprise to the detriment of the adver-
sary is then most favourable, since the enemy’s intelligence has not been able 
to detect anything very alarming, but mainly contradictory signals or signals 
difficult to interpret. It seems improbable that governments would make diffi-
cult and costly decisions for mobilization on such shaky grounds. Thus Rus-
sia’s striving to reach a high degree of basic readiness is logical defence plan-
ning. After reaching such high readiness capability, the Russian armed forces’ 
ability to achieve their military objectives even with limited resources must be 
deemed as being good. 
 
For the time being Russia seems only to have embarked on the road to such 
higher readiness. Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the 
airborne forces suggested in 2009 that:  
 
It makes sense to move to a three-way troop training system. While one battalion is 
sending people on leave, the second is at some distant range, the third will be carrying 
out combat training at its place of deployment. … It is on combat duty. The events in 
                                                           
165 Kalashnikova, 2005. An English version, “All They Had to Do Was Give the Signal” is 
found at [http://www.kommersant.com/ page.asp?id=558042]. 
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South Ossetia have shown the necessity of maintaining a fist of 5-10 battalions which 
are always ready to fight.166 
 
The President of the Academy of War Sciences, Army General Makhmut Ga-
reev, pointed out in December 2009 that it is impossible in modern condi-
tions to resist a massive first strike. It is crucially important to analyze not only 
the initial period of war, but primarily the first strategic assault. “Therefore, as 
in the fight against terrorism, we need more offensive action, and, if necessary, 
pre-emptive action.”167  
 
In 1996 Lieutenant General (ret.) Valery Dementyev, a defence analyst and 
military adviser to the Russian President, the Ministry of Defence and the 
General Staff, jointly with defence analyst Dr. (Tech.) Anton Surikov de-
scribed in an exceptionally frank manner the characteristics of an operation 
similar to “strategic assault”: 
 
In the first stage, aviation, special military intelligence (GRU) forces, and special Fed-
eral Security Services (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) groups carry out 
strikes for the purpose of  destroying or seizing the most important enemy targets and 
eliminating the enemy's military and political leadership. Then Mobile Forces, with 
the support of  army and frontline aviation and naval forces, crush and eliminate en-
emy forces and take over their territory. After that, subunits of  Ground Forces and 
Internal Troops of  the Ministry of  Internal Affairs, RF, preferably with some com-
bat experience, move in. They establish control of  the most crucial locations and carry 
out "cleansing" of  the territory. Then, with the help of  militia formed out of  the pro-
Russian part of  the local population, they establish control over the territory and en-
sure the elimination of  nationalists and deportation of  some categories of  citizens 
from certain locations. It should be emphasized that until the end of  the special opera-
tion, local authorities are needed only insofar as they are useful in supporting military 
control over the territory.168 
 
Detailed information of Soviet military contingency plans for occupation of 
Helsinki, bearing a striking resemblance with the general outline for a strategic 
                                                           
166 Giles, 2012, p. 13. According to Keir Giles, “Five to ten battalions at real readiness may have 
greater value in the kind of future conflict envisaged by the Russian military than 85 brigades at theoretical 
readiness.” 
167 Miranovitsh, Gennady, 2009. See also McDermott, 2011, pp. 67−68. This c o rresponds 
well with the traditional Russian defence doctrine of offensive defence.  
168 Dementyev & Surikov, 1996. Dr. (Tech.) Anton Viktorovich Surikov (26 May 1961  
–23 November 2009) was also a high-ranking officer in the military intelligence service 
GRU and served as adviser in the government of Yevgeny Primakov and as assistant to 
Yuri Maslyukov, Chairman of the Defence Industrial Commission. He died in rather murky 
circumstances at the age of 48 in November 2009. Surikov’s biography can be found at: 
[http://www.peoples.ru/state/politics /anton_surikov/]. 
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assault described above, became public in June 2012.169 Evaluation of these 
plans became possible by analyzing very detailed military maps from 1989, 
made and successively updated by the Soviet Army General Staff. 
 
The Finnish interpretation of what Soviet Cold War contingency planning 
would have meant, if operations had been executed, can be summarized as 
follows: Central functions of the Finnish society were to be paralyzed, radio 
and TV stations knocked out, the Parliament, the Presidential palace and mili-
tary command centres were to be seized rapidly. Road junctions, harbours, 
bus depots, railway and metro stations were to be captured, financial institu-
tions, water supply and district heating shut down. The aggressor would strive 
to defeat any organized military resistance by a steady supply of airborne rein-
forcements as well as by forces landing from the sea. The general population’s 
will to resist was expected to break down in a few days as hunger and thirst 
take command. The whole Finnish capital and its surroundings would be oc-
cupied and sealed off in a matter of a few days. 
 
An interesting present day comparison is offered by the prestigious Russian 
Valdai Discussion Club: 
 
Military operations are designed to not only defeat the enemy physically, but also to 
crush their morale, and not just of the troops but also of the people and the govern-
ment. Factors such as the depth of support for the war among the general population 
play an increasingly important role and, accordingly, so does understanding and using 
culturally specific features of the enemy and his political system, including through ex-
posure via the media. 
[...] 
The distinction between “civilian” and “military” segments of society is disappearing. 
The aim of a military campaign is to impact not only the enemy army, but also its so-
ciety, understood in terms of its cultural as well as its physical aspects. This trend 
makes it necessary to conduct joint “civilian-military” operations, rather than purely 
military ones.170 
 
If Russia’s decision to extend her operations to enemy territory was made one 
month before execution, some brigades may be ready for deployment. If the 
decision is made, say, six months in advance, an additional force, roughly 20-
30 brigades, could be ready for deployment. Forces available for deployment 
could be even more, if they are not bound to other directions. Concealment 
                                                           
169 Salonen, 2012. The existence of these valuable maps in Estonia became known at the 
time of the Soviet withdrawal from Estonia. Their destruction was averted and Finnish 
military historian Antero Uitto was later able to acquire them. It is interesting that the So-
viet Union placed Finland squarely in the enemy camp, regardless of the FCMA Treaty 
between the countries, the cornerstone on which Finnish and Russian official political rela-
tions were built. 
170 Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012, p. 8.  
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and deception (‘maskirovka’) are essential parts of activities. The amount of 
available units will of course be affected by the opponent’s reaction as well as 
his readiness level, and by the role of possible allies and the general situation 
elsewhere. 
 
5.1 Russia Cannot Tolerate Threats Arising from the Direction of Small 
Neighbouring Countries 
 
In the light of history, Russia has had a tendency to consider all the areas she 
has once governed as “legitimate” spheres of interest.171 While seeking influ-
ence, she also sees threats everywhere. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union set as 
her goal to return her sphere of influence of 1914. In the 1920s, Finland was 
classified as “neutral”, but in the next decade she had already become an “en-
emy state.”172 Finland became friendly only after the legally binding Treaty of 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) came into force in 
1948. This period lasted for more than four decades. 
 
Russia does not exclude the possibility that foreign powers could in the future 
use Finnish territory as an avenue of approach towards the St. Petersburg and 
northern areas. The current changes in Russia’s military structure and military 
build-up close to her western borders support this assumption.173 The use of 
Finnish territory for this purpose must be prevented. This issue has once 
again returned in connection with speculations about Finland’s NATO mem-
bership. Neither the Soviet nor Russian political and military leadership have 
ever considered Finland herself a military threat.174 
 
Russia’s strategic objective with regard to Finland seems then to be to assure 
that no threat be aimed at her from Finnish territory. From the Russian point 
of view, the essence is not the intention of either the United States, NATO, or 
Finland alone, but of military capability. 
 
The military alternatives for the great powers always include intimidation, 
pressure and threats, and also tailor-made attacks for attaining desired political 
objectives. In the first phase, vital military, social and economic information 
networks can be the targets of attack. If the desired objectives are not 
achieved, more robust measures may be used. Infrastructure assets and 
ground already seized may be used to advantage in that type of operation. The 
                                                           
171 Koivisto, 2001, p. 292. 
172 Kilin, 2010, pp. 19−37.  
173 This was confirmed by Russia’s Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov during the visit 
by his Finnish counterpart Stefan Wallin in Moscow on 14 February 2012.  
174 Virkkunen, 2007. Ambassador Jaakko Blomberg illuminates further the attempts of the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negate the Finnish decision of 21 September 1990, 
to declare the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 void, which would in fact 
have curtailed Finnish sovereignty; Blomberg, 2011, pp. 56−58. 
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control of logistics, highways, railroads and sea transport is significant in this 
respect.175  
 
Russia’s declaration of new limitations for foreigners, dealing with the pur-
chase of property in land near borders176, may also stem from security policy. 
For the sake of military security, Russia may not want possible foreign obser-
vation posts in areas, whose owners’ rights and potential activities even the 
officials may have a responsibility to protect.  
 
During the war in Georgia in August of 2008, Russia showed in practice how 
far she is ready to go, if she feels that a small neighbouring country threatens 
her national interests.177 President Putin confirmed in August 2012, that the 
invasion of Georgia was pre-planned.178 Russia’s concern over the Baltic 
States’ membership in NATO has already been mentioned. Colonel Ari Pu-
heloinen made a thorough research of Russia’s geopolitical objectives in the 
Baltic Sea area at the end of the 1990s. One scenario, “The Rise of Russia,” 
closely reminds one of recent developments.179  
 
However, if Russia should decide to take action against the Baltic countries, 
the Finnish Defence Forces would probably be tied up, in order to prevent 
Finland from becoming a flank threat. The means of such actions could be 
threatening, various kinds of precision attacks, or even invasion.180 
 
                                                           
175 See cf. Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2010, p. 8 
176 Finland lost about 10 percent of its territory and property to the Soviet Union in 1940 
and 1944. Many Finns would want to buy back their former land property, build Summer 
houses etc. This has proved to be very difficult and Russia applies a far more restrictive 
policy towards Finns than the Finnish Government towards Russians buying property in 
Finland. 
177 Agrell, 2010, p. 235 (in Swedish). Professor Wilhelm Agrell, well-known Swedish peace 
and conflict researcher, is of the same opinion as Russia, but with opposite arguments, that 
the credibility of the European security regime collapsed in the war in Georgia, at the latest.  
178 Студия “Альфа”, г. Тверь, 7 August 2012, “Потерянный день" вся правда о  
Войне 08.08.08г.” (The Lost Day, the Whole Truth about the War 8 August 2008) 
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYQeeFXhOQw]; Ennis, 2012; RIA Novosti, 8 Au-
gust 2012, “Former Generals Slate Medvedev Over Ossetia War” 
[http://en.rian.ru/world/ 20120808/175066806.html]; AFP (Yahoo News), 8 August 2012, 
“Russia Prepared for Georgia War, Trained ‘Militiamen’: Putin” [http://news. ya-
hoo.com/russia-prepared-georgia-war-trained-militiamen-putin-200115109.html]. See  
also Felgenhauer, 2012. 
179 Puheloinen, 1999, pp. 50–51. 
180 When the Red Army executed its grand strategic assault in the Baltics in late summer 
1944, the Soviet Union tied up the Finnish forces, which still held a considerable strike 
capability, at Ilomantsi in eastern Finland. The loss of two Red Army divisions was the 
price the Soviet Union was then ready to pay in order to avert the flank threat. 
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5.2 Basic Readiness and Its Enhancement 
 
The number of Russian forces in the former Leningrad Military District has 
changed significantly after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The units with-
drawn from East Germany were first concentrated there. Then followed a 
huge reduction of troops. Now the trend has again been reversed. 
 
The headquarters of the 6th Russian Army was stationed in Petrozavodsk. It is 
now located near Kasimovo, the “military village” built by the Finns for Rus-
sian helicopter units north of St. Petersburg. The headquarters appears to be 
in charge of the ground forces east and south-east of Finland. 
 
A new motorized infantry brigade was re-established in 2010 in Vladimirsky 
Lager south of St. Petersburg. It may still be deficient but is likely to belong to 
the planned units of high readiness. In Kamenka, on the Karelian Isthmus 
there is an elite motorized infantry brigade. From the weapons depot at Ser-
tolovo, north of St. Petersburg, it is possible to establish a reserve brigade. A 
helicopter unit in support of these brigades is also stationed on the Isthmus. 
Furthermore there is an abundance of artillery units in the area, supporting 
these brigades, including a heavy rocket launcher brigade (Tver) with a range 
of 80 kilometres. In addition an operational brigade belonging to the Ministry 
of the Interior is located in Lebyazhie (Лебяжье, Lepäsi). 
 
A particularly significant addition of military potential is the deployment of 
the new ballistic missile system Iskander-M, with a missile brigade in Luga, 
south of St. Petersburg. The maximum range of the missile is officially 450 
kilometres but may reach 700 kilometres, depending of the weight of the war-
head.181 
 
Professor Stephen J. Blank (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute) 
underlines that it is no longer political rhetoric, but actual policy when Is-
kander-missiles are deployed in the neighbourhood of Finland: 
 
                                                           
181 Forss, 2012. See also STRATFOR, 30 November 2010, “Russian Missiles on NATO’s 
Border.” The first Iskander missiles (one battalion) arrived at the 26th Artillery and Missile 
Brigade in Luga in the spring of 2010 and were declared operational in mid-December 
2010. See also RIA Novosti, 14 December 2010, “Western Military District Gets First Is-
kander Tactical Missile System” [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101214/161766995. 
html]. The brigade was fully equipped with Iskander missiles in mid-2011 and is now com-
bat ready; Russia Today, 20 October 20011, “In a Nod to European Missile Defence, Russia 
Rolls Out the Iskander Missile [http://rt.com/politics/russia-missile-defence-nato-europe-
293/]. See also Garavskij, 2011; Isby, 2011. A thorough technical analysis of the missile 
shows that the maximum range with a 480 kilo warhead is about 700 kilometres and that an 
upgraded missile using more efficient fuel may reach 1000 kilometres in the future. It is not 
known that the missile would have been tested at ranges exceeding 500 kilometres, which 
would mean definite violation of the INF Treaty.  
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Recent deployments of the SS-26 Iskander missile (that comes in both nuclear and 
conventional formats) in the [former] Leningrad Military District where it could 
threaten Finland and the Baltic States suggest not just a desire to deter NATO, but 
also the continuing desire to intimidate Russian neighbors. Should Russia divine a 
threat in Europe, it reserves the right to place these missiles in Kaliningrad from where 
it could threaten Poland and even Germany as well.182 
 
The dual-capability Iskander missiles in Luga are replacing the older Tochka-
U (SS-21 Scarab) tactical missiles with a range of 120 kilometres. The new Is-
kander-M missiles represent the precision weapons mentioned in the Russian 
military doctrine. Their range covers the Baltic States and a major part of the 
Finnish territory. A full Iskander-M brigade consists of 12 launchers, each 
with two missiles, and 12 missile transporters with an additional 24 missiles.  
 
In Russian defence planning, the Iskander missile systems, including the not 
yet operationally deployed Iskander-K cruise missile system183, seem to have a 
dual role: on the one hand nuclear deterrence and highly unlikely nuclear war-
fighting, and on the other an increasingly important conventional offensive 
role in strategic directions. Tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles sup-
plement the ground attack capability of the frontal aviation substantially. The 
Russian military has great expectations with regard to this missile as a substi-
tute for the missile capability lost after implementation of the INF treaty in 
the early 1990s. Military Parade, a magazine for Russia’s defence industry, 
wrote in the spring of 2011, that the Iskander-M missile, a weapon of choice 
in theatre operations, with longer range and greater accuracy, was a part of the 
modernization program of the ground forces. The advanced accurate homing 
system of this missile (Udarnik) will be completed in 2016.184  
                                                           
182 Blank, 2011, p. 331. On 23 November 2011 President Medvedev made a statement re-
garding the European missile defence issue which included the threat that “Russia will deploy 
cutting–edge ballistic missile systems capable of the total destruction of US ABMs in Europe. One of the 
measures will be deploying is the 9K720 Iskander Mobile Theatre Ballistic Missile System in a special 
area in Kaliningrad.”; The Voice of Russia, 23 November 2011, “Medvedev’s Special Statement 
on Missile Defence” [http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/11/23/60905583.html]. See also, 
Golubkova, 2011. 
183 If the Iskander-K TEL is equipped with a six-tube launcher, a full brigade would theo-
retically carry 144 Iskander-K cruise missiles. 
184 Gulyaev, 2011, pp. 10–13. 
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Figure 7. Iskander-M missile range from the 26th Missile Brigade based in Luga. At present 
there are no Iskander missiles at Alakurtti, but the mobile missile system could be quickly re-
deployed, if necessary. 
 
In building a capability for strategic assault operations, the Iskander missile 
brigade in Luga is of fundamental importance. By taking advantage of the op-
ponent’s low readiness, precision strikes by this brigade could be used to-
gether with air strikes to paralyze his defence. It is interesting to note that 
units from the 98th Guards Airborne Division in Ivanovo, 400 kilometres 
north-east of Moscow, exercised in Luga in February 2012.185 
 
An air assault division is active in the Pskov area, along with a 'Special Desig-
nation' (Spetsnaz) commando brigade. In Pechenga there is a motorized in-
fantry brigade and a naval infantry brigade. These brigades are in full readiness 
(in hours). According to Colonel General Postnikov, then commander of the 
Russian Ground Forces, an arctic brigade composed of Spetsnaz troops, fa-
miliar with arctic conditions, would also be established in Pechenga. In Febru-
ary 2012 it became evident that the plans were postponed to 2015.186 Chief of 
General Staff, Army General Makarov assured in Helsinki on 5 June 2012 that 
Russia ”has no intention of establishing any arctic brigades”.187 Russia’s state-
ments are contradictory. The real outcome remains to be seen. 
                                                           
185 Yläjoki, 2012.  
186 Myasnikov, 2011. See also Pettersen, Trude, 2011.  For an update see RIA Novosti, 21 
February 2012, “Russia to Field First Arctic Brigade in 2015”  
[http://en.rian.ru /mlitary_news/20120221/171440711.html];  Pettersen, 2012a. 
187 YLE News, 7 June 2012, ”Kenraali Makarovin puhe kokonaisuudessaan” (General  
Makarov’s Full Speech) [http://yle.fi/uutiset/kenraali_makarovin_puhe_kokonaisuudes-
saan /6169951].  
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The condition of the Alakurtti airbase, east of Salla, will be improved and a 
refurbished helicopter regiment will be stationed there. Its equipment will in-
clude attack helicopters and armed transport helicopters. Apparently, new 
helicopters are badly needed.188 A reserve motorized infantry brigade can be 
mobilized with equipment from the Alakurtti storage. The above-mentioned 
helicopter regiment will support this brigade. The depot in Petrozavodsk con-
sists of equipment for one reserve brigade, which performed a mobilization 
and refresher training exercise in September 2012, thus proving its capability 
as a military unit not to be dismissed.189 
 
A powerful early warning radar against strategic missile attack at Lekhtusi vil-
lage, north of St. Petersburg has been completed. A new air surveillance radar 
station on Hogland Island is under construction. It will cover the entire air 
space over southern Finland, the Gulf of Finland and Estonia.  
 
All together the 1st Air Force and Air Defence Command, the air force of the 
Northern and Baltic Fleets, have more than 200 combat aircraft of different 
types, more than 100 combat helicopters and a corresponding amount of 
armed transport helicopters and many special and transport planes of various 
kinds. Some other air force units use air bases in the area for forward staging 
purposes.190 
 
The air force units can universally be quickly mobilized. They can be trans-
ferred in a short time from long distances to the desired areas. The Chief of 
General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, declared in February 2011 that 
the Russian air force units are in permanent readiness and in full combat or-
der.191  
 
To clarify dimensions one may observe that the Finnish inventory of about 60 
F/A-18 Hornet combat aircraft will even in the future primarily serve as inter-
ceptors. The situation will change somewhat, when they obtain air-to-ground 
capability after completion of their mid-life upgrade.192  
 
                                                           
188 The efficiency of Russia’s air assault units depends heavily on the capability of the  
helicopters. The present equipment is evidently so worn out that, for example, the 76th Air 
Assault Division deployed to Georgia as ordinary infantry units. See Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 
89. 
189 РИА Новости, 14 September 2012, “Военные учения проходят в Карелии 
 впервые с 90-х годов” [http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20120914/750088693.html]; TV 
Zvezda, 26 September 2012, “Command and staff mobilization exercises in Karelia - Krl 
299” [http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=dWOyWraA  
JhE#]. 
190 IISS, 2011, pp. 188–189. 
191 Falichev, 2011. 
192 Ministry of Defence (Finland), 1 March 2012.  
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The once formidable Swedish Air Force, one of the strongest air forces in 
Europe during the Cold War, has been allowed to diminish dramatically in 
capability. When the threat of massive invasion in the Baltic Sea area faded 
away, the major portion of squadrons were disbanded. This was also the case 
with most of Sweden’s impressive road-base network, vital for wartime com-
bat endurance. 
 
The numbers of both pilots and missiles available in the Swedish Air Force 
are thought to be modest. “Our capability for air support of ground combat in 
a war situation is completely inadequate because of lack of suitable weapons”, 
Major General (retd.) Karlis Neretnieks, the former Chief of Operations of 
the Swedish Defence Forces writes in “Friends in Need”, published by the 
Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences in the spring of 2011.193  
                                                           
193 Neretnieks, 2011, p. 216. This pessimistic assessment may be only partly true as the 
Swedish Air Force is equipped with various types of laser-guided Paveway bombs, Maver-
ick missiles and Saab Rb15 anti-ship missiles. The Swedish Air Force has a limited tradition 
with regard to close air support (CAS), but has rather focused on air interdiction, striking 
against supply lines, etc., in the rear of the adversary, and air defence. See more Rydell, 
2012.  
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CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FINLAND’S POINT OF 
VIEW 
 
 
6.1 Alliances and Proclamations of Solidarity 
 
he major global geopolitical changes and deep economic problems of 
many countries have also affected Europe and the neighbourhood of 
Finland. The foundations of the European Union and NATO no 
longer appear as solid as at the turn of the century. 
 
The most important NATO and European Union member states have greatly 
reduced their defence spending. A profound difference of threat assessments 
can be found between old and new NATO member states. The strategic in-
terest of the United States is increasingly focused towards the Asian direc-
tion.194 
 
Russia is significantly increasing her defence expenditure, and also growing 
stronger militarily. The smaller countries are uncertain and confused as to how 
to organize their security.  
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established primarily to 
protect the security of Western Europe against the Soviet threat, has been 
largely dismantled. Except for the integrated command and control system, 
NATO’s armed forces have in practice been armed forces of sovereign mem-
ber states, which have decided independently on how to use their forces. The 
political goals to guarantee the security of member countries have remained, 
although with the exception of the United States, the allies’ military capability 
is questionable. The decision taken by the four Visegrad countries in May 
2011 speaks for itself. 
 
NATO’s Article 5 reads as follows: 
 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of in-
dividual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 
                                                           
194 Clinton, 2011. 
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and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
[…] 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately 
be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Secu-
rity Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security.195 
 
NATO’s security clause is not unconditional, but the power to decide whether 
to give aid remains with the member states, who also decide on the quantity 
and quality of that aid. In addition, Article 5 is also directly coupled to the 
United Nations and especially to its security council, whose permanent mem-
bers may theoretically complicate the application of NATO’s Article 5. Swed-
ish defence researcher Mike Winnerstig notes: 
 
In the end, NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 as well as NATO’s Charter and Ar-
ticle 5, are mainly words on a piece of paper. How these articles will be applied in 
peacetime becomes a central question in assessing their credibility.196 
 
NATO’s significance as a guarantor of security is, above all, political in nature. 
The mere achievement of membership in a defence alliance was not “an ob-
jective or an accomplishment, but a logical step in a broadly based defence 
and security reform,” Estonia’s Defence Minister Mart Laar stated in April 
2011.197 NATO is a security-political haven for new members, and it also im-
poses duties upon them. This is also the opinion of old member states, who 
do not consider the threat from Russia to be acute at all. 
 
It was already previously stated that Russia has no respect for the defence ca-
pabilities of individual European NATO members. On the other hand, Russia 
has a strong interest in trying to marginalize NATO as a political factor. 
 
As a member of the European Union, Finland has also approved the Lisbon 
Treaty’s articles 1-42.7:  
 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in 
their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall 
not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States. 
 
The wording of the EU solidarity clause is noticeably more demanding than 
NATO’s Article 5. The contradiction between the goals of solidarity and their 
                                                           
195 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949. 
196 Winnerstig, 2011, pp. 113–134. 
197 Iivonen, 2011, p. 13. 
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credible application is also a question of resources.198 The EU does not have 
an independent military organisational structure, and NATO member states 
are committed to fulfil only their own obligations, albeit with a diminished 
capability as a result of significant military reductions and a lack of political 
cohesion. NATO has, however, to some extent returned to actual contingency 
planning. 
 
The EU’s ability to react quickly to a serious security-political crisis in its own 
area or outside it is modest. A great majority, 21 EU member states are also 
NATO members and nearly 95 percent of all EU citizens live in NATO coun-
tries. These states oppose the creation of duplicate military organizations as a 
useless waste of resources, for the single purpose of meeting the needs of a 
small minority. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that EU’s military-political 
weight will increase in the future. On the contrary, the EU’s weakness in tak-
ing responsibility was revealed in an embarrassing way when the Libyan crisis 
erupted in spring 2011. It should be noted that the development of the EU’s 
military capabilities, according to the Union’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), is exclusively directed towards crisis management operations, 
not waging war.  
 
Finland and Sweden have committed themselves to helping other EU coun-
tries, and Sweden, in addition, to assisting Nordic countries which are not EU 
member states, i.e. Norway and Iceland. Finland and Sweden themselves will 
decide upon the quantity and quality of the aid. The unilateral proclamation of 
solidarity issued by Sweden in 2009, has evoked vivid discussion. It was issued 
at a time when the country’s capabilities to give significant military assistance 
had already declined sharply in the wake of Sweden’s radical defence re-
form.199 
 
The key passage of the solidarity proclamation states: 
 
A military conflict in our immediate region in which only one country alone is affected 
is virtually inconceivable. Sweden will not take a passive stance should another EU 
member state or Nordic country suffer a disaster or come under attack. We expect 
these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected. Sweden should 
thus both extend and receive military support.200 
 
                                                           
198 Koivula & Forss, 2012, pp. 147–173. 
199 Rydell, 2011, pp. 55–57. The full manpower strength of the Swedish Armed Forces  
will be about 50 000, but only 15 700 in continuous service. See also Agrell, 2010,  
p. 235. 
200 Government Offices of  Sweden, Ministry of  Defence, A Functional Defence, Summary of  
the Bill Dated March 19, 2011 [http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2011/a/137705]; See also 
Hugemark, 2012, pp. 9–26. 
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The mention of an ability to give and receive military aid is also a way to make 
public the secret basic pillar of the country’s defence policy during the Cold 
War; her extensive co-operation with the United States and NATO.201 
 
While pondering the mutual solidarity declaration, the different defence solu-
tions of Finland, Sweden and the other Nordic countries have been an obsta-
cle to finding a binding security guarantee between them. The Finnish posi-
tion has been that separate Nordic security guarantees are not trustworthy as 
such. Norway and Denmark, which enjoy NATO’s security guarantees, can-
not unilaterally add to NATO’s burden by making promises which eventually 
may be left to the bigger NATO countries to carry. A very unfavourable situa-
tion for Finland would be one in which the Nordic countries would be left 
alone with their mutual solidarity commitments in a conflict between the great 
powers, as has sometimes happened in history.202 These political problems 
would not arise if all Nordic countries were NATO members. 
 
For small militarily non-aligned states like Finland, current changes in her 
neighbourhood create a condition of deepening insecurity. The Finnish white 
paper (Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009) stated that “strong grounds 
exist for considering Finland’s membership of NATO”.203 No security guaran-
tees, whether provided by organizations or states are, however, comprehen-
sive but being left alone also has its risks. In the light of history, agreements 
have often been interpreted in a way that the interpreter considers beneficial 
from his own point of view. 
 
The basic security-political positions in the Nordic countries have been static 
for a long time. Some significant movement can, however, be noted as a result 
of geopolitical developments and fiscal austerity in Europe and the USA. 
These provide strong incentives for the Nordic countries to deepen their de-
fence co-operation. It is still premature to consider binding security guarantees 
in one or another form, but there is a clear understanding that creating com-
mon capabilities will serve the Nordic interest.204 Recent examples of military 
intervention or crisis management suggest that ‘coalitions of the willing’ are often 
                                                           
201 Holmström, 2011. Sweden’s role as NATO’s unofficial 17th member during the Cold 
War was one of the cornerstones of Swedish defence policy. The co-operation with the 
United States and NATO assumed the form of quite detailed plans to receive and give 
help, but due to Sweden’s neutrality this had to be kept strictly secret – especially from the 
Swedish people.  
202 Koivula & Forss, 2012, pp. 147–173. 
203 Prime Minister’s Office, 2012, p.75. The government white paper released on 21  
December 2012 says that Finland preserves the possibility to apply for NATO member-
ship. 
204 This was articulated in an op-ed article in Helsingin Sanomat by the Swedish, Finnish and 
Norwegian Chiefs of Defence in September 2012. See Göranson, Puheloinen and Sunde, 
2012. See also STRATFOR, 1 November 2012, Finland, Sweden: A Step Toward Greater Nordic 
Security Cooperation. 
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a more realistic alternative than full commitment of defence alliances such as 
NATO. Russia’s position to Nordic defence co-operation (NORDEFCO) is 
negative.205 
 
Closer Finnish co-operation with the United States in the field of defence 
might bring a substantial change in the current situation, with advantages and 
disadvantages alike. Thus, Finland has to build her defence relying primarily 
on her own resources without underestimating the significance of co-
operation with other partners, such as the Nordic countries. 
 
6.2 What Kind of Defence Forces does Finland Need? 
 
Finland’s national Defence Forces (FDF) exist above all for those unpredict-
able circumstances when Finland may have to face unacceptable demands, 
and all other security arrangements have failed.  
 
The guiding factors in deciding the future of the national defence forces are 
the tasks and demands on the FDF defined by the Finnish Government and 
Parliament. The Government report of 2009 stated inter alia the following with 
regard to the role of the FDF and military defence: 
 
The Defence Forces, pursuant to their statutory tasks, are employed in the military de-
fence of Finland, in supporting the other authorities as well as in international mili-
tary crisis management. 
[…] 
Finland prepares to repel the use of military force, or the threat thereof, against the na-
tion. This highlights the importance of deterrence. The defence capability and readiness 
are scaled to correspond to the situation at hand. 
[…] 
In line with the comprehensive approach, it is necessary to estimate whether it is possi-
ble to carry out the required tasks with national capabilities alone. Should the capa-
bilities prove inadequate, during normal conditions it is necessary to guarantee the re-
ception of military and other assistance needed in a crisis situation. This can be 
achieved through close international cooperation or through being allied with others.206 
 
The strength of Finland’s peacetime defence forces is among the smallest in 
Europe, some 30 000. Especially in peacetime, the ground forces are essen-
tially a training organization. Combat forces will have to be mobilized from 
the reserve. 
 
                                                           
205 Russia’s Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, Helsinki 5 June  
2012. See also Benitez, 2012.  
206 Prime Minister’s Office, 2009, p. 109. The substance of  the wordings in the new gov-
ernment white paper, released on 21 December 2012, remains essentially unchanged. See 
Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2012, pp. 96-97.  
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These comparisons are misleading, incomplete and slanted in which Finland’s 
total wartime strength of 230 000 after full mobilization is compared to the 
strength of professional armies of countries with many times larger popula-
tions, smaller national territorial areas and a completely different geopolitical 
position.207 
 
In discussions about professional armies, the focus is primarily on ground 
forces. For Finland a professional army is out of the question. Economic 
grounds alone rule out that alternative.  
 
This fact was once again established in September 2010 by the so-called 
Siilasmaa Committee, appointed by the Finnish Ministry of Defence.208 A pro-
fessional army would be such an expensive solution that its actual size would 
inevitably be very small. As a new, low-pay profession, the professional soldier 
would not be an attractive alternative for young Finns to enlist, and the im-
pact on the will of the Finns, which has remained exceptionally high for many 
decades, to defend their country could be disastrous.209 
 
Participation in international military co-operation is natural. Doing so also 
serves Finland’s own defence capability. Finnish reservists with versatile skills 
have proved to be useful in various tasks in international operations. Finland’s 
resources are, however, sufficient only for a small contribution to the interna-
tional crisis management (CM) activities, no matter how much harder we 
would strive to increase our share in CM operations.  
 
The primary task of the FDF remains the defence of the homeland. However, 
the cost-effective defence solution has its downside. Combat units, established 
from the reserve are most vulnerable at the moment of mobilization. Another 
significant fact is that peacetime readiness is so low that repelling a surprise 
attack may be difficult.210 
                                                           
207 Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces, 8 February 2012. 
208 Ministry of Defence (Finland), 2010, p. 7. According to the source, ”General conscription is 
in our opinion the most cost-effective way to produce defence capability in Finland. The costs of even a very 
modest professional army would be significantly higher than that of the conscript army.” The chairman 
of  the committee, Mr. Risto Siilasmaa is the co-founder of  the F-Secure Corporation and 
present chairman of  the board of  the Nokia Corporation.  
209 The will to defend their country is traditionally very high among the Finns. About 75 
percent of the Finns regularly answer “yes” and about 20 percent “no” to the following 
question: “If Finland were attacked, should Finns, in your opinion, take up arms to defend 
themselves in all situations even if the outcome seemed uncertain?” See Ministry of De-
fence (Finland), The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2009. 
210 In the Finnish Ground Forces there are perhaps only about a company of Special Jae- 
gers ready to return fire immediately. The Finnish peacetime units are primarily training 
units, not fighting units. The readiness of the Finnish Air Force is considered good, but its 
peacetime inventory of combat missiles is very low, adequate only for training needs and 
surveillance flights. 
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It is decisively important that the units mobilized are not eliminated with a 
few well-targeted strikes, and that they would be capable of fighting territori-
ally dispersed after having survived the first blows. Sufficient endurance is 
needed and also for buying time to allow for counteractions of friends and 
allies even after surprise precision strikes. 
 
The Finnish defence community and the FDF contingency planning have to 
consider the significance of nearby foreign forces in a high state of permanent 
readiness. Sufficient reserves must be available in order to compensate for 
initial losses during the mobilization phase and those caused by enemy strikes 
as well as for personnel rejected due to deteriorated combat capability or for 
other reasons. If the trained reserve is only equal to the nominal mobilization 
strength, the precondition for the entire defence capability is rapidly put into 
question.  
 
A significant part of the reserve will be tied up with different kinds of guard-
ing, protection and auxiliary support duties. The need is already great during 
the pressuring and threatening phase of the crisis. The call-up and training of 
the whole annual contingents is necessary in order to satisfy the quantitative 
demands for reserve units. For example, at the end of the Cold War, there 
were in Sweden 8 000 sites or locations considered vital for the national de-
fence to be guarded.211 One can assume that in Finland, there would be thou-
sands of corresponding locations. 
 
The Finnish territorial defence is largely based on the requisition of vehicles 
and tools from the civilian community in order to fill the needs for mobilized 
reserve territorial units. There are available at low cost in our country enough 
all-terrain, four-wheel drive vehicles, snow mobiles, ‘monkeys’ and other vehi-
cles. 
 
Enemy operations would extend deeply into our territory from the very start 
with no single, clearly defined front line, and the need for defending units in 
the vast Finnish territory will be great. An aggressor would have to be met 
with determined resistance from the very onset of hostilities at important lo-
cations anywhere in the country. 
 
The crucial question is how to allocate resources between increasingly expen-
sive state-of-the-art army units and the indispensable local defence system 
which covers the whole country. A certain modern spearhead is needed to 
defeat the aggressor. Yet it is questionable how much a possible invader is 
deterred by a Finnish qualitative military high-tech capability if the quantita-
tive dimension of it is miniscule. 
                                                           
211Agrell, 2010, p. 44. 
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 7 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
he forceful return of geopolitics in international affairs is a fact. It also 
has implications in the neighbourhood of Finland. The withdrawal of 
the Russian forces from the previous Soviet positions in the Warsaw 
Pact countries and in the Baltic States at the end of the Cold War was the first 
phase of the change, which coincided with the efforts of the CSCE to build a 
new cooperative security structure for Europe. 
 
The second phase, Russia’s return as a dominant player in the former Soviet 
sphere began in earnest halfway through the last decade and gained increased 
momentum during the war in Georgia, the downfall of the so-called Ukrainian 
orange revolution, and the broader integration of Belarus into the Russian sys-
tems.212 Russia’s efforts to establish a Eurasian Union, is a manifestation of 
her current ambitions and is also an excellent example of the impact of Alex-
ander Dugin’s thinking on contemporary Russian policy.  
 
Wilhelm Agrell, a Swedish professor and well-known peace and conflict re-
searcher, wrote in 2010 that the European security architecture suffered a dis-
astrous failure in the war in Georgia: 
 
The war, no matter how insignificant it was, and how well its foreign political effects 
have been brushed out of sight, simply should never have taken place […] It was an 
anomaly, an exception impossible to explain in light of the adopted basic security po-
litical framework. 
[…] 
The war did not fit at all into the picture of the EU’s and the eastern border area’s 
mutual and stabilizing relationships […]. The EU’s primary or rather only foreign 
political capability – soft power – turned out to be merely a stage setting which the 
Russians punctured unscrupulously.213 
 
By going to war with Georgia in 2008, Russia halted NATO’s expansion east-
ward, President Medvedev pointed out in November 2011: 
 
                                                           
212 STRATFOR, 25 November 2011, “Russia, Belarus: Setting the Stage for the Eura- 
sian Union.” See also STRATFOR, 7 June 2011, “Europe: A Shifting Battleground, Part 
1.” 
213Agrell, 2010, p. 235. 
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The military operations we conducted to force Georgia to peace … were absolutely nec-
essary. The fact that Russia adopted such a tough line at the time ultimately ensured 
that the situation is much more peaceful now, in spite of certain difficulties. 
[…] 
We were able to calm down some of our neighbours by showing them how they should 
behave with regard to Russia and small adjacent states. For some of our partners, in-
cluding NATO, it was a signal that they must think about the geopolitical stability 
before making a decision to expand the alliance. I see this as the main lessons of what 
happened in 2008.214  
 
President Putin confirmed in August 2012 that planning for the war started in 
late 2006. His comment came after high-ranking military officials criticized 
their former Supreme Commander Medvedev for his hesitant leadership, and 
for failing to give the final order to execute the plan in time. 
 
The Russian political and military leadership have in recent years adopted a 
more confrontational language. After Vladimir Putin’s return as President in 
2012, Russia has more and more adopted positions in line with the traditional 
FSB attitudes. The dominant players in the West tended to dismiss this mostly 
as posturing without much substance in deeds.215 Russia’s invasion of Georgia 
was simply forgotten.216 This western perception may, however, be changing 
as the first cracks in the friendly facade among Russia’s closest western part-
ners begin to appear.217  
                                                           
214 President of Russia, 2011. Russia’s NATO Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin was more  
explicit, without active Russian operations Georgia and Ukraine would have become 
NATO members. See РИА Новости, “Медведев: бездействие РФ в 2008 г могло бы 
привести к расширению НАТО”, November 21, 2011, [http://ria.ru/defence_safety/ 
20111121/494106971.html]. See also Giles, 2012a. Keir Giles argues convincingly that the 
Russian view of events related to the war in Georgia is not credible. “Russia and the world 
woke up to war on the morning of 8 August, but close study of events leading up to that point provides a 
number of indicators that suggest additional Russian troops were moving into South Ossetia significantly 
earlier - crucially, without necessarily having explicit authority to do so from the supreme command.” In 
addition, he raises the important question of risks related to deficient command and con-
trol systems in Russia, which may lead to dangerous and provocative activity at a time of 
tension by individual units, as was the case in Georgia. 
215 Germany’s Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle’s comments to Russia’s threats to react 
militarily to NATO’s missile defence plans in Europe are revealing: “In any case, I see not only 
the possibility for agreement, but the necessity for agreement. … We will not ensure our own security against 
Russia, but together with Russia in Europe.” See Bidder, 2011. Another example is provided by 
Army General Makarov’s speech in Helsinki on 5 June 2012 and President Putin’s confir-
mation that the Chief of the General Staff voiced Russia’s position. Finnish Foreign Minis-
ter Erkki Tuomioja held that the General had spoken in a personal capacity. 
216 Seldom has a fine book carried such a sadly misplaced title as that of the late Ronald D. 
Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World – Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010.  
217 Neukirch, 2012. Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff, Chancellor Merkel’s commissioner for 
German-Russian co-operation has strongly criticized the leadership style of President 
Vladimir Putin and charged that "state power (in Russia) views politically active citizens as 
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Russia aims to overthrow perhaps the most important achievements of the 
OSCE, the commitments by the member states made in the Paris Charter 
(1990) and the Istanbul Document (1999).218 Russia suspended implementa-
tion of the CFE Treaty in 2007. The United States and the UK followed suit 
four years later and other NATO member states are expected to follow.219 
Russia responded strongly, using the ballistic missile defence controversy as a 
tool. "The current political leadership can't act like Gorbachev, and it wants 
written obligations secured by ratification documents," Russia’s former 
NATO envoy, Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin said.220 
 
The U.S. think-tank STRATFOR commented already in December 2011 as 
follows: 
 
For Russia, the fundamental issue at hand is not the BMD system itself, but the 
U.S. military presence the system would bring with it. U.S. BMD plans are focused 
on Central Europe, which abuts Russia’s former Soviet periphery. Moscow can’t help 
but feel threatened by the U.S. military commitment to the region that the system 
represents.221  
 
In its military doctrine, Russia considers NATO a danger. The authors of the 
doctrine, however, regarded NATO still a threat to Russia, even a serious 
threat.222 A disunited NATO, on the other hand, considers Russia a partner. 
The experienced Swedish Russia expert Jan Leijonhielm writes in Friends in 
Need:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
opponents rather than partners." Well-known Russian scientist, Dr Igor Sutyagin, who 
spent 11 years in prison and labour camps on dubious charges before he was released in 
the swap related to the exposed Russian spy ring in the USA in 2010, cited a British politi-
cian as follows: “If you want to speak about Russia, speak about it as it is, not as you want 
it to be.” See Sutyagin, 2012. 
218 Frolov, 2011. Ambassador Rogozin points out that the Treaty on Conventional Forces 
in Europe (CFE, 1990) and the adapted CFE Treaty (1999) were agreed upon at a time 
when Russia was weak and that they are no longer acceptable. The CFE negotiations took 
place in parallel with the confidence-building talks leading up to the Paris Charter and the 
Istanbul Document. 
219 Kimball, 2011. See also RIA Novosti, 25 November 2011, “UK Halts Military Data Shar-
ing with Russia” [http://en.rian.ru/world/20111125/169036481.html]. 
220 Isachenkov, 2011. "We won't allow them to treat us like fools," he [Mr. Rogozin] 
said, and continued: "Nuclear deterrent forces aren't a joke." Mr. Rogozin was soon after-
wards appointed Deputy Prime Minister. His main responsibilities are in the domain of 
arms procurement. 
221 STRATFOR, 8 December 2011, “Central Europe Watches as Washington, Moscow  
Clash over BMD” [http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/205624/geopolitical_diary/ 
20111207 -central-europe-watches-washington-moscow-spar-over-bmd].  
222 Felgenhauer, 2010. 
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For small states in Russia’s neighbourhood the military doctrine is by no means a 
calming document, given the earlier-mentioned Russian law stipulating a right for 
Moscow to intervene wherever and however in defence of Russian citizens abroad.  
[…] 
Investment in considerably higher readiness, great mobility and attempts to increase air 
assault capabilities […] matches ill with the development of Russian doctrine, which 
stresses defensive capability. A possible future Chinese threat, for example would 
probably not require any major naval landing capability.223 
 
In Western Europe, the threat of war is considered an extremely outdated 
thought. It has resulted in exceptionally large reductions in the armed forces 
of NATO and of other Western countries, and the emphasis of tasks has 
shifted from national defence to international crisis management. At the same 
time their military operational readiness has decreased drastically. 
 
Russia takes advantage of this situation, and acts in her own way. In develop-
ing the capabilities of her armed forces she aims to create units of high readi-
ness which are able to achieve operational results also in the western direction 
by surprise strikes directly from their peacetime deployments. Reinforcements 
would be brought in and possible occupation forces mobilized from the re-
serve only after the operation has begun.  
 
The “new” NATO member states gained a political victory when the Alliance 
finally agreed to work on contingency plans for the defence of the Baltic 
States. The geostrategic position of these countries is exceptionally unfavour-
able. A capacity to repel invasion from the very outset of hostilities may there-
fore not be deemed possible. Only scarce open information about these plans 
is available, but it appears that the starting point for the planning is retaking of 
lost ground.224 
 
If Russia were forced to consolidate territorial gains, obtained with conven-
tional means, she might be tempted to use nuclear threat. Open discussions of 
“de-escalation” of conflicts by the use of nuclear weapons, the simulated use 
of tactical nuclear weapons at the end of large military exercises, such as Za-
pad-2009 and Vostok-2010, and the deployment of dual-capable Iskander 
missiles not far from the Estonian border, support this view.225 It will be in-
                                                           
223 Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 98 and 106.  
224 Neretnieks, 2012, pp. 199-204. According to Karlis Neretnieks, “It’s all about reta- 
ke.” This description of the allied contingency planning for the Baltic States was communi-
cated by a Swedish defence researcher. 
225 In addition to Luga, Iskander missile deployment to both Kaliningrad and Belarus is  
contemplated. See Liakhovich, 2012.   
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teresting to see how the planned Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2013 exercise will 
be executed in September 2013, announced as a CSTO exercise.226 
 
A general perception is that there is no immediate threat in view now.227 
However, no one can predict reliably what the world will look like ten or 
twenty years from now, the timeframe of today’s strategic decision-making. 
Finland’s influence on world affairs is modest, at best. Capabilities, not inten-
tions are significant. 
 
The defence can be considered credible, when the aggressor realizes that de-
feating it will be achieved only at an unacceptably high cost. The defender 
himself has to be confident of his capabilities. In broader terms, national de-
fence requires the comprehensive military and societal capability to endure. 
The importance of good strategic early warning should not be underestimated.  
 
A sufficiently large military reserve is a signal of the people’s will to defend the 
homeland. Above all, it also indicates that the defence cannot be paralyzed by 
a surprise attack or by threat thereof, and that resistance will continue even 
after enemy invasion. The preventive value of a large reserve is significant. 
                                                           
226 РИА Новости, 28 December 2012, “Российско-белорусские стратегические уче-
ния пройдут в 2013 году” [http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20121224/915972564.html]. 
President Putin: "It is important to enhance the interaction with allies, particularly those in the CSTO. 
Such tasks will be solved in the framework of the planned Russian-Belarusian military exercises West-
2013.” 
227 As this report deals primarily with military capability developments, the authors leave it 
to others, mainly the decision-makers, to assess the threat. 
·  The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland 
 
64 
 
 ANNEX 1 
 
 
Russia’s Military Expenditure 
 
In September 2012 the Russian government submitted to parliament the draft 
budget for the years 2013 to 2015. The Russian State Duma approved it for 
the next three years at first reading at the end of October.228 The budget pro-
posal subsequently passed the parliamentary process and was signed into law 
by the President on 5 December 2012.229 
 
Overall, the federal budget demonstrates the government’s commitment to 
responsible macroeconomic policy. The Russian government is prepared to 
deal with the probable drop in oil revenues, which constitute almost half of 
the federal government income.  
 
Russia’s finance ministry unveiled in July 2012 the direction of 2013−2015 
federal state budgets, presenting a rise in defence spending by 25.8 percent for 
2013 alone.230 The total state budget for 2013 is 12 745 billion rubles (€ 316 
billion; 40.3 RUR = € 1).The  do c ument formed the basis for the 2013 budget 
presented by Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev later in 2012. Interesting to 
note is that the budget plan stipulated an oil price of $92 for a barrel in 2013. 
 
The budget breakdown provides insight on the priorities of the Putin admini-
stration. More than one third of the federal government spending is assigned 
to defence, security and police. According to the analysis of Gaidar Institute, a 
leading Russian think-tank, the military spending is the only part of the budget 
growing in real terms in 2013−2015 with the total three-year increase of 37%. 
In contrast, the health care spending will be cut by 50% from the current me-
diocre level. The details on the defence budget are not disclosed: 50% of 
spending is secret. Presumably, most of the money will be spent on the rear-
mament of the Russian military force. 231 
 
“Targeted ‘national defence’ spending as a percentage of GDP will amount to 
3.2 percent in 2013, 3.4 percent in 2014 and 3.7 percent in 2015”, Defence 
Committee chairman Vladimir Komoedov was quoted as saying in the com-
mittee’s conclusion on the draft budget for 2013-2015. The spending propos-
als provide financing to “re-equip units with new weapon systems, military 
                                                           
228 Committee for Russian Economic Freedom, 2012.  
229 President of Russia, 2012b. 
230 Министерство финансов Российской Федерации (Ministry of Finance, Russian  
Federation), 2012; Nilsen, 2012.  
231 Committee for Russian Economic Freedom, 2012. 
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and special equipment and provide housing and social safeguards for service 
members” among other issues, Komoedov said.232 
 
The share of GDP relating to the total military expenditure is shown in the 
table. 
 
MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET FOR 2012–2015233  
(The total military expenditure includes spending for ‘national defence, other military ex-
penditure, military pensions, MOD and paramilitary forces’) 
 
The share concerning other security and military services (so called “power 
ministries”, siloviki, Russian: силовики) is estimated to exceed 1%. Although 
salaries for members of the Russian armed forces are rising fast, it is not visi-
ble in the budget.234 The current rearmament programme (total amount of 
20 000 billion roubles, approximately 500 billion euros) extends to 2020. It 
will be aimed more at purchasing of new armaments instead of modernizing 
old.  
 
In addition, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced already in October 
2011, that the government is going to use 3000 billion roubles (around 72 bil-
lion euros) for upgrading defence industry, a necessary step for fulfilling the 
ongoing purchasing plans.235 
 
The Defence Ministry coordinates also the weapons procurement of all other 
“power ministries”.236 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a 
detailed breakdown of the planned annual rearmament expenditure at the end 
of 2012 as follows: “The state defence order will reach about 1.9 trillion rou-
bles in 2013, about 2.2 trillion in 2014 and 2.8 trillion in 2015”, and is ex-
pected to stay at that level until the end of the decade.237 
                                                           
232 Fedorenko, 2012. 
233 Cooper, 2012. 
234 Arkhipov, 2011. 
235 Rosbalt, 6 October 2011 [http://www.rosbalt.ru/business/2011/10/06/898103.html]. 
236 Fedorenko 2012.  
237 RIA Novosti, 27 December 2012, Russia to Triple State Defense Order by 2015,  
[http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20121227/178443375.html]. 
Year 
Total military ex-
penditure 
(billion roubles) 
Total military 
expenditure 
(billion euros) 
Growth (%) 
Total military 
expenditure   
(as % GDP) 
2012 2 798.249 46.2 + 12.3 % 4.57 % 
2013 3 052.723 58.2 + 14.8 % 4.59 % 
2014 3 389.244 65.8 + 11.7 % 4.58 % 
2015 3 973.042 71.0 + 12.3 % 4.79 % 
 ANNEX 2 
 
 
The Development of the Russian Armed Forces 
 
In October 2008, Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced 
the launch of a new stage of military reform, aimed at transitioning the Rus-
sian Armed Forces to a new look. This rapid and intensive military reform 
turned out to be the most radical transformation of the armed forces since the 
Second World War. From the very beginning the planned reform met with 
strong opposition from conservative circles of the defence community, even-
tually leading to what could almost be called dishonourable discharge of both 
the defence minister and the chief of general staff in November 2012. Al-
though implementation of the reform is well under way, it is by no means 
completed. Ambitions to create a pure and radically smaller professional army 
than the former Soviet-style army, equipped with state-of-the-art weapons, 
were thwarted. The final outcome remains to be seen, but is likely to be a mix 
of both concepts.  
 
The Goals and Objectives of the Russian Armed Forces’ Reform 
 
The purpose of the reforms is to create mobile and well-trained armed forces 
equipped with modern equipment and weapons. Priorities are as follows: 
 
• Re-deployment of all formations and units for permanent combat 
readiness, 100% staffing for a state of war, 
• Re-equipment of the Armed Forces with modern armaments, military 
and special equipment to meet modern requirements, 
• Revision of program statutory documents for instruction, training and 
conduct of military operations of the Armed Forces, as well as plan-
ning and guidance documents to ensure the vital functions of troops 
and forces, 
• Training of new officers and non-commissioned officers, compiling of 
new training programs, creation of a modern network of military 
schools, 
• Ensuring decent military pay, fulfilment of permanent and service 
housing requirements and resolution of complex social security prob-
lems.238 
 
The President of Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev appeared in March 
2010 at the meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defence. At that 
meeting the ten year rearmament program (2011−2020) for the Russian 
Armed Forces was finally accepted. The Russian Government was given the 
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task of renewing the weaponry of the Armed Forces by an average of 9-11% 
per year, so that by 2020 the modern equipment would make up 70% of the 
total. At the same time they were also to improve the education of officers 
and other military personnel and to raise the combat readiness of troops.239 
 
One main objective of the rearmament program, signed by the President on 
31 December, 2010, is to secure maintenance and further development of 
Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons. About 10% of all the funds are concen-
trated on the development and acquisition of land-based nuclear weapons. 
These include both the modernization of existing systems and the purchase of 
new ones.240 Efforts are also being made to improve the nuclear strike capabil-
ity.241 
 
Another priority is strategic space defence, especially the development of an 
advance early warning system. By 2018 the modernization of the present sys-
tem should be completed and new facilities constructed in all threatened di-
rections. The program also includes different types of satellites, and other 
space defence systems.242  
 
The Voronezh-M anti-missile radar at Lekhtusi, north-east of St. Petersburg, 
became the first radar station of its kind in the country. There are three other 
new generation radar stations in other directions of Russia. At the end of 
2011, Russia started to operate another new missile warning radar Voronezh-
DM. This station is located in the Kaliningrad enclave. These stations can 
monitor the Northern sector including space and missile launches in Sweden 
and Norway. They are also monitoring aircraft flying in the area of their re-
sponsibility.243  
 
Russia is also modernising her airborne early warning and control aircraft, A-
50 Mainstay (AEW&C).244 There have already been doubts about the realiza-
tion of the latest equipment program, since the three previous programs were 
not completed. The former program (GPV-2015) for 2007−2015 was far be-
hind the established schedule when it was abrogated in 2010.245  
 
There are serious doubts that Russian defence industry will be able to fulfil its 
goals. Co-operation today with several western manufacturers is one indica-
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tion. On the other hand, it should be noted that when Russia’s defence indus-
try finally received the promised entire budgetary funds, it was able to carry 
out about 70% of the State’s orders.246 
 
Now it seems that the new leadership team at the MOD has decided to stop 
using the threat of importing armaments from abroad to get Russian defence 
industry to improve the quality of its products. For a couple of years, this 
seemed to be a favourite tool used by former Defence Minister Serdyukov, 
especially in his bid to improve the quality of Russian tanks and armoured ve-
hicles.  Just in the beginning of 2013 there have been some indications that 
the MOD has turned away from imports and will return to the autarkic model 
of military procurement that has been more traditional for the Russian armed 
services.247 
 
Russia’s new Army Brigades 
 
The reform of the Russian army includes forming three categories of brigades, 
designed for different tasks.248 The first category of brigades, heavy brigades, 
will be the main army unit and will maintain permanent readiness status. Such 
a brigade consists of tracked, main battle tanks (for example T-90) and BMP 
(amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles). The brigade’s organic artillery 
is mainly armoured with self propelled guns. 
 
The second category of brigades, medium brigades, will be used as rapid-
response unit. The combat vehicles of these medium brigades are mainly 
wheeled-chassis armour (BTR). The brigade’s artillery is towed or self pro-
pelled on wheels.  
 
The third and final category of brigades, light brigades, will be highly mobile 
units and use light armoured vehicles are characterized by high protective full 
field equipment of individual combatants. 
                                                           
246 Gorenburg, 2011. 
247 Gorenburg, 2013a. 
248 Boltenkov, Gayday, Karnaukhov, Lavrov & Tseluiko, 2011, p. 30. 
·  The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland 
 
70 
 
PERMANENT READINESS BRIGADES OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES249 
(Note: a) Signal, electronic warfare, logistics, ABC, naval, air force, air-space defence and 
some other brigade-level units not included; b) The small distinctions between the above 
table and the list of the permanent readiness formations in The Western Military District 
(Annex 3) are due to different sources). 
  
In all military districts, from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, groups of armed 
formations capable of offensive strike operations, have been built. In these 
formations, combat brigades and airborne divisions of permanent readiness 
are playing the most significant role. The troop skills in combat have been 
tested in many large field exercises. The Chief of General Staff, Army General 
Nikolai Makarov mentioned on 17 November, 2011 that all these formations 
are fully operational and ready to meet their combat tasks in one hour.250 Ac-
cording to our estimates in reality each permanent readiness brigade may have 
only one battalion battle group in high daily readiness.  
 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir 
Chirkin has said that Russia will also add 10 reconnaissance, 14 army aviation 
and two air defence brigades by 2020 without increasing the overall number 
of personnel in the Armed Forces.  
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In line with the current military reform, the Russian Armed Forces have been 
reduced to 1 million personnel and reorganized from a four-tier (military dis-
trict - army - division - regiment) to a more flexible and battle-ready three-tier 
structure (military district - operational command - brigade). At present, there 
are more than 100 brigades deployed in four military districts. (See after the 
table on previous page).251 
 
The military districts have formed their own separate reconnaissance units. 
The ground forces brigades of constant readiness will be capable to operate 
independently aside mobile battle groups and other brigades. With the aid of 
these intelligence units, the commanders have a clear picture of what is hap-
pening from 25−100 kilometres beyond the front lines. In the near future this 
capacity can be extended even to 5000 kilometres by the aid of UAV`s and 
other modern means. Each military district has its own separate reconnais-
sance brigade and each motorized and armour brigade has its own reconnais-
sance battalion.252 
 
At least three military districts have a new air assault brigade at their disposal. 
There will be total six of these brigades. To improve the mobility of these bri-
gades each of them will have a helicopter regiment of 60 helicopters (40 Mi-8s 
and 20 Mi-24s). These brigades will serve in the role of strategic reserve for 
the Joint Strategic Commands (Military Districts) as the airborne divisions are 
subordinated the Supreme Command.253 
 
Each Military District will also have an artillery missile brigade with dual capa-
ble Iskander-M missiles. The first brigade of this kind is already operational at 
Luga base, near St. Petersburg. The range of the missile is officially below 500 
kilometres, but it has potential to fly 700 kilometres in its present configura-
tion and 1000 kilometres in a model employing new, more efficient fuel. Each 
brigade has twelve launchers of two missiles. The new structure of the Rus-
sian Ground Forces is said to be alike its western counterparts. The new 
structure is expected to improve the effectiveness of operations, to coordinate 
and shorten the chain of command.254 
 
The brigade organisation also seems noticeably more flexible and more suit-
able for local conflicts, since the divisions were too large and cumbersome, 
and regiments on the other hand, lacked weapons and equipment necessary 
for carrying out independent operations. The ground force brigades will be 
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used as constantly ready units which will be capable to operate independently, 
along with highly mobile units under one command.255 
 
The tendency in reorganization is to strengthen important directions like 
Northwest, South and Far East, on expenses of other areas.256 
 
Ground Forces play a primary role in defending a large area and long borders 
of Russia and securing country’s integrity. It has a decisive role also in present 
circumstances in defeating enemy and in gaining important goals and objec-
tives.257 
 
Reforming the armament and other equipment  
 
The Army 
 
Colonel-General Aleksandr Postnikov, the former Commander-in-Chief of 
the Russian Ground Forces has stated three problematic areas and six priori-
ties as follows: 
 
The problems: 
 
• Lack of modern equipment, 
• Uneven capability and performance of older equipment, ineffective in-
telligence, C3, navigation, target acquisition, camouflage, forces protec-
tion, and firepower (“gun power”), 
• Wide range of equipment models further aggravate maintenance and 
repair. 
 
The six priorities: 
 
• The creation of a common, automated intelligence and information 
system, C3I, capable of serving through the chain of command agency 
on all leadership levels (ESU TZ leadership organization), 
• Equipping of troops with different kinds of precision long-distance 
and short-range weapons, 
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• Increasing the effectiveness of the equipment for a solitary fighter 
with the aid of different intelligence elements, 
• Introducing remote guided and piloted recognition and weapon sys-
tems i.e. robots, drones, sensors, UAV’s, 
• Improving the capacity of individual soldier by net centric systems and 
utilising nanotechnology in micro-miniaturizing, 
• Improving protection of individual soldiers and vehicles.258 
 
The fundamental change in 2010 was to move from repairing and moderniz-
ing the equipment to production of new and modern weapon systems. 
Top on the purchase list among other things are: 
 
• Ground Forces anti-aircraft brigades` automatic C3I system (ASU), 
• Further acquisition of missile and an artillery systems for Ground 
Forces, such as tactical missiles Iskander-M, heavy multiple rocket 
launcher Tornado-G, self-propelled artillery systems Hosta and Nona-
SVK and anti-tank missile system Khrysantema-S, 
• Modernized S-300V4, Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 SAMs, Tor-M2U(M) 
short range AA-system, shoulder launched Igla-S and Verta close 
range AA-missiles, 
• New T-90 MBT, BTR-82A ACV and considerable amount of foreign 
and domestic produced trucks.259 
 
In 2012 the Russian Ministry of Defence bought armament and equipment 
worth of $ 23.1 billion (about € 18 b illio n). By 2020, Russia’s tro o ps are  to  
receive approximately 2,000 new artillery systems, 2,300 tanks, and 17,000 ve-
hicles. Four hundred (400) intercontinental ballistic missiles will be purchased 
over the coming decade.260  
 
In Russia artillery is traditionally called “God of the War” (Bog voinyi). The de-
velopment of different types of Russian artillery is still going on. The accu-
racy, rate and range of fire are particular objects for development.  
 
Russia's artillery currently deploys the 122-mm Grad, 220-mm Uragan, and 
300-mm Smerch rocket systems and the improved Tornado-S, Tornado-G, 
and Uragan 1-M are currently undergoing state acceptance trials. The army is 
in the process of receiving up to 30 Tornado-G systems this year, replacing 
the BM-21 Grad. 
 
The Russian Army is gradually moving toward a new level of capability for 
deploying precision use of long-range rocket artillery. For instance Russia is 
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now developing new long-range multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) with 
improved guidance that could allow them to strike targets up to 200 km away. 
That means a new generation of MLRS with a range of 200 km. The new 
Tornado-S rocket launcher will have a longer range and increased effective-
ness, thanks to greater accuracy and the use of new warhead payloads and a 
reduced launch readiness time of just three minutes.261 
 
The Russian Army is planning to begin modernize its armoured and mecha-
nized forces beginning in 2015, fielding a new family of vehicles comprising a 
new main battle tank, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and various support 
platforms. The main battle tank (MBT) will be based on the new model Ar-
mata, the prototype is scheduled to enter field trials in 2013, about 10 months 
ahead of schedule. According to the First Deputy Defence Minister Alexander 
Sukhorukov, the new tank is under development at Uralvagonzavod in Omsk. 
The first deliveries of the tank to the Armed Forces are scheduled for 2015.262  
 
According to preliminary reports, the new tank designated T-99 will be less 
radical and ambitious than the failed ‘Object 195’ or T-95. It will weigh less, 
therefore, become more agile and will be more affordable, compared to its 
more ambitious predecessors.263The Armata platform is intended to be the 
basis for a number of other vehicles too, including a main battle tank, a heavy 
infantry fighting vehicle, a combat engineering vehicle, an armoured recovery 
vehicle, a heavy armoured personnel carrier, a tank support combat vehicle 
and several types of self-propelled fighting vehicles.264 
 
It should be remembered that the Russians are building their fighting forces 
not only against NATO, but more importantly, to protect their long southern 
borders with radical Islamic countries that may be gathering military power, 
and the growing dominance of China in the east. Armoured and mechanized 
forces are key to maintaining military superiority or parity against such threats. 
The level of sophistication in meeting those threats is not as demanding as 
meeting the advanced technology fielded by US and NATO forces.265 
 
The Air Force 
 
The Russian Air Force is currently undergoing a period of significant restruc-
turing, both in terms of general organization as well air base and unit struc-
ture. The organization will be changed from previous division–regiment struc-
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ture to air base organization. There will be about 50 bases of three different 
categories.266 
 
• The first category air base includes 5–10 squadrons. The main bulk of 
bases are of this category. They will be located in directions, where 
army brigades most probably need air support and cover. 
• The second and third category bases are less well equipped. 
 
Not long ago, the Russian Air Force was in quite poor shape. Almost all of its 
aircraft were 20−25 years old, outdated, and in poor condition. It’s therefore 
not surprising that the State Armament Program made procurement of new 
aircraft a priority, with a total investment of four trillion roubles (~ € 100 b il-
lion) in that sector alone.267 
 
According to the new ten year procurement programme the Russian Air 
Force will purchase over 1 500 new aircraft and significantly increase the 
number of high-precision weapons in its arsenal by 2020. Overall, Air Force is 
planning to acquire and modernize about 2 000 aircraft and helicopters by 
2020, including more than 1 500 new aircraft and about 400 modernized ones. 
The number of all-weather aircraft, capable of carrying out day and night mis-
sions would increase almost 80 percent, and the share of UAV’s would consti-
tute about 30 percent of the total by 2020.268 Every Joint Strategic Command 
(Military District) can enable its own air support (air transport and close air 
support) exploiting its own frontal air force and helicopter brigade. Even each 
motorized rifle brigade and tank brigade will have air support from its heli-
copter unit (helicopter squadron).269  
 
Since 1992 until in 2010 Russian Air Force has not received new aircraft in 
significant numbers. The new aircraft received earlier were not genuine serial 
production products but came from smaller prototype series. In 2010 the first 
fifth generation T-50 PAK FA stealth fighter flew its maiden flight. It is due 
to enter service in the middle of this decade.270  
 
Some of the largest investments in the Russian Air Force are earmarked for 
military transport aircraft. Contracts have been signed to acquire 20 Antonov 
An-124-100 Ruslan (NATO: Condor) heavy strategic transport aircraft start-
ing in 2015, 39 Ilyushin Il-476 (aka Il-76MD-90A) heavy airlifters starting in 
2014, 11 Antonov An-140 light transport planes (two of them have already 
been delivered), and up to 30 Czech made Let L-410UVP commuters (7 of 
them have already been delivered). 
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In addition, there are plans to purchase up to 50 Il-214 MTA medium-lift 
military transport aircraft, which are expected to be ready for production by 
2016, and up to 20 Antonov An-148 passenger transport planes. Finally, 41 Il-
76s and 20 An-124s will undergo modernization. Some Russian experts men-
tioned the possibility of a tender for up to 100 Ilyushin Il-112 light transport 
planes.271 
 
The air force is also planning to buy up to 30 refuelling planes that will be 
based on the Il-476 transport plane. There are also plans to buy an unspecified 
number of A-100 Beriev AWACS planes, which are currently under develop-
ment, and four Tupolev Tu-204 reconnaissance planes. These will serve in 
conjunction with 12 modernized A-50 Beriev (NATO: Mainstay) AWACS 
planes and 10 modernized MiG-25RB reconnaissance planes. The Russian Air 
Force has altogether around 20 A-50 Mainstay AWACS planes, based on Ilyu-
shin Il-76 transport.272 
 
In terms of strike aircraft, the air force is placing a big bet on the Sukhoi T-50 
PAK FA fifth generation strike fighter. Sixty of these planes are expected to 
be procured starting in 2016 (originally planned for 2014). While four T-50 
prototypes are already being tested, there are indications that new engines and 
advanced electronic systems (and especially its avionics) are not yet ready. 
This may lead to another round of delays in serial production.273 
 
While waiting for the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA fighters, the air force is receiving 
new Su-35S “generation 4++” strike aircraft, 48 of which were ordered in 
2009 for delivery through 2015. Four have been received to date. According 
to estimates in 2011 the Russian Defence Ministry received at least 28 jets 
(two Sukhoi Su-35S multirole fighters, six Su-34 fighter-bombers, eight Su-
27SM3 4+ generation fighters, eight Yak-130 trainers, one Tupolev Tu-
214ON (Open Skies surveillance plane)274, two Tu-154Ms and one Antonov 
An-140-100 transport air craft) and more than 100 helicopters (15 Mil Mi-
28Ns, 10 Kamov Ka-52s, two Mil Mi-35Ms, one Mi-26, six Ansat-U helicop-
ters, six Ka-226s, more than 60 Mi-8s of different modifications).275 
  
It is possible that an additional 48 or 72 Su-35s may be ordered once the cur-
rent order is completed. The air force is also planned to receive 30 Su-30SM 
fighters by 2015, with an option for an additional 30 planes. The first two of 
these have been received. The Russian military has also received four Sukhoi 
Su-30M2s and twelve Su-27SM3s since 2010. Older planes are being modern-
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ized, including a total of 120 Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO: Frogfoot) close air sup-
port aircraft (50 already upgraded) and 120 Mikoyan MiG-31 (Foxhound) in-
terceptor aircraft (at least 25 to be completed by the end of 2012).276 
 
In addition to the fighters, the air force has ordered 129 Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-
bombers to be delivered by 2020, with an option for at least another 18. Fif-
teen of these planes have been delivered. In the meantime, the air force is 
continuing to modernize its existing stock of Su-24s, with 50 already modern-
ized and 50 to be upgraded before 2020. In terms of training aircraft, 18 Yak-
130s have been delivered as of October 2012, with another 49 on order and 
an option for another 10. The air force is also purchasing twelve Su-25UBM 
two-seaters that will likely be used for training. 277 
 
By comparison, long-range aviation will get very little over the next decade. 
There are no plans to complete the two or three remaining Tupolev Tu-160 
(NATO: Blackjack) supersonic strategic bomber, carrying cruise missiles. Pro-
duction of these strategic bombers dates back to Soviet times. Discussions 
about designs for a new long range bomber are continuing. In any case, pro-
duction of new long range bombers will not start until after 2020. The only 
contracts in this sector are for modernization, including 30 Tupolev Tu-22M3 
(NATO: Backfire) bombers and cruise missile carriers, 14-16 Tu-160 strategic 
bombers, and up to 30 Tu-95MS (NATO: Bear) strategic bombers.278 
 
In terms of rotary-wing aircraft, there are contracts in place for 167 Mi-28N 
(45 already delivered), 180 Kamov Ka-52, and 49 Mil Mi-35M (10 already de-
livered) attack helicopters. Transport helicopter orders include 38 Mi-26 heavy 
lift helicopters. Six have already been delivered and another 22 may be or-
dered in the future. Up to 500 Mi-8s of various types will be purchased. These 
are currently being produced at a rate of 50 per year. There are also contracts 
in place for 36 Ka-226 (6 already delivered) and 32 Mil Ansat-U (16 delivered) 
light transport helicopters. Additional contracts for 38 Ansat-U and up to 100 
Kamov Ka-62 helicopters may be placed in the near term.279 
 
During the year 2012 the Russian Air Force appears to have turned a corner 
on procurement, having received 40 new airplanes and 127 new helicopters. 
For the first time, the entire aviation procurement plan appears to have been 
fulfilled. The winged aircraft include now 10 Su-34s, 6 Su-35s, 2 Su-30SMs, 
and over 20 Yak-130s. There’s no detailed breakdown regarding helicopters, 
though the bulk are probably Mi-28N and Ka-52s. This is an improvement on 
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2011, when 31 fixed-wing aircraft and over 50 helicopters were procured. 
Given that in 2010, the numbers were 23 and 37, respectively.280 
 
It will probably still be tricky for the aircraft industry to reach the stated State 
Armament Program goal of delivering 1 120 helicopters and 600 fixed-wing 
aircraft by 2020, but reaching 70 percent of that target by 2020 appears do-
able, with the rest arriving by 2025 at the latest.281 
 
The Aerospace Defence (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona – VKO) 
 
On 1 December, 2011 the Aerospace Defence Forces (Vozdushno-
Kosmicheskaya Oborona – VKO) were officially formed and headed by Lieu-
tenant-General Oleg Ostapenko. Two commands were included in the struc-
ture: the Space Command and the PVO and PRO (Air and Missile Defence). 
In the first phase of equipping the VKO, which is placed operationally under 
the General Staff, the PVO/PRO Command’s missile defence division and 
three S-44 SAM brigades stationed in Podmoskovye were tasked with protect-
ing Moscow. It is planned to reinforce this defence with additional brigades 
and by 2020 to introduce the advanced S-500 air defence system.282 
 
The Air Defence system of Russia works as follows: Fighter jets act as the 
first echelon, covering the area beyond the range of anti-missile systems (from 
300-400km to 1,000-1,500km). At the distance of 50-100 km to 250-400 km, 
targets are engaged by S-300PM, S-400 and S-300V4 air defence missile sys-
tems, capable of shooting down combat jets, unmanned aerial vehicles and 
airborne command posts deep in the enemy’s formations.283 
 
Medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, such as Vityaz (with a range of 
up to 120 km) and Buk (with a range of up to 30–70 km), cover the further 
stretch of the way to the vital military facilities. The Russian air defence is cur-
rently equipped with just ten systems of this type, supplied in 2010. The mis-
sile weapon system consists of command post, an X-band multi-functional 
fire control, tracking and surveillance radar, and up to three missile launchers 
with ten 9M96E missiles or two 9M100 short-range missiles replacing one 
9M96E missile. The Vityaz system is able to detect and track up to 40 targets 
simultaneously while engaging eight of them with two missiles per target.284 
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The plan to renew Russian Air Defence in the near future includes also the 
acquisition of 100 (ten battalions) new, still under development, S-500 
Samoderzhets ("Czar") surface-to-air missiles, the first to be completed by 
2013 and 56 battalions of S-400Triumf (SA-21 Growler) missile systems. Two 
air defence regiments were armed with this system prior to 2010 and an addi-
tional five were to be procured in 2011. S-400 missile system is able to destroy 
cruise missiles and tactical missiles 400 km away. The S-400 missile system is 
already operational around Moscow and Kaliningrad.285 A standard battalion 
includes eight launchers with four missiles each.286 
 
The goal is to have as many as 23 S-400 air defence missile regiments (of 8 to 
12 missiles each) by 2015. It will then be augmented by the more advanced S-
500 system, currently under development and expected to be ready for pro-
duction by 2013. Both the S-400 and S-500 systems are claimed to be superior 
to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 in maximum speed, range, and accuracy. Russia will 
also continue to procure the Pantsir-S1 short-range surface-to-air missile, with 
at least 200 units expected to be added by 2016 to the 10 already in service in 
2010.287 
 
All air defence regiments in the Russian Armed Forces will be equipped with 
advanced S-400 Triumf and Pantsir-S missile systems by 2020, Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin said in March 2011. "We are planning to revamp our air de-
fence network. All air defence regiments will receive new S-400 Triumf and 
Pantsir-S systems," Putin told defence industry officials commenting on the 
state arms procurement program until 2020.288 
 
The S-400 system has a maximum range of up to 400 km and may engage tar-
gets up to an altitude of 40−50 kilometres. The system uses a range of mis-
siles, optimized for engaging ballistic and cruise missiles.  
 
Pantsir-S is a short-to-medium range combined surface-to-air missile and anti-
aircraft artillery system designed to protect point and area targets.289 It carries 
up to 12 two-stage solid-fuel surface-to-air missiles in sealed ready-to-launch 
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containers and has two dual 30 mm automatic cannons that can engage targets 
at a range of up to 4 km.290 
 
Russia planned to station several new S-400 Triumf air defense systems near 
its borders in 2012, former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Alexander Zelin 
stated. “The Russian Armed Forces will receive several S-400 air defence mis-
sile systems this year,” Zelin told RIA Novosti. “This time they will be de-
ployed in air defence units guarding [Russia’s] border regions.” 
 
The Navy 
 
The Russian Naval Headquarters officially moved to St. Petersburg after sev-
eral years of plans and delays. On the Senate Square a ceremony was held and 
the Andreyevskiy flag hoisted over Admiralty in a light snowfall November 7, 
2012. 291 
 
The latest Russian armament program for the Navy includes 100 fighting 
ships. In addition to strategic nuclear submarines the ten year program 
(2011−2020) includes acquisition of following ships and weapon systems:  
 
• 35 Corvettes (including Stereguschiy class, Project 20380), 
• 15 Frigates (nine Project 22350 and six Project11356M), 
• 20 new 5th generation multi-purpose nuclear attack submarine (for 
example nuclear powered Yasen, Project 885), 
• Numerous new supply and special vessels, 
• New ship-based supersonic missile system “Tsirkon-S”.292 
 
The limits in shipbuilding have forced Russia to purchase special ships also 
from abroad. In 2010 Russia signed a contract with France to buy four Mistral 
class amphibious assault ships (LHD). Two will be acquired from France and 
two license-built in Russia. The deal also includes the Zenith-9 C3I system. 
The carriers will be strengthened and equipped so that they are able to operate 
with other surface combatants, submarines and air force in arctic waters.293 
 
President Vladimir Putin visited the northern city of Severodvinsk on 30 July 
2012 and attended the ceremony marking the launching of the fourth Borei 
class nuclear ballistic missile submarine Prince Vladimir. He also presided 
over a meeting on the future naval construction program. Putin underlined 
the importance of the naval capability of Russia: “The Navy is an instrument 
                                                           
290 Ibid. 
291 RusNavyCom, 31 October 2012, “Russian Navy HQ Finally Settled in Saint Peters- 
burg” [http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=16318]. 
292 Gorenburg, 2011b. 
293 Falichev, 2011a, p. 1.. 
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for defending our national economic interests, including in regions like the 
Arctic, which holds a rich concentration of bio-resources, as well as deposits 
of hydrocarbons and other natural resources.”294   
 
The naval construction program calls for investing about 4.5 trillion roubles 
(ca € 111 m illio n) over the next several years, for the construction of 51 mod-
ern surface warships, 16 nuclear attack submarines and 8 nuclear ballistic mis-
sile submarines by 2020 (two of which are now undergoing trials), all but two 
of the surface ships to be built in Russian shipyards. This will allow the share 
of modern vessels and equipment making up the naval forces to be brought to 
70 percent by 2020, Putin said. An explicit part of the program is the upgrad-
ing of Russia's defence industry, which has been slow to deliver new weapons 
in recent years.295  
                                                           
294 President of Russia, 2012c; Russia Today, 31 July 2012, “Bid For Naval Dominance: Rus-
sia Significantly Boosts Nuclear Fleet” [http://rt.com/news/russia-navy-nuclear-
submarine-fleet-450/]; NTI Global Security Newswire, 31 July 2012, “Putin Pledges to Bolster 
Sea-Based Nuclear Arms”  
[http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/putin-pledges-bolster-sea-based-nuclear-arms/]. 
295 Ibid. 
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 ANNEX 3 
 
 
The Development of Russian Military Potential Nearby  
Finland 
 
Western Military District (WMD) 
 
WMD includes former Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, Northern 
and Baltic Fleets, Kaliningrad Special Area and 1st Air Force and Air Defence 
Command. The HQ of Western MD is located in St. Petersburg, in former 
location of Leningrad MD`s HQ. Colonel-General Arkady Viktorovich 
Bakhin was the first CO of this Joint Strategic Command West (OSK, Obyed-
inyennoye Strategicheskoye Kommandovanye) 2010− 2012.296 
 
The Ground Forces of WMD are considerable strong. According to a Russian 
estimate its capability of warfare has been increased “more than 13 times” (> 
90%)297 compared with former Leningrad Military District (LMD).298  Western 
MD includes among other two General Force Armies: 
- 6th Army, HQ at Agalatovo, on Karelian Isthmus, close to Saint Peters-
burg and 
- 20th Guards Army, HQ at Mulino, east of Moscow.299 
 
In the Western Military District (WMD) there are more than 40 peace-time 
brigades and detached special regiments/battalions in declared permanent 
readiness as follows300:  
 
Tank   
4. Detached Guards Tank Brigade   (Naro-Fominsk) 
6. Detached Tank Brigade   (Dzhershinsk) 
 
 
                                                           
296 Warfare.be, “Russian Military Analysis: Western Military District – OSC West” 
[http://warfare.be/?linkid=2225&catid=321]. 
297 In Russia the mathematical comparison is often expressed as “times”; something is X 
times bigger. It is possible to calculate as per cent with formula: 100–100/X times. In this 
case the exact calculation is 100–100/13 = 92.3%. 
298 Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 December 2010, “Armija Rossii: Novyj oblik “Prioritety stroitelstva 
Vooruzhennyh sil”” (Russian Army: Priorities of Armed Forces’ Organization) 
[http://old.redstar.ru/2010/12/29_12/1_08.html]. 
299 Warfare.be, “Russian Military Analysis: Western Military District – OSC West.” 
300 Warfare.be; IHS Jane’s; Jane’s World Armies, “Russian Federation” (15 November 2012). 
Note: not included signal, communications, C3, ECM, elint, NBC, support, logistics, avia-
tion, naval, space, etc. brigades neither reserve. Due to different sources there are small 
distinctions between the above list and the table of Annex 2 (Permanent Readiness Bri-
gades of The Russian Armed Forces). 
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Motor Rifle Infantry   
138. Detached Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Kamenka) 
200. Detached Motor Rifle Brigade  (Pechenga) 
25. Detached Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Vladimirskiy Lager) 
27. Detached Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Vidnoye) 
5. Detached Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Kalininets) 
9. Detached Motor Rifle Brigade  (Nizhniy Novgorod) 
10. Motor Rifle Brigade   (Novomoskovsk) 
22. Motor Rifle Brigade   (Yakhroma) 
39. Motor Rifle Brigade   (Kursk) 
79. Detached Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Gusev/Kaliningrad) 
7. Detached Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (Kaliningrad) 
  
Spetsnaz /Recce  
2. Detached Spetsnaz Brigade  (Promezhits) 
16. Detached Spetsnaz Brigade  (Tambov/Chuchkovo) 
218. Separate Strategic Reconnaissance Rgt. (Sokolniki/Moscow)  
216. Detached Spetsnaz Battalion  (Moscow) 
 
Airborne/Commando  
76. Air Assault (Commando) Division (Pskov) 
98. Airborne Division   (Ivanovo/Kostroma) 
106. Airborne Division   (Tula/Ryazan/ 
Naro-Fominsk) 
45. Separate Airborne Infantry Regiment (Sokolniki/Moscow) 
 
Artillery Missile   
448. Missile Brigade   (Durnevo/Kursk) 
26. Missile Brigade   (Luga) 
112. Guards Missile Brigade  (Shuya) 
152. Missile Brigade   (Chernyakhovsk) 
 
Artillery    
288. Artillery Brigade   (Mulino) 
9. Artillery Brigade   (Luga) 
45. Heavy Artillery Brigade  (Tambov) 
235. Artillery Brigade   (Skopin) 
244. Artillery Brigade    (Kaliningrad) 
 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MRLS) 
79. Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade (Tver) 
 
Air Defence   
5. Air Defence Brigade (Nyunemyaki  
[fi. Nenimäki]) 
202. Air Defence Brigade  (Naro-Fominsk) 
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53. Air Defence Brigade  (Kursk) 
49. Air Defence Brigade  (Elnya) 
133. Guards Detached Air Defence Brigade (Strugi Krasnye) 
183. Guards Detached Air Defence Brigade (Gvardeisk/Kaliningrad) 
43. Detached Air Defence Brigade  (Znamensk/Kaliningrad) 
 
Engineer    
140. Detached Engineer Regiment  (Kerro) 
317. Detached Engineer Brigade  (Belev/Tula) 
 
Naval Infantry  
336. Detached Guard Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltiysk) 
61. Detached Naval Infantry Brigade (Sputnik/Pechenga) 
 
Coastal Missile  
25. Coastal Missile Regiment  (Donskoye/Kaliningrad) 
522. Coastal Missile Brigade  (Olenya Guba/ 
Kola peninsula) 
  
These formations are part of the order of battle of the above mentioned ar-
mies or some of them are directly subordinated to the Western Military Dis-
trict (WMD).301 In the WMD there are altogether more than 60 bri-
gades/formations in declared permanent readiness or to be established from 
reserves in mobilisation (including all branches).302 The Russian Ministry of 
Defence has reported plans to establish two new arctic brigades. It was de-
cided at the Security Council in September 2008 that Russia is to deploy a 
combined-arms force to protect its political and economic interests in the 
Arctic by 2020, including military, border and coastal guard units to guarantee 
Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances.303 
 
The first arctic brigade seems to be the present 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade 
at Pechenga. As possible locations of the second one Arkhangelsk, Alakurtti 
and even Novaya Zemlya have been mentioned.304 In Alakurtti village infra-
structure already exists and from there is also railway connection to the vicin-
                                                           
301 Forum ”Voennyj Rubezh”, 24 October 2010 [http://ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php/  
topic,2478.0.html]; Milkavkaz.net, 13 October 2009, ”Московский военный округ” 
[http://milkavkaz.net/?q=node/42]; Milkavkaz.net, 13 October 2009, ”Ленинградский 
военный округ” (Leningrad Military District) [http://milkavkaz.net/?q= node/43]. 
302 IHS Jane’s World Armies, “Russian Federation”, 15.11. 2012. 
303 Osborne, 2011. See also IISS, 2012, p. 187 and IHS Jane’s World Armies, “Russian Fed-
eration”. 
304 Wezeman, 2012, pp. 8-10; REUTERS, 1 July 2011, “Russia creates two brigades of  
Arctic troops” (Grove, Thomas) [http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/01/russia-arctic-
troops-idUKLDE76017D2011 0701]. 
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ity of Kandalaksha harbour at the White Sea.305 The formation of the Arctic 
brigades has been delayed and the schedule according to present planning is 
set to 2015.306 
 
The Coast Guard formations (FSB) in the northern waters are to be strength-
ened and their presence to be increased by 2017.307 
 
The strength of the training centre of the Western Military District at Mu-
lino308, near Moscow, is equivalent to a former reinforced army division.  De-
tached ground force training subcenters at Sertolovo309, north of Saint Peters-
burg and Kovrov310 east of Mulino, almost equal the strength of a brigade.  
 
This annex has not listed training battalions and regiments of different mili-
tary schools. Under the WMD’s premises there are in additional different 
types of supporting units and paramilitary, armed formations of other minis-
tries. All these units will be subordinated to the Joint Strategic Command of 
the WMD in the time of crisis. Several maintenance and repair depots in the 
area will also establish reserve formations/units with the equipment at their 
disposal.311 
 
The maintenance and repair depots near Finland are able to establish at least 
three reserve brigades, such as 62nd Motorized Rifle Brigade at Alakurtti, 41st 
Motorized Rifle Brigade at Sertolovo, and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade in 
                                                           
305 51.ru Novosti online, 19 May 2011, “В мурманском поселке Алакуртти размес- 
тится арктическая бригада” (Arctic Brigade Will Be Deployed at Alakurtti) [http:// 
51.ru/newsline/394717.html]. 
306 Myasnikov, 2011. See also Pettersen, 2011. For an update see RIA Novosti, 21 February 
2012, “Russia to Field First Arctic Brigade in 2015” [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_ 
news/20120221/171440711.html] & Pettersen, 2012a. 
307 ARCTICWAY.ru, 30 March 2011, “Защищать национальные интересы РФ в Арк-
тике, являющейся по оценке президента России ресурсной базой страны, будет 
специальная мотострелковая бригада.” [http://www.arcticway.ru/index.php ?id=173] 
According to the Russian President’s evaluation concerning the defence of the National 
Resources  in the Arctic Region, the Special Motor Rifle Brigade will be formed.  
308 Nekhai, 2012. 
309 BaltInfo.ru, 8 September 2012, “В Сертолово с размахом отметили День танкис-  
та” (The Day of Tankman at Sertolovo) [http://www.baltinfo.ru/2012/09/08/V-Serto-
lovo-s-razmakhom-otmetili-Den-tankista-302955]. 
310 Voyennoe Obozrenie, 29 February 2012, “467-й окружной учебный центр” (467.  
Training Centre of Military District) [http://topwar.ru/11741-467-y-okruzhnoy-uchebnyy-
centr.html]. 
311 Warfare.be, “Russian Military Analysis: Western Military District OSC West.”  
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Petrozavodsk.312 The 85th Detached Helicopter Regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8 heli-
copters) at Alakurtti will be re-established.313 
 
There are approximately 60 army depots in Russia. Most of them have the 
capacity to establish at least one brigade size unit. Military schools and training 
centres have a certain role in mobilisation.314 
 
The Baltic Fleet 
 
The allocation of the total defence budget for naval forces has been about 25 
percent. The strategic ballistic missile submarines of the Northern and Pacific 
Fleets retain their traditional role (second strike) in the nuclear triad. 
 
The role of the Baltic Fleet is in securing the country’s export – import routes, 
especially of energy export. The Baltic Sea is nowadays only partly under Rus-
sia’s control. Because of NATO’s eastward expansion and some increase of 
activities (for example the U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missiles in north-eastern 
Poland) Russia has decided to improve her military readiness in the Baltic 
area.  
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the situation of the Russian Baltic Fleet 
weakened, when it lost a major bulk of its previous bases. Its main base and 
headquarters are located in Kaliningrad area. 
 
The main tasks of the Baltic Fleet of Russia at present are as follows: 
• Protection of the Russian economic zone and areas of productive ac-
tivities, suppression of illegal productive activities,  
• Ensuring safety of navigation,  
• Implementation of foreign policy actions of the Government in eco-
nomically important areas of the World oceans (visits, routine entries, 
joint exercises, and action in the composition of peacekeeping forces, 
etc.), 
• Co-operation with other Russian naval units operating in the area, es-
pecially with the Northern Fleet.315 
                                                           
312 Military and Security, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, “Russian Federation  
Army”, 24 February 2010 [http://www.milnet.fi/www8.janes.com]. 
313 Pravitelstvo Murmanskoi oblasti (Murmansk Region Government), Press-release 28 
September 2010, Discussion Between Murmansk Region Governer Dmitri Dmitrenko and Russian 
Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov about Alakurtti Air Base [http://www.gov-
murman.ru/press/?d=28-09-2010_09:07]; Observationsplatsen, 1 October 2010, “Avbruten 
reträtt” [http://oplatsen.wordpress.com/2010/10/01/avbruten-retratt] and [http://www. 
hibiny.ru/news/ru/archive/20851]. 
314 Pukhov, 2012 and Barabanov, 2010. 
315 Flot.com, Пресс-служба Балтийского флота (Press service of the Baltic Fleet) 23 July 
2010, [http://flot.com/nowadays/structure/baltic/]. 
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The operational forces of the Baltic Fleet include: 
• Two diesel submarines, 
• Five principal surface combatants (destroyers/frigates), 
• 20 Coastal combatants (corvettes) and patrol boats, 
• Around 70 fixed wing aircraft and some 55 helicopters of various 
types.316 
 
While renewing surface combatants the focus is in building corvettes with 
precision guided weapons and long ranged cruise missiles. The amphibious 
capability will improve drastically, if the Fleet will introduce the new amphibi-
ous assault ships.317 
 
If transferring other major naval combatants from the Atlantic to the Baltic 
Sea is part of contingency plans, they have to pass the Danish Straits before 
crisis. 
 
The Northern Fleet 
 
The Northern Fleet is the strongest and most versatile command in the Rus-
sian Navy. Its major role is the maritime component of the nuclear triad. The 
growing importance of northern waters emphasizes the role of this fleet and 
its support area. The Fleet HQ is located in Severomorsk near Murmansk. 
Other bases are situated mostly by the fjords of the northern coast of Kola 
Peninsula, and in Severodvinsk on the south-eastern coast of the White Sea.318 
 
The 1st Command of Air Force and Air Defence  
 
During the current military reform, the Russian Air Forces were organized 
into a new system, including seven operational commands (i.e. four Air Force 
and Air Defence Commands subordinated to corresponding military districts, 
Long-range Aviation Command, Military Transport Aviation Command plus 
Joint Strategic Aerospace Defence Command), seven air bases of 1st class 
category and thirteen air-space defence brigades.319 
 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force stated in November 2010 
that the Air Force HQ will take the responsibility only for combat training 
and general development of the branch. The Long-range Aviation Command 
                                                           
316 Warfare.be: “Baltic Fleet.” 
317 Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 89. 
318 Baev, 2012. 
319 Kolbin, (ed.), 2011, pp. 9-24; Gazeta.ru, 9 February 2010, “Alexander Zelin, Colo- 
nel-General: ВВС России проведут ребрендинг” (The Russian Air Force is Rebranding) 
[http://www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/-glavkom-vvs-zelin-vystupil-po-istrebitelyu/28 
8356.html]. 
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and the Transport Aviation Command will stay subordinated to the high 
command. All the rest remains under the military districts.320 
 
Jane’s World Air Forces reported that:  
 
Russia’s long-range air force has had its mission changed from nuclear deterrence to 
conventional strike against point targets in support of counter-insurgency operations. 
In 2005, the division took delivery of the first examples of the new Kh-101 conven-
tional stealthy air-launched cruise missile and augmented its fleet with a pair of up-
graded Tu-160 bombers able to carry and deliver laser-guided bombs.321  
 
While counter-insurgency operations were mentioned as a motive for the role-
change, it is obvious that these long-range weapon systems can reach any-
where in Europe. 
 
According to its mission and tasks the Air Force’s Aviation is divided into 
long-range, front-line, military transport and army aviation, which in turn in-
clude bomber, attack, fighter, reconnaissance, transport and special aircraft. 
The core of the Air Force’s combat element is composed from air bases and 
brigades of the Air Defence.322 
 
Air Force’s divisional/regimental echelons have been supplanted by Air Base 
unit establishments, with the majority of these possessing three subordinate 
squadrons. In addition, a number of former Naval Aviation elements have 
been (and are still being) reassigned to the Air Force (these include Su-27 and 
MiG-31 interceptor units, Tu-22M medium-range bomber units and at least 
two major air bases in the Kaliningrad region). Many of the changes have 
been accomplished simply by transferring aircraft. This process of consolida-
tion permits closure of a substantial number of airfields.323 
 
The 1st Command of Air Force and Air Defence consists of the following 
formations: 
• Headquarters is located in Voronezh, and the 7000th AFB in Vo-
ronezh is the main air base,324 
• 1st air-space defence brigade (Severomorsk) 
• 2nd air-space defence brigade (St. Petersburg) 
• 6961st aviation base (Petrozavodsk) (Sukhoi Su-27) 
                                                           
320 Gorenburg, 2011.  
321 IHS Jane’s World Air Forces, “The Engels-Based Bomber Force, Which Includes Exam-
ples of the Tu-22M 'Backfire', Tu-95MS 'Bear' and Tu-160 ‘Blackjack’”, 27.11..2012. 
322 McDermott, 2012b. 
323 IHS Jane’s World Air Forces, “Russia”, 27 November 2012. 
324 Gavrilov, 2009. 
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• 6964th aviation base (Monchegorsk, Murmansk Oblast) (Sukhoi Su-
24M, Su-24MP) 
• 6965th aviation base (Viaz’ma, Smolensk Oblast) (Mil Mi-8, Mi-24) 
• 7000th aviation base (Voronezh) (Sukhoi Su-24M, Su-24MP, Su-34).325 
 
The inventory of the Russian Air Force may have included around 5000 fixed 
and rotary wing air craft before the military reform.326 The number of aircraft 
left in the Air Force and Army Aviation after the reform, has not been dis-
closed. The plan was to reduce them by no less than a third.327 A significant 
portion of the assets are apparently beyond repair. IISS Military Balance 2012 
lists about 1 800 fixed wing aircraft and 1 000 rotary wing aircraft as combat 
capable.328 The Swedish Defence Research Establishment FOI has presented 
even lower numbers and predicts that the number of aircraft will continue to 
diminish until 2020, when equipment from the Soviet era is finally phased 
out.329  
 
Selected air units of Russia’s Western military district have started prepara-
tions to return to abandoned Arctic airfields, the commander of the district’s 
aviation Maj. Gen. Igor Makushev said on Wednesday 30 May 2012. The mili-
tary airfields in the Arctic were used extensively in the Soviet era, but after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 they have been generally mothballed. 
“We will start reopening airfields on Novaya Zemlya and in Naryan-Mar as 
early as this summer (2012),” Makushev told a news conference in Saint Pe-
tersburg. Plans for 2013 include the reopening of a military airfield on Gra-
ham Bell Island, which is part of Franz Josef Land.330 These plans turn out to 
have been more political than based on real plans and are to be considered 
premature. Ex-commander of the Air Force Vladimir Mikhailov says that it is 
too early to talk about a base of jet fighters in the Arctic. “In the current situa-
tion we don’t need any base there. First we have to deal with all the problems 
on the main land, and only then, when we are “tougher”, we will move on to 
Novaya Zemlya”.331  
  
This does not, however, reverse Russia’s plans to strengthen her military 
means to protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic region by 
                                                           
325 Gorenburg, 2011c. 
326 The numbers were calculated from the order of battle lists given by Jane’s, but they 
probably do not represent the situation as of November 2012 accurately, since detailed 
figures have not been disclosed after Russia stopped CFE Treaty implementation and data 
sharing in 2007. See IHS Jane’s World Air Forces, “Russia”.  
327 Lavrov, 2011, p. 59. 
328 IISS, 2012, p. 197. 
329 Carlsson & Norberg, 2012, pp. 111 – 112. 
330 Melnikov, 2012; IHS Jane’s World Air Forces, “Russia.” 
331 Pettersen, 2013. 
 
                                                                                                                       Annex 3  ·    
   
 
91 
 
2020. Deployment includes military combined-arms, including border and 
coastal guard units to guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military 
and political circumstances. 
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 ANNEX 4 
 
 
EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN 
MILITARY EXERCISES SINCE 2009 
 
Large-scale strategic military exercises of Russian Armed Forces and together 
with forces of other "power ministries", so called “siloviki”, have been carried 
out in different parts of Russia on rotation basis every 1-4 years. After one 
such exercise, Kavkaz-2008, in August 2008 troops continued directly to the 
pre-planned military operation against Georgia, instead of returning to their 
home bases in the Northern Caucasus Military District.332 The next large-scale 
strategic military exercise Zapad-2013 (West-2013) will take place in western 
Russia and Belarus in 2013.333 
 
Large-scale strategic exercises in North-West Russia have not been frequent. 
The year 2009 made an exception. Two large-scale partly overlapping exer-
cises were carried out. Exercise Ladoga-2009 was carried out in a zone of 300 
km x 1200 km, from Pechenga to Vyborg and further south of St. Petersburg. 
A few weeks later started another, even larger exercise, Zapad (West) 2009 
which tested the new chain of command. 
 
Both exercises started from the same basic scenario, invasion by enemy 
ground forces from the west toward western and north-western Russia, sup-
ported by air and naval forces. Exercise Ladoga took place mainly in nine 
separate ranges between The Arctic Ocean and Pskov oblast. The live firing 
climax was a launch of ballistic missiles. Both exercises were coordinated by 
the General Staff. Ladoga-2009 was executed under the command of Com-
mander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces and Zapad-2009 under Chief of 
General Staff.334 
 
One important goal of both exercises was to scrutinize the protection of 
flanks of two commands. New tactical and technical innovations with "good 
                                                           
332 Cohen, 2008. See also the video Студия "Альфа", г. Тверь, 7 August 2012,  
Потерянный день" вся правда о Войне 08.08.08г. (The Lost Day – the Whole Truth 
about the War on 8 August 2008) & Felgenhauer, 2012. The “Lost Day” film and the 
comments by Putin and Medvedev have revealed a great deal: that the invasion of Georgia 
in August 2008 was indeed a pre-planned aggression and that so-called “Russian peace-
keepers” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were in fact the vanguard of the invading forces 
that were in blatant violation of Russia’s international obligations and were training and 
arming the local separatist forces. 
333 Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BELTA), 26 October 2012, “Belarus to Host Next  
Belarusian-Russian Army Exercise in 2013” [http://news.belta.by/en/news/society?id= 
664528]. 
334 Khaimendrinov, 2009. 
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old" equipment and weaponry were used. The command, control and co-
operation of troops were the focal point of both exercises. Comprehensive 
net work based air defence, wide signal intelligence, common communications 
system and automated command (ASU TZ) in one integrated net work were 
tested. Satellite intelligence, UAVs, electronic warfare, automated C3I will be 
essential factors on future battlefield.335 
 
About 20 000 Russian and Belorussian troops participated in Exercise Zapad-
2009 and about 7 400 Russian soldiers of different "power ministries" partici-
pated in Exercise Ladoga-2009. Parts of the 28th Motorized Rifle Brigade 
were transferred from Yekaterinburg by train to the Karelian Isthmus. Troops 
of 20thGuards Army from then Moscow Military District were transported to 
Zapad-2009 exercise area.336 
 
Approximately 60 Russian and Belorussian combat aircraft and more than 40 
helicopters were involved in Zapad-2009. New generation precision guided 
weapon and target acquisition systems were tested. The Joint Russian - Belo-
russian Air Defence System, which was founded earlier in 2009, was also 
proved.  
 
Night vision capable combat helicopter Mil Mi-28Ns together with older, but 
modernized Mi-24 PMs operated the first time at exercises. Also Kamov Ka-
50s and Ka-52s were seen. The latest model MiG-29 SMT interceptors par-
ticipated also for the first time. Aged but modernized Tupolev Tu-160, Tu-
95MS, Tu-22MS bombers, Sukhoi Su-27SM, Mikoyan MiG-31BM fighters 
and Sukhoi Su-24M2 and Su-25SM ground attack air craft were in action. 
Units of long range S-400 and S-300 PM SAM-batteries performed in air de-
fence and anti air duties.337 Air launched precision guided weapons from Tu-
polev Tu-22M3 (NATO: Backfire) bomber and tactical Sukhoi Su-24M 
(NATO: Fencer) attack aircraft were also tested in Belarus during this exer-
cise.338  
 
As to the exercise’s maritime section, a naval anti-ship cruise missile P-700 
Granit (NATO: SS-N-19 Shipwreck) salvo, employing so called “wolfpack” 
tactics, was launched from different directions for the first time in fifteen 
years. Maximum range of the Granit missile is about 550 km.339  
 
                                                           
335 Ekström, 2010, p. 25. 
336 Khaimendrinov, 2009. 
337 RIA Novosti, 8 September 2009, “Russia and Belarus Start Zapad 2009 Military Ex- 
ercise” [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20090908/156054418.html] & Smith, 2009. 
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The summary a few months after the exercise declares that major reorganiza-
tions were made or were in the final phase. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of 
Ground Forces emphasized e.g. following factors:340 
 
In several military districts, including border and inland regions extending 
from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, efficient formations have been established. 
Permanent-readiness brigades and airborne divisions play the most important 
role. Instead of the previous former six first-line assault strike divisions, alto-
gether 85 motorized rifle, armour, missile, artillery, air assault, and various 
kinds of signal and electronic warfare, engineering, ABC-warfare and logistic 
brigades had been formed. These brigades are at full strength and fully 
equipped. Their combat skills were tested, for example in Ladoga-2009 and 
Zapad-2009 large scale exercises. The new C3I (ASU TZ) system has been 
successfully tested during these exercises. 
 
Three military districts have got detached air assault brigades. They will be 
directly subordinated to the military districts. These brigades will serve as the 
mobile reserve for the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Strategic Command. 
Brigades can be used in prompt actions in dangerous zones or directed to 
support infantry fighting units. In larger operations air assault brigades may be 
supported by helicopter regiments. The brigade has an organic helicopter 
regiment of sixty helicopters. 
 
Each Joint Strategic Command (Military District) will have at least one heli-
copter brigade (70−100 helicopters). In some cases a helicopter unit (squad-
ron) can be attached to a motorized rifle or tank brigade.341 
 
The Army Aviation will be transferred from the Air Force back to the 
Ground Forces, which is a significant advantage. This makes it easier to move 
air assault and infantry units to necessary directions according to battlefield’s 
requirements. Subsequently Mi-24 and Mi-28N combat helicopters assure im-
mediate air support for brigades in all circumstances both in defence and at-
tack. 
 
All military districts have formed their own detached reconnaissance brigade, 
which will assure the necessary information about enemy at many levels. The 
permanent-readiness brigades of the General Purpose Forces have got their 
own reconnaissance battalion. The commanding officers of above mentioned 
units will get information from a range of 25–100 km beyond the front line. 
The intention is to extend gradually the range of reconnaissance up to 500 km 
with UAV’s and other means. 
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Each military district will get or has already got a missile brigade equipped 
with Iskander-M ballistic missiles with versatile conventional warheads. These 
missile units are also certified to employ nuclear warheads.342 The 26th Missile 
Brigade at Luga, south of Saint Petersburg is already operational. The system 
will include in addition to ballistic missiles also cruise missiles. 
 
The Readiness of the Russian Ground Forces 
 
The readiness of Ground Forces has been increased significantly in recent 
years. General Makarov, however, reported in November 2011 that all units 
and formations in the category of  permanent readiness have been reinforced 
to full combat strength. These units are to be ready to execute combat opera-
tions within 1−2 hours after given order. This claim should, however, rather 
be interpreted as an ambition, not as an established fact.343 Jane’s World Ar-
mies estimated in November 2012 that the majority of the Russian Airborne 
Forces can be deployed within 12 hours while the bulk of the Ground Forces 
should be operational within 24 to 48 hours, albeit in many cases with 20−40 
percent deficit in vehicles.344 In practice, it is evident that ‘permanent readi-
ness’ brigades will not appear as originally planned, to be able to maintain 
daily readiness at full strength. Rather there will be combat units of battalion 
strength in permanent readiness.345 
 
Conscript soldiers are transferred from their training centres after six months 
basic training to formations (brigades) of constant readiness. They can be 
transferred to any theatre of war at short notice.  
 
The mobilization system of Russian Ground Forces has changed drastically in 
recent years. In addition to cadre brigades there are numerous (more than 60) 
depots/storages, each with sufficient equipment for a brigade size unit or 
even more. 
 
Mobilization was exercised also in Ladoga-2009 346 and again in September 
2012, when an exercise was held in Petrozavodsk (Karelian Republic) under 
the command of the Western Military District Commander.347 The local Mo-
tor Rifle Infantry Brigade (4th Detached Motor Rifle Brigade)348 was called up 
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345 McDermott, 2012. 
346 Khaimendrinov, 2009. 
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from reserve, brought to full readiness and performed a combat exercise be-
tween 13 and 30 September 2012.349 
 
The brigade organization is more flexible and fits better into local conflicts in 
comparison with previous division organization. The main function of the 
ground force brigades as a permanent-readiness formation is capability to op-
erate independently with highly mobile battle groups or other brigades under 
common command.  
 
War games are yet another tool used in annual command exercises that are 
conducted in the country’s different strategic regions. In 2012 the Russian 
Army tested its new organizational and command structures, much like it did 
during the Zapad (West) 2009, Vostok (East) 2010 and Zentr (Center) 2011 
exercises.350 
 
The Russian Military Exercise Activities in 2012  
 
The intensity and activity of Russia’s Armed Forces have gradually grown 
over the last few years. Several factors have contributed. Main reasons are 
found in the recently introduced new military organisation (military com-
mand-army-brigade), adopted new equipment, weaponry and particularly test 
runs of the new command and control system.351 It seems that the command 
system tested in Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009 was then still in its infancy. 
The Russian Armed Forces’ exercises cover practically all the services and 
branches plus other power ministries’ armed elements. 
 
In addition, Russia has traditionally conducted exercises mutually with some 
other country or even multinational exercises and, of course, military exercises 
of her own. The year 2012 is not an exception in this respect. 
 
As for the coming large-scale strategic exercise in 2013, the Russian General 
Staff has released information that the biggest exercise of the whole Russian 
Armed Forces will be “Zapad-2013” (West 2013) in September 2013, at the 
same time a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) exercise.352 
                                                           
349 RIA Novosti, 14 September 2012, “Военные учения проходят в Карелии впервые с 
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350 Kramnik, 2012. 
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International Military Exercises 
 
In Central Asia the Russian, Chinese and Tajik Armed Forces took part in a 
common counter terrorism exercise in Tajikistan between June 8 and 14, 
2012. Of the five former Soviet Central Asian states, only isolationist Turk-
menistan is not a member of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), 
the group named after the city where it was set up in 2001. Over the past few 
years China has strengthened its interests in Central Asia.353 
 
The CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) joint drills hinged on 
humanitarian and anti-terror manoeuvres to synchronize command and logis-
tics operations of CSTO member states and tested force elements assigned to 
the KSOR - the Collective Rapid Reaction Force. A number of international 
organizations were also expected to join in the drills, for instance the Red 
Cross movement.354 
 
The joint Russian-Kazakh anti-terrorist exercise “Aldaspan-2012”, was con-
ducted in June 2012 in the Koktal exercise area in south-eastern Kazakh-
stan.355 Russia held also different military exercises with Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Armenia and Belarus during 2012. Already in early May (11-16) Russia and 
Norway held another common naval exercise “Pomor-2012”.356 
 
“The Northern Eagle 2012” trilateral naval exercises for Russia, Norway and 
the United States were held 21-25 August, in the Norwegian Sea. The Rus-
sians were represented by the Admiral Chabanenko, a Northern Fleet de-
stroyer at the manoeuvres, Norway by the Nordkapp coast guard frigate and 
the U.S. by the Farragut guided weapons destroyer.  
 
All three countries will arrange these exercises in turn. This kind of manage-
ment system has previously repeatedly been tested in the Norwegian-Russian 
Pomor exercises and was recognized as the most effective way to work to-
gether at sea.357 
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Russian Military Exercises 
 
Kavkaz-2012 
The September 2012 war games, dubbed Kavkaz-2012, were to focus on “pol-
ishing” the armed forces’ command and control units, which have received a 
lot of criticism over the past few years. Kavkaz-2012 was the largest Russian 
military exercise conducted in 2012. It was held in the area of the Southern 
Military Command.358 This time the size of the military exercise contingent 
involved about eight thousand personnel, was aided by up to 200 armoured 
vehicles, less than a hundred artillery systems, a group of ten warships and 
boats, as well as an unidentified number of frontline combat aircraft, helicop-
ters, and drones.  
 
In fact, as a gesture of goodwill the contingents in the Russian bases in Arme-
nia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not involved in the exercise. According 
to Deputy Chief of the General Staff Alexander Postnikov, this decision was 
taken in order not to heighten tension in the region. Moreover, the exercise 
was to be held far away from the Georgian border.359 
 
Ladoga-2012 
Pilots from the Western Military District flew on MiG-29SMT, MiG-31 and 
different modifications of Su-27 fighter aircraft during “Ladoga-2012” air 
force exercise on 9-15 April, 2012. Military airbases in north-western Russia 
(Karelian Republic, Kursk, Tver and Kaliningrad oblasts) were used in the 
exercise. About 50 aircraft and 100 pilots participated. Live firing (gun, rocket 
and missile) took place above Lake Ladoga and its shore area.360 
 
Air Force and Air Defence Exercise  
The Western Military District conducted also another tactical exercise on air 
defence brigade level in area of the Karelian republic, Murmansk, Leningrad 
and Tver regions in June 2012. The aircraft (Sukhoi Su-27 fighters and Sukhoi 
Su-24 fighter bombers) taking part in the exercise came from Khotilovo (Tver 
Region), Besovets (Karelian Republic) and Monchegorsk (Murmansk Region) 
airbases. In addition to flying units, the air defence missile brigades (S-300), 
radar and radio units formed the interception zone.361 
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Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Kola Peninsula 
On 25 October 2012, as part of a Command Post Exercise in the Western 
Military District, the coastal forces of the Northern Fleet made Russia’s first 
ever sea-borne landing on the shores of the uninhabited Kotelny Island. That 
was a part of a wide-ranging exercise which included all the Russian armed 
forces’ units deployed in the Kola Peninsula area.  
 
This was the first time that combat training of this kind focused on protecting 
civilian facilities – research stations, drilling facilities and energy-industry in-
stallations located in the Arctic region. These were the reasons why the large 
destroyer “Vice-Admiral Kulakov” and the heavy nuclear-powered battle 
cruiser “Pyotr Veliky” were stationed in coastal Arctic waters of the Northern 
Sea Route. More than 7000 military personnel and 150 objects of military 
equipment were involved in the CPX. Training exercises conducted in the 
military testing zones of the Barents Sea, the sub-Arctic areas of the Northern 
Sea Route, the coastal regions of the Pechenga Area in Murmansk Region, and 
on the Sredniy and Rybachiy Peninsulas.362 
 
138. Guard Detached Motor Rifle Brigade’s Exercise 
Under the command of the Western Military District the 138. Guard De-
tached Motor Rifle Brigade conducted in mid October a large exercise on lo-
cal firing range area on the Karelian Isthmus at Kamenka (in Finnish Perk-
järvi). More than 3000 troops, 150 military vehicles, army air force (incl. Mi-24 
attack helicopters and Su-24 bombers) took part in the exercise. More than 
one hundred generals and other high ranking officers of the Western Military 
District staffs and other formations also visited the exercise. The most impor-
tant training objects were to demonstrate strong heavy weapon fire and action 
against enemy’s reconnaissance groups.363 
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum up, there have been at least five exercises of medium or larger scale in 
the near vicinity of Finland in 2012, held by the Russian military. The Western 
Military District did not conduct any strategic level large-scale exercise in 
2012. The exercise intensity has in the last year, however, grown essentially 
because of the diversity of several medium-size local exercises (ground force, 
air force, navy, mobilization, inter-arms etc). Although Russia has, on the one 
hand, carried out constantly growing number of  different types of  military 
exercises on a yearly basis, it has, on the other hand, strongly criticized some 
neighbours which have held their own manoeuvres.364 
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 YHTEENVETO 
 
Geopolitiikan vahva paluu maailmanpolitiikkaan on tosiasia. Vaikutukset ulot-
tuvat myös Suomen lähialueelle. Neuvostoliiton/Venäjän vetäytyminen ase-
mistaan Varsovan liiton maissa ja Baltian maissa kylmän sodan loputtua oli 
muutoksen ensimmäinen vaihe, joka samalla osui Euroopan uuden ns. yhteis-
työvaraisen turvallisuusjärjestelmän rakentamisen aikaan ETY-järjestön puit-
teissa.  
 
Toinen vaihe, Venäjän uusi nousu entisen Neuvostoliiton maiden vaikutuspii-
riin, pääsi vauhtiin viime vuosikymmenen puolivälissä ja huipentui Georgian 
sotaan, Ukrainan ns. oranssin vallankumouksen kaatumiseen ja Valko-Venäjän 
laajempaan integrointiin Venäjän järjestelmiin. Maalle on tärkeää korjata epä-
edulliseksi kokemansa 1990-luvun ratkaisut. Venäjä tavoittelee suurvalta-
asemansa palauttamista.  
 
Vastakkainasettelu on siten jossain määrin palannut kuvaan mukaan ja euro-
atlanttisen turvallisuusjärjestelyn uskottavuus heikentynyt, vaikka sitä lännessä 
ei mielellään myönnetä. Yhtenä osoituksena tästä on Venäjän yritys kumota 
Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestön (ETYJ) tärkeimmät saavutukset, 
kuten Euroopan turvallisuuden peruskirjan sitoumukset vuodelta 1999. Venäjä 
pitää sotilasdoktriinissaan Natoa vaarana ja epäyhtenäinen Nato puolestaan 
Venäjää kumppanina.  
 
Länsi-Euroopassa alettiin kuitenkin 1990-luvulla pitää sodan uhkaa niin van-
hentuneena ajatuksena, että se mahdollisti Nato-maiden ja muiden länsimai-
den asevoimien poikkeuksellisen mittavan alasajon ja tehtävien suuntaamisen 
maanpuolustuksesta kriisienhallintaan. Samalla maiden sotilaallinen valmius 
heikkeni olennaisesti. 
 
Puolustusliitto Naton sisäiset vaikeudet korostuvat tilanteessa, jossa liiton tär-
keimmän jäsenen Yhdysvaltain intressit kohdistuvat yhä voimakkaammin Aa-
sian ja Tyynenmeren suuntaan. Yhdysvaltain taloudelliset resurssit kaventuvat 
ja erilaisten sitoumusten täyttäminen käy epävarmemmaksi. Asiaan vaikuttavat 
myös Yhdysvaltain perinteisten suurten eurooppalaisten liittolaisten teot ja 
asenteet. Nato-maa Saksan rooli on keskeinen ja erityisesti Saksan mutta myös 
Ranskan Venäjä-politiikka on herättänyt kysymyksiä. Suurten eurooppalaisten 
Nato-maiden sotilaalliset resurssit ovat kaventuneet nopeasti. 
 
Venäjän asevoimien uudistamisprosessin taustalta on selvästi nähtävissä pyr-
kimys vastata eri puolilla valtavaa valtakuntaa ilmeneviin erimuotoisiin haastei-
siin. Organisatorisesti on tehty ajan edellyttämiä muutoksia. Raskas ja kömpelö 
divisioonaorganisaatio on lännen tapaan saanut antaa tilaa joustavammalle pri-
kaatiorganisaatiolle. Vanhoista sotilaspiireistä on luovuttu ja niiden tilalle on 
tullut neljä operatiivis-strategista yhteisjohtoporrasta. Leningradin ja Mosko-
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van sotilaspiirit yhdistämällä muodostetun Läntisen sotilaspiirin esikunta on 
sijoitettu Pietariin. Tämän yhteisjohtoportaan alaisuuteen on liitetty myös Poh-
joinen ja Itämeren laivastot sekä koko uuden sotilaspiirin alueen ilmavoimat ja 
ilmapuolustus. Tämä on samalla osoitus painopisteen siirtymisestä läntisellä 
suunnalla Keski-Euroopasta luoteeseen. 
 
Venäjän rapautuneita asevoimia on ryhdytty modernisoimaan monipuolisesti 
vahvalla ja kasvavalla taloudellisella panostuksella, osittain myös Saksan ja 
Ranskan suoranaisella tuella. Vuoteen 2020 ulottuvalle varusteluohjelmalle on 
varattu yhteensä noin 20 biljoonaa ruplaa eli noin 500 miljardia euroa. Venäjän 
asevoimien kaluston laajamittainen sarjatuotanto on käynnistymässä ensi ker-
taa Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. Venäjän johdon päättäväisyys varuste-
lusuunnitelmien toteuttamisessa näkyy tulevien vuosien nopeasti kasvavissa 
puolustusmäärärahoissa. Ruotsin puolustusvoimien arvion mukaan Venäjän 
varusteluohjelma sujuu hyvin. 
 
Varusmiespalvelusta ei luovuta ainakaan seuraavien 10−15 vuoden aikana, mi-
kä takaa maalle usean miljoonan miehen koulutetun reservin, joista 700 000 
voidaan mobilisoida nopeasti. Vaikka Venäjä kehittää asevoimiaan ennen muu-
ta alueellista sodankäyntikykyä varten, se varautuu myös jatkossa äärimmäisenä 
vaihtoehtona suurimittaiseen sotaan. Suurta reserviä tarvitaan erityisesti itäisel-
lä suunnalla. Sitä on teknisesti mahdollista käyttää myös miehitysjoukkona.  
 
On ilmeistä, että Venäjä tarvitsee läntisellä suunnalla pieniä, joustavia, hyvin 
koulutettuja ja korkeassa perusvalmiudessa olevia tehokkaita iskujoukkoja joil-
la on kyky saavuttaa operatiivisia tuloksia suoraan rauhan ajan ryhmityksestä. 
Tämä visio on uuden venäläisen sotatieteellisen ajattelun tulosta, ja se korostaa 
sotien alkuvaiheiden ratkaisevaa merkitystä, mutta myös ensimmäisen strategi-
sen iskun, mukaan lukien ennalta ehkäisevien toimien tärkeyttä. 
 
Joukkoja voidaan tarvittaessa vahventaa nopeasti. Nato-maiden alueellisen 
puolustuksen alasajo ja toisaalta Venäjän korkeassa valmiudessa olevien jouk-
kojen kehittäminen ovat aiheuttaneet hämmennystä ja epävarmuutta lähialu-
eellamme ja itäisen Keski-Euroopan valtioissa. 
 
Venäjän joukkojen määrä entisen Leningradin sotilaspiirin alueella on vaihdel-
lut merkittävästi Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. Vuosituhannen alun suur-
ten joukkojen supistusten jälkeen suunta on taas muuttunut nousujohteiseksi. 
Venäjän asevoimien harjoitusaktiviteetti on selvästi vilkastunut. 
 
Venäjän 6. Armeijan esikunta johtanee Suomen itä- ja kaakkoispuolella olevia 
maavoimien joukkoja. Vuonna 2010 perustettiin uusi moottoroitu jalkaväki-
prikaati Pietarin eteläpuolelle. Se kuulunee kaavailtuihin korkean valmiuden 
joukkoihin. Kannaksella on valmiudessa maan valioyksiköihin kuuluva moot-
toroitu jalkaväkiprikaati Kamenkassa. Pietarin pohjoispuolella, Sertolovossa 
olevasta kalustovarastosta voidaan tarvittaessa perustaa prikaati. Prikaateja tu-
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keva helikopteriyksikkö sijaitsee myös Karjalan kannaksella. Runsaasta, jouk-
koja tukevasta tykistöstä mainittakoon raskas raketinheitinprikaati, jonka heit-
timien kantama on yli 80 kilometriä. 
 
Varsin merkittävä potentiaalin lisäys on uusien 450–700 kilometrin kantaman 
omaavien Iskander-M -ohjusten sijoittaminen Lugaan, Pietarin eteläpuolella 
olevaan tykistöohjusprikaatiin. Ne edustavat doktriinissakin mainittua täsmä-
aseistusta ja niiden kantama kattaa Baltian ohella pääosan Suomen alueesta. 
Iskander-M voidaan varustaa monipuolisilla tavanomaisilla taistelukärjillä ja 
tarvittaessa myös ydinkärjillä.  
 
Iskander-ohjusjärjestelmälle on Venäjän puolustussuunnittelussa kaavailtu se-
kä tärkeä ydinpeloterooli että tehokas hyökkäyksellinen rooli eri puolilla maata. 
Taktiset ballistiset ohjukset ja risteilyohjukset ovat ottamassa yhä lisääntyvän 
operatiivis-taktisen roolin ja täydentävät rynnäkköilmavoimia erinomaisesti. 
Maan sotilasviranomaisilla on suuria odotuksia tämän ohjuksen suhteen.  
 
Strategisen iskun suorittamisen kannalta Lugan Iskander-tykistö-ohjusprikaati 
on olennaisen tärkeä. Sen täsmäiskuja saatettaisiin käyttää ilmavoimien ohella 
vastustajan puolustusjärjestelmän lamauttamiseen käyttäen hyväksi tämän al-
haista valmiutta. 
 
Pihkovan alueella toimii ilmarynnäkködivisioona sekä erikoisjoukkojen (spets-
naz) prikaati. Petsamossa on yksi moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati sekä merijalka-
väkiprikaati. Myös näiden joukkojen valmiusvaatimus on vain tuntiluokkaa. 
Arktisiin oloihin soveltuva Spetsnaz-erikoisjoukoista koottava Arktinen prikaa-
ti perustetaan myös Petsamoon, Venäjän maavoimien komentaja ilmoitti maa-
liskuussa 2011. Suunnitelmat on sittemmin lykätty vuoteen 2015. On ennenai-
kaista sanoa, onko kyseessä täysin uusi yksikkö. 
 
Sallan itäpuolella sijaitsevaa Alakurtin lentotukikohtaa kunnostetaan ja sinne 
sijoitettaneen uusittu helikopterirykmentti. Sen kalusto käsittää rynnäkköheli-
koptereita ja aseistettuja kuljetus-helikoptereita. Alueella olevasta kalustovaras-
tosta perustettaneen moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati, jota helikopterirykmentti 
voi tukea. Myös Petroskoissa sijaitsevasta kalustovarastosta voidaan perustaa 
ainakin yksi prikaati, jonka kykyä demonstroitiin liikekannallepano- ja taistelu-
harjoituksessa syyskuussa 2012. 
 
Lehtusiin, Pietarin pohjoispuolelle on valmistunut tehokas tutka-asema mm. 
antamaan ennakkovaroitusta mahdollisesta strategisesta ohjushyökkäyksestä. 
Lisäksi Suursaaressa on jälleen pitkähkön tauon jälkeen rakennettu uusi ilma-
valvontatutka-asema. Suomenlahden ohella se tulee kattamaan muun muassa 
Viron ja koko eteläisen Suomen ilmatilan. 
 
1. Ilmavoima- ja ilmapuolustusalueella, Pohjoisen laivaston ja Itämeren laivas-
ton ilmavoimilla on yhteensä yli 200 erityyppistä taistelulentokonetta, toista 
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sataa taisteluhelikopteria ja vastaava määrä aseistettavia kuljetushelikoptereita 
sekä paljon muita erikois- ja kuljetuskoneita. Alueelle tukeutuu lisäksi eräitä 
muita ilmavoimien yksiköitä. 
 
Venäjän ilmavoimat ovat kaikkialla nopeasti mobilisoitavissa ja yksiköt ovat 
jatkuvassa valmiudessa ja täydessä sodan ajan kokoonpanossa. Niitä voidaan 
siirtää lyhyessä ajassa kaukaakin halutulle kohdealueelle. 
 
Uusia raskaita S-400-ilmatorjuntaohjuksia, joita aiemmin oli operatiivisina vain 
Moskovan suojana, on nyt myös sijoitettu Kaliningradiin. Lugan Iskander-
ohjusten ohella myös tämä on vahva poliittinen signaali. S-400 voisi kriisitilan-
teessa vaikeuttaa toimimista Itämeren alueen ilmatilassa merkittävästi ja käy-
tännössä ehkä sulkea ilmatilan täysin. Asia vaikuttaa suoraan kysymykseen Bal-
tian maiden puolustamisesta, josta erityisesti Ruotsissa on kannettu huolta.  
 
Ruotsin sotatiedeakatemian Nationell strategi för närområdet -tutkimushankkeen 
yksi merkittävä tulos oli, että Nato todennäköisesti ei ehtisi reagoida kyllin no-
peasti mahdollisessa sotilaallisessa konfliktissa Baltian maissa, vaan joutuisi 
tapahtuneiden tosiasioiden eteen. 
 
Venäjällä on julkisuudessa esitetty yhä enemmän arvioita Suomen kuulumises-
ta Venäjän etupiiriin ja vastustettu yhä selvemmin Suomen Nato-jäsenyyttä ja 
pohjoismaista puolustusyhteistyötä. 
 
Suomen puolustusvoimien päätehtävänä pysyy oman maan puolustaminen. 
Valitun alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän rauhan ajan valmius on matala. Tä-
män tulisi olla ympäristöä rauhoittava elementti, mutta samalla se asettaa suu-
ria vaatimuksia valmiuden kohottamisjärjestelyille. 
 
Suomen puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan vahvuus on Euroopan pienimpiä, noin 
30 000 henkilöä. Erityisesti rauhan ajan maavoimat on käytännössä koulutus-
organisaatio. Taistelujoukot muodostetaan vasta reserviläisistä perustamalla.  
 
Harhaanjohtavia, puutteellisia ja tarkoitushakuisilta vaikuttavia ovat vertailut, 
joissa Suomen täyden liikekannallepanon edellyttämää vahvuutta, 230 000, 
verrataan väestöltään moninkertaisten, pinta-alaltaan paljon pienempien ja 
geopoliittiselta asemaltaan kokonaan toisenlaisten maiden ammattiarmeijoiden 
rauhan ajan vahvuuksiin. 
 
Suomen alue on suuri ja reserviä tarvitaan paljon lukuisien kohteiden suojaa-
miseen koko valtakunnan alueella sekä korvaamaan liikekannallepanon hävik-
kejä ja ensi-iskuissa aiheutuvia tappioita. Koko vuosittaisen ikäluokan koulut-
taminen on tarpeen jos aiotaan saada riittävästi yksiköitä. Suuri reservi on 
osoitus maanpuolustustahdosta ja siitä, että vastarintaa on tarkoitus jatkaa jopa 
maahantunkeutumisen jälkeen. Tämän ennaltaehkäisevä arvo on suuri. 
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